发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Knowing, Knowing Perspicuously, and Knowing How One Knows 知、明、明
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-19 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000145
G. Longworth
{"title":"Knowing, Knowing Perspicuously, and Knowing How One Knows","authors":"G. Longworth","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000145","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Knowing and Seeing, Michael Ayers presents a view of what he calls primary knowledge according to which one who knows in that way both knows perspicuously and knows how they know. Here, I use some general considerations about seeing, knowing, and knowing how one knows in order to raise some questions about this view. More specifically, I consider some putative limits on one’s capacity to know how one knows. The main question I pursue concerns whether perspicuity should be thought of either (i) as a condition of sensory experience, (ii) as a condition of sense-based cognition, or (iii) as an interface condition, involving interrelations between sensory experience and sense-based cognition.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49105262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
At Work in the Fields of the True 在真实的领域中工作
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-19 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000149
C. Travis
{"title":"At Work in the Fields of the True","authors":"C. Travis","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000149","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and ‘propositional’ (awareness-that), and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers’ view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44183718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Thing before Us 摆在我们面前的事
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-11-19 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000150
Sofia Miguens, Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum
{"title":"The Thing before Us","authors":"Sofia Miguens, Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000150","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article the authors identify and analyse points of agreement and disagreement between Michael Ayers and Charles Travis, starting from their views on ‘things before us’. The authors then try to spell out what separates these philosophers in matters concerning perception, knowledge and language. In spite of their both being self-professed realists, equally critical of conceptualism and representationalism, Ayers’ empiricism and Travis’ anti-empiricism lead them to different positions in these three areas. It is shown that in the case of Ayers they hinge on “ordinary” objects and a KK principle (knowledge that and how we know), whereas in the case of Travis they are articulated around occasion-sensitivity and anti-psychologism.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44444841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Non-uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims 非均相论与哲学上有趣的模态主张的认识论
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-15 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000146
Ylwa Sjölin Wirling
{"title":"Non-uniformism and the Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting Modal Claims","authors":"Ylwa Sjölin Wirling","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000146","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46974153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Governing Laws and the Inference Problem 支配律和推理问题
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000138
Stavros Ioannidis, Vassilis Livanios, S. Psillos
{"title":"Governing Laws and the Inference Problem","authors":"Stavros Ioannidis, Vassilis Livanios, S. Psillos","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000138","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000How do non-Humean laws govern regularities in nature? According to the Inference Problem, non-Humean accounts of governing face a central problem: it is not clear how such laws do perform their governing function. Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that the introduction of a law-to-regularity axiom is sufficient to solve the Inference Problem. The authors argue that Schaffer’s solution faces a devastating dilemma: either the required axiom cannot, on its own, differentiate the non-Humean account from a Humean account of laws or, if more content is added to the primitive governing posit, it should be shown how and why the ‘outfitted’ posit obtains in the world. Furthermore, the authors show that those cases that Schaffer presents to motivate his approach are not analogous to the case of lawhood and so they cannot provide justification for his axiomatic solution.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42312127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Blameworthiness and Time 罪责与时间
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000137
I. Haji
{"title":"Blameworthiness and Time","authors":"I. Haji","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000137","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The following theses concerning moral obligation are widely accepted. Future Obligation: it is possible that at some time you are morally obligated to do something that you have not yet done but will do at a future time. Obligation-Changeability: it is possible that although it is obligatory, at some specified time, for you to do something later, at a time pursuant to this specified time you no longer have this obligation. The author argues that analogous theses concerning moral blameworthiness are true too: it’s possible that you may now be blameworthy for something you have not yet done but will do, and that blameworthiness can change with the passage of time.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48495574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers 未来的自我和现在的道德哲学家
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000139
Jakob Lohmar
{"title":"Future Selves and Present Moral Philosophers","authors":"Jakob Lohmar","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000139","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors in such cases, moral philosophers are epistemic superiors in moral matters more generally since their epistemic advantages are even more significant. The author concludes by arguing that moral philosophers plausibly even qualify as moral experts.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43025870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Extended-Expert-As-Teacher (EEAT) Model 扩展专家即教师（EEAT）模型
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000141
Joseph E. Blado
{"title":"The Extended-Expert-As-Teacher (EEAT) Model","authors":"Joseph E. Blado","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000141","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this article, the author argues for, and expands upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, the author proposes that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, the author shows the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, he argues the expert-as-teacher model can overcome its weaknesses by adding what he calls the “Authority Clause”, “Advisor Clause”, and “Ex Post Facto Clause” of the EEAT model. After developing a robust account of these clauses, the author entertains three major objections. First, he responds to the charge that the EEAT model is little better than the expert-as-authority model. Second, he responds to a double-counting objection. Lastly, he responds to a pragmatic objection from complexity.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42419914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reasons to Be Rational 理性的理由
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000142
Jens Gillessen
{"title":"Reasons to Be Rational","authors":"Jens Gillessen","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000142","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In the wake of Kolodny (2005) and Raz (2005), the normativity of rationality has become the topic of an intricate debate: what normative reasons are there, if any, to be rational? This article explains what kinds of ‘reasons to be rational’ there are. It then argues that, while we often have reason to be rationally disposed, rationality is neither itself normative nor necessarily underwritten by normative reasons – at any rate not when construed as conformance with coherence requirements. Allegedly omnipresent reasons to be coherent are shown to be ‘ghost-like’: hard to disprove, and yet irrational to believe in. This conclusion is rendered persuasive with scenarios featuring rewards for violating coherence constraints. The article also deals with the long-standing objection that such ‘irrationality rewards’ would be reasons ‘of the wrong kind’. Furthermore, Kolodny’s explanation of why rationality has the appearance of being normative is replaced with a more credible ‘error theory’.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44589517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective 建构摩尔式的“开放问题”论证：真实的思想运动与真实的目标
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000140
N. Shackel
{"title":"Constructing a Moorean ‘Open Question’ Argument: The Real Thought Move and the Real Objective","authors":"N. Shackel","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000140","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. The author’s purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, he does not claim to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, the author offers a reconstruction, making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the argument is played by what the author calls the real thought move. He shows that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. The author finishes by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and showing how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45912566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信