{"title":"Titelseiten","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/agph-2023-frontmatter3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2023-frontmatter3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135320058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jones, Tom. George Berkeley: A Philosophical Life. Princeton / Oxford: Princeton University Press 2021, xxi + 622 pp.","authors":"Manuel Fasko","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43151760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Johansen, Thomas Kjeller (ed.). Productive Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy: The Concept of Technê. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2021, xiv + 316 pp.","authors":"Marilù Papandreou","doi":"10.1515/agph-2023-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2023-0009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45435200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Titelseiten","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/agph-2023-frontmatter2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2023-frontmatter2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136000556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"« Le mouvement semble faire partie des continus » : les commentateurs anciens sur Aristote, Phys. III 1, 200b16–17","authors":"Giovanna R. Giardina","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-0015","url":null,"abstract":"Résumé Dans cet article, j’analyse quelques passages des Commentaires sur la Physique de Simplicius, Philopon et Thémistius afin de : 1) démontrer que ces commentateurs interprètent la phrase d’Aristote, Phys. III 1, 200b16-17, comme affirmant que « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement ; 2) identifier la raison pour laquelle ils pensent que parler du mouvement naturel revient à dire que le mouvement est continu, et que, par conséquent, quand Aristote évoque le continu dès le début de sa théorie sur le mouvement, il ne fait qu’affirmer quelque chose d’évident ; 3) montrer que si l’analogie selon laquelle « continu » est un terme définitoire du mouvement, tout comme « mouvement » est un terme définitoire de la nature et « infini » un terme définitoire du continu, n’est pas parfaite (en effet « continu » n’apparaît pas explicitement dans la définition du mouvement), ceci est dû à l’impossibilité de subsumer le mouvement sous une catégorie de l’être. Pour appuyer ce dernier point, j’utilise une citation d’Alexandre par Simplicius, et un passage de Philopon.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46614520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moser, Aloisia, Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Performativity of Thought. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 2021, xv + 158 pp.","authors":"Jan Podacker","doi":"10.1515/agph-2023-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2023-0006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49303221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mathematics First: Russell’s Methodological Response to Bradley","authors":"O. Spinney","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article I examine the dispute between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell concerning the reality of relations. I show that Bradley’s objections to Russell’s view, that there are such things as relations which serve to effect the unity of complex items, were rooted in a methodological approach which Russell did not share. On Bradley’s view, one must be able to offer reductive analyses of the items one postulates in order that commitment to those items be justified. I argue that Russell expressly rejected this methodological principle of Bradley’s, and instead adopted the view that one may justifiably postulate entities if doing so aids in the illumination of mathematical truths. I show that the postulation of relations does, on Russell’s view, serve to provide that illumination. Russell held that the truths of mathematics constitute fixed data, and that philosophical positions may be judged as successful according to the extent that they possess explanatory power with respect to this data. I argue that Bradley’s and Russell’s exchanges in print, as well as in private correspondence, reflect Russell’s awareness of a fundamental difference in methodological approach. I conclude that Russell elected not to answer Bradley’s objections on their own terms, but rather rejected the methodological assumptions from which those objections emerged.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43742605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Schofield, Malcolm, Cicero: Political Philosophy. Oxford / New York:: Oxford University Press 2021, xiv + 285 pp.","authors":"Raphael Woolf","doi":"10.1515/agph-2023-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2023-0005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"105 1","pages":"349 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46883807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Trivial Source of Wonder: Some Mathematical Examples in Plato’s Dialogues","authors":"Laura Marongiu","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0161","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The purpose of this paper is to reassess some mathematical examples in Plato’s dialogues which at a first glance may appear to be nothing more than trivial puzzles. In order to provide the necessary background for this analysis, I shall begin by sketching a brief overview of Plato’s mathematical passages and discuss the criteria for aptly selecting them. Second, I shall explain what I mean by ‘mathematical examples,’ and reflect on their function in light of the discussion on παραδείγματα outlined in the Sophist and the Statesman. Against this framework, I shall move to a close examination of specific examples drawn from the Theaetetus (154c–55d), the Republic (523c–24d), and the Phaedo (96d–97b, 100e–101d). By placing these examples in the broader context of pre-Euclidean mathematics, I shall show that their mathematical content is often less elementary than might appear at first sight. Moreover, by placing emphasis on the specific philosophical concerns that motivated their introduction, I shall argue that the examples are not merely nonsensical jokes. Even if their illustrative purpose is not always immediately clear, and even if they can sound playful and bizarre, they in fact fulfil an important function: by virtue of their power to generate wonder or confusion, they serve as exercises and act as a trigger with respect to the difficult philosophical issues they are intended to clarify.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46855446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Warding off the Evil Eye: Peer Envy in Rawls’s Just Society","authors":"J. Pearson","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-0048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-0048","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article critically analyzes Rawls’s attitude toward envy. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is predominantly concerned with the threat that class envy poses to political stability. Yet he also briefly discusses the kind of envy that individuals experience toward their social peers, which he calls particular envy, and which I refer to as peer envy. He quickly concludes, however, that particular envy would not present a serious risk to the stability of his just society. In this article, I contest this claim by arguing that the principles that structure Rawls’s ideal society are likely to exacerbate particular envy to a politically risky extent. Section 1 reconstructs his account of envy, giving special attention to his belief that competition kindles envy between peers. Section 2 then examines the way in which Rawls often endorses rivalry within the body politic. I argue that the society governed by justice as fairness is, on account of this rivalry, likely to generate a politically problematic degree of particular envy. In Section 3, I invoke ancient Greece as an example of a society that was, as a result of its intense competitiveness, often imperiled by dangerously elevated levels of peer envy. I then survey the key institutional mechanisms by which the ancient Greeks sought to manage this hazardous emotion. It turns out, however, that most of these mechanisms would be unavailable to Rawls insofar as they starkly contravene his principles of justice. I conclude that if Rawlsians wish to establish a society that fosters rivalry, they would do well to reflect on the means by which peer envy can be effectively harnessed.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42851511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}