IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01007-z

Rafal K. Stepien

引用次数: 0

Unlimited Nature: A Śaivist Model of Divine Greatness 无限的自然：神圣伟大的圣雄模式

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01005-1

Davide Andrea Zappulli

{"title":"Unlimited Nature: A Śaivist Model of Divine Greatness","authors":"Davide Andrea Zappulli","doi":"10.1007/s11841-024-01005-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01005-1","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of maximal greatness is arguably part of the very concept of God: something greater than God is not even possible. But how should we understand this notion? The aim of this paper is to provide a Śaivist answer to this question by analyzing the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition. First, I extract a model of divine greatness, the Hierarchical Model, from Nagasawa’s work Maximal God. According to the Hierarchical Model, God is that than which nothing could be greater by virtue of being better suited than all other beings in relation to certain great-making properties (§1). I then offer an analysis of the form of theism advocated in the Pratyabhijñā tradition by discussing passages from the works of Somānanda, the founder of the Pratyabhijñā school, and of Utpaladeva, the most prominent of Somānanda’s disciples. I argue that the Pratyabhijñā theist cannot account for divine greatness in terms of the Hierarchical Model. My argument is that the Hierarchical Model requires a comparison between God and other beings that cannot be made with the Pratyabhijñā God (§2). Finally, I develop an original alternative model, the Unlimited Nature Model, that accounts for God’s maximal greatness in a way that suits Pratyabhijñā’s theism. According to the Unlimited Nature Model, the nature of all ordinary beings is metaphysically limited as a result of realizing only a small portion of the potential of what could be, and God is maximally great because only he has a completely unlimited nature (§3).","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139945483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Would God Really Send Me to Hell for Stealing a Wispa Bar? 上帝真的会因为我偷了一根威斯巴巧克力棒就把我送进地狱吗？

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01002-4

Nikk Effingham

引用次数: 0

A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil 斯特巴自然邪恶问题的自然神论

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01004-2

Dwayne Moore

{"title":"A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil","authors":"Dwayne Moore","doi":"10.1007/s11841-024-01004-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01004-2","url":null,"abstract":"In a series of writings, James Sterba introduces several novel arguments from evil against the existence of God (Sterba, 2019; Sterba Sophia 59, 501–512, 2020; Sterba International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, 203–208, 2020b; Sterba International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87, 223–228, 2020c; Sterba Religions 12, 536, 2021). According to one of these arguments, the problem of natural evil, God must necessarily prevent the horrendous evil consequences of natural evil such as diseases and hurricanes; however, these horrendous evil consequences of natural evils still occur, so God does not exist. In this paper, I reply to Sterba’s argument from natural evil by introducing a naturalistic theodicy, and then demonstrating how it overcomes Sterba’s problem of natural evil.This paper is divided into five sections. First, I unpack Sterba’s problem of natural evil into three parts (Section 1), namely, Sterba’s moral obligation claim about humans, Sterba’s moral obligation claim about non-human life, and Sterba’s arguments from analogy. I then introduce a general naturalistic theodicy to the problem of natural evil (Section 2): naturalists grant that natural forces (entropy, evolutionary pressures, tectonic plate movements, etc.) cause horrendous consequences of natural evil, yet still consider human life in the universe a good better than humans are entitled to, so, if God made this naturalistic universe, God made human life in the universe a good better than humans are entitled to. I then use this naturalistic theodicy to reply to Sterba’s moral obligation claim about humans (Section 3), before bolstering the case by appeal to Sterba’s moral obligation claims about non-human life (Section 4). I then reply to Sterba’s arguments from analogy (Section 5).","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139918737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

‘Metaphysics of the Exodus’: Debating Platonic Versus Christian Traces in St Thomas’ Concept of Being 出埃及记的形而上学"：辩论圣托马斯存在概念中的柏拉图痕迹与基督教痕迹

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01006-0

Manuel Alejandro Serra Pérez

引用次数: 0

The Law of Non-contradiction and Global Philosophy of Religion 不矛盾律与全球宗教哲学

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01001-5

{"title":"The Law of Non-contradiction and Global Philosophy of Religion","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11841-024-01001-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01001-5","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> This article focuses on the applications of philosophical logic in the discipline of philosophy of religion of both ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ traditions, in which the problem of apparent ontological contradictions can be found. A number of philosophers have proposed using the work of those non-classical logicians who countenance the violation of the law of non-contradiction (LNC) to address this problem. I discuss (1) whether classical or non-classical account of logic is universal in applying to all true theories, and (2) whether there might be extra-logical considerations which affect what is the correct account of logic for the doctrines in question. With regard to Jc Beall’s application of non-classical (FDE) logic to the doctrine of the Incarnation, I argue using the evidence from the writings of church fathers that the meaning of negation found in the core claims of the doctrine of the Incarnation should not be interpreted in accordance with Beall’s FDE account, and that this extra-logical consideration refutes Beall’s project. Moreover, the FDE’s acceptance of the possibility of statements that are both true and false is contrary to what is allowed by the definition of negation in classical logic; therefore (contrary to Beall), Beall is in fact using a different definition of negation compared with the definition used by the classical account. I develop this point in interaction with contemporary philosophy of religion literature and explain its implications and significance for this discipline.","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139760461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Truth in Metaphor: an Exploration into Indian Aesthetics 隐喻中的真理：印度美学探索

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-09 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-023-00995-8

Arundhati Mukherji

引用次数: 0

Rescuing the (Open) Theistic Multiverse Against Two Recent Challenges 拯救（开放的）有神论多元宇宙，应对最近的两大挑战

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-024-01003-3

Kirk Lougheed, Timothy Blank

{"title":"Rescuing the (Open) Theistic Multiverse Against Two Recent Challenges","authors":"Kirk Lougheed, Timothy Blank","doi":"10.1007/s11841-024-01003-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-024-01003-3","url":null,"abstract":"One theistic account of creation says that God created the best possible world in the form of a multiverse containing all and only all of the universes sufficiently good enough to create. Certain proponents of this view urge that it solves the problem of no best world and need not commit one to affirming divine middle knowledge. We address two recent challenges to the (open) theistic multiverse. First, Marshall Naylor argues that what he calls the Cantorian account of divine creation is better than any theistic multiverse account because it provides more satisfying answers to a number of philosophical problems (2020). Second, Elliot Crozat criticizes the open theistic multiverse by arguing that if God lacks middle knowledge, God cannot know infallibly that the universe token he creates will be the right type (i.e., sufficiently good enough for inclusion in the multiverse) (2019). We show that Naylor’s alternative violates incredibly strong moral intuitions and that Crozat’s objection fails to appreciate that on open theism God still knows all the possible future outcomes. Theistic multiverse accounts of divine creation in general, and one cojoined with open theism in particular, remain unscathed in the face of the criticisms offered by Naylor and Crozat.","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139759783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Heidegger and the Riddle of the Early Greeks’ Encounter with das Asiatische 海德格尔与早期希腊人接触亚洲之谜

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-023-00998-5

{"title":"Heidegger and the Riddle of the Early Greeks’ Encounter with das Asiatische","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11841-023-00998-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00998-5","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> From the 1920s to the 1960s, Martin Heidegger on several occasions referred to the early Greeks’ encounter with what he called ‘the Asiatic’ (das Asiatische). Meanwhile, he was also concerned with a sort of ontological power of destruction and ruination that according to him should be understood in the Greek sense, which he also called das Asiatische. In this article, I first sketch the contributions made by Asian/African traditions to the origin of Greek philosophy and highlight Heidegger’s own recognition of it in the 1920s. Second, I examine Nietzsche’s remarks bearing on the early Greeks’ intricate bond with the Asiatic, which is formulated in terms of a distinction between the ‘Dionysiac Greeks’ and the ‘Dionysiac barbarians.’ Third, I scrutinize Heidegger’s relevant statements—especially those in the 1930s—in the light of Nietzsche’s influence on him. I argue that two different meanings of the Asiatic are at play in Heidegger’s thought: One is the Greek Asiatic, the Being-historical Asiatic; The other is the alien Asiatic, ‘the most foreign and most difficult’ Asiatic, which has been overcome by the Greeks. Fourth, I show that in the 1960s Heidegger seems to consider a sort of conflation of these two meanings—a conflation that remains fraught with tension.","PeriodicalId":44736,"journal":{"name":"Sophia","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139515688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Mātṛkā Dance: Conceptualizing the Dancing Body of the Goddess 玛特卡舞蹈：将女神的舞姿概念化

IF 0.3 3区哲学

Sophia Pub Date : 2024-01-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-023-00988-7

Ana Laura Funes Maderey

引用次数: 0

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