{"title":"Golden Rules of Wages","authors":"A. Young, Hernando Zuleta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2329801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2329801","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a neoclassical growth model where labor collectively chooses the labor share to maximize its steady-state wage rate. If the labor share increases relative to the competitive share, labor captures a larger share of a smaller total income. At a higher labor share the incentives to invest are lower and the steady-state capital to labor ratio is lower. We derive the golden rule of wages: set labor share equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor. This is precisely the competitive outcome. We also consider the model with two types of labor: organized and unorganized. In this case, organized labor may choose a higher than competitive income share. Relative to the Cobb-Douglas case, when the elasticity of substitution is less than unity the chosen organized labor share is higher. We also analyze a version of the model that incorporates a tradeoff between collective bargaining opportunities and skill acquisition.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116929309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mainstream Economics in the Early 21st Century: What, How and How Far","authors":"Hernán Vallejo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2159475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2159475","url":null,"abstract":"This essay defines economics as a social science characterized by a particular and evolving way of thinking, and explores its scope and limitations. It is argued that economics has a strong normative nature and that it is ideological by construction. Thus, economics is better suited to improve our understanding of economic phenomena, contribute to solve better current problems and generate a sufficiently large and lasting consensus, than to prove anything for sure. Some reasons for persistent differences among economists are trade-offs, problems measuring economic variables and deficient definitions for key concepts. Thus, economics education should seek constructing explicitly the economics way of thinking and maintaining focus on optimal policy intervention, while its practice should aim at clarity, transparency, tractability, consistency, replicability, applicability, relevance and responsibility.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127475722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Provision of Public Goods: Neutrality and Wealth-Dependent Preferences","authors":"Oskar Nupia","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2104425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2104425","url":null,"abstract":"Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130287487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Peer Effects, Cooperation and Competition in Human Capital Formation","authors":"R. Zárate","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2104234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2104234","url":null,"abstract":"Economic literature has identified positive effects of peer abilities on individual achievement. However, the intuitive arguments supporting this evidence are not clear. This article presents a specific mechanism: cooperation and competition among group members; more precisely, the presence of positive and negative externalities in human capital accumulation. First, I develop an economic model that incorporates both kinds of externalities and shows the existence of an optimal level of competition between group members that maximizes human capital accumulation. Then, using data from PISA (2000) and an empirical strategy that controls for potential endogeneity issues, I find empirical evidence supporting the main results of the theoretical model. Namely, I find robust evidence of a non-linear effect of competition on academic performance. These results are consistent with the proposed model and the presence of positive technological externalities in educational production functions.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128054369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cooperation Under Fear, Greed and Prison: The Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation","authors":"César A. Mantilla","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2104254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2104254","url":null,"abstract":"This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from leaving mutual defection are associated to fear dimension. The manipulation of these dimensions allows defining two cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, is shown that the magnitude and the direction of these inequalities have an effect over the decision of cooperation.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125046459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"'Out of Sight, Out of Mind': Modern Economics, Social Interactions, and Smith’s Sympathy","authors":"Andrés Álvarez, Jimena Hurtado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2008418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2008418","url":null,"abstract":"After having reviewed some of the recent advances in Economics trying to incorporate new elements in our understanding of human interactions, we aim at contributing to this line of research using Adam Smith´s system of sympathy. The features Smithattributes to the intersubjective identification mechanism of sympathy lead not only to conceive the construction of a community but also the possibility of exclusion of some of its members. The asymmetry of sympathy allows explaining emulationof those seen as more fortunate as well as the exclusion of those perceived as miserable. Through a formal representation we try to illustrate the phenomena of inclusion and exclusion present in intersubjetive relations and the construction of communities.Keywords: Adam Smith, sympathy, emulation, exclusion.JEL Codes: B12, B31, D03.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134396761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Endogeneity of Inflation Targeting: Preferences Over Inflation","authors":"N. de Roux, M. Hofstetter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1862210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1862210","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last quarter of a century, inflation targeting has become a popular monetary regime. Nevertheless, empirical evaluations of IT have shown contradictory results. Part of the reason is that IT in and of itself constitutes an endogenous decision and thus needs to be properly instrumented. In this paper, we show that preferences over inflation constitute a crucial determinant of IT: countries exhibiting greater inflation aversion are more likely to adopt IT.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123687331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Devolution and Accountability Effects in the Public Provision of Water Services in Indonesia","authors":"C. Rodríguez, Patricia Meirelles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1755050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1755050","url":null,"abstract":"This paper separately evaluates how devolution and accountability, two distinct aspects of the decentralization reforms implemented in Indonesia in the year 2001, influenced the public provision of water services. Using household level data it is found that the devolution of responsibility does not necessarily affect the provision of public services. Our findings show that the quality of publicly provided water decreased only in cities in which devolution was accompanied by a change in accountability. Robustness checks suggest that these results are driven by changes in the accountability framework rather than trends in the health services.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"31 15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132137939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miguel Andrés Espinosa, Juan David Prada Sarmiento
{"title":"Identities for Homogeneous Utility Functions","authors":"Miguel Andrés Espinosa, Juan David Prada Sarmiento","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1705480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705480","url":null,"abstract":"Using a homogeneous and continuous utility function that represents a household's preferences, this paper proves explicit identities between most of the different objects that arise from the utility maximization and the expenditure minimization problems. The paper also outlines the homogeneity properties of each object. Finally, we show explicit algebraic ways to go from the indirect utility function to the expenditure function and from the Marshallian demand to the Hicksian demand and vice versa, without the need of any other function, thus simplifying the integrability problem avoiding the use of differential equations.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124638083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intermediate Econometrics: Theory and Application (Fundamentos de Econometría Intermedia: Teoría y Aplicaciones) (Spanish)","authors":"Jorge Andres Perdomo Calvo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1586448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1586448","url":null,"abstract":"Econometrics is the area of statistics concerned in analyzing economic data, for both economic and business applications. This document, introduces the intermediate concepts of this area, for students already familiarized with basic econometric theory. In particular, topics concerning endogenity, simultaneous equation models, time series and panel data, are discussed. One special contribution of these class notes is that both theory and applications, using Stata® statistical software package, are developed.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"17 8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125789774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}