公共物品的私人供给:中立性和财富依赖偏好

Oskar Nupia
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引用次数: 0

摘要

几位作者研究了所谓的中立定理的边界,其中公共产品是私人提供的。沿着这条分析路线,我在本文中进一步研究了这个结果的界。我专注于现有文献中一个未被探索的案例——即个人对公共产品的偏好受到各自个人财富水平的影响。我证明在这种情况下,中性定理不再成立。更吸引人的是,我讨论了财富再分配可能提高公共产品总供给效率的条件。有趣的是,我们发现财富从对公共物品估值低的个人再分配给对公共物品估值高的人并不一定会增加公共物品的总供给。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Private Provision of Public Goods: Neutrality and Wealth-Dependent Preferences
Several authors have investigated the bounds of the so-called neutrality theorem where public goods are privately provided. Following this line of analysis, I investigate further in this paper the bounds of this result. I concentrate on an unexplored case in the existing literature- namely that where individual preferences for a public good are affected by respective levels of individual wealth. I prove that under such circumstances, the neutrality theorem no longer holds. More appealing, I discuss the conditions under which a redistribution of wealth might improve efficiency in the aggregate provision of public goods. Interestingly, we find that a redistribution of wealth from individuals who have a low valuation for public goods to those who have a high valuation for public goods does not necessarily increase its aggregate provision.
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