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Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy最新文献

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Performatives Selbstbewusstsein, written by Stefan Lang 执行Selbstbewusstsein，作者:Stefan Lang
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000132
Maik Niemeck
{"title":"Performatives Selbstbewusstsein, written by Stefan Lang","authors":"Maik Niemeck","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000132","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44034751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Ontology of Discrimination 歧视的本体论
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000134
G. Torrengo
{"title":"The Ontology of Discrimination","authors":"G. Torrengo","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000134","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Discrimination is a social phenomenon which seems to be widespread across different societies and cultures. Examples of discrimination concerning race, class, gender, and sexual orientation are not difficult to find in contemporary western societies. In this article, the author focus on the ontological ground of this phenomenon, with particular attention to its diffuse and institutionalised forms. The author defends a broadly speaking reductionist approach, according to which the various manifestations of discrimination are grounded on the existence of the effects of “discriminatory stances” in social contexts. Discrimination may become part of the institutional sphere, either by way of bottom-up “crystallisation” of discriminatory practices, or by top-down “dilution” of institutional defaults into ordinary interactions.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42638602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness 主体性是现象意识的原点
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000133
Kyle Banick
{"title":"Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness","authors":"Kyle Banick","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000133","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy. From this vantage, a common objection to non-relational views is deflated. The common objection is that one-level, non-relational views are either unexplanatory or smuggle in resources from higher-order and/or relational views. The author uses an argument from formal ontology to suggest that such objections stem from a category error. The result is that first-order non-relational views need not lapse into higher order or relational views – subjective character can be a structured and intrinsic feature involved in the ontological constitution of mental acts. Ultimately, the author emphasizes the need to conceive of subjective character as the source of intentionality, and not the result of a prior intentional relation.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44642088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine Verteidigung gegen zeitgenössische Einwände, written by Nicole Rathgeb 21号的透析当代反对的辩词
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-18 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000131
W. Barz
{"title":"Die Begriffsanalyse im 21. Jahrhundert: Eine Verteidigung gegen zeitgenössische Einwände, written by Nicole Rathgeb","authors":"W. Barz","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000131","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49202097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Naturalizing Program of Perceptions Defended 知觉归化程序辩护
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-18 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000130
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
{"title":"The Naturalizing Program of Perceptions Defended","authors":"Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000130","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The author defends the naturalizing program of the notion of representation against the primitivist view according to which the notion of representation as belonging to psychology as a mature science is irreducible. First, the author concedes that the original teleological project trivializes the concept of representation by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, amoeba, when the best available explanation is the assumption that primitive organisms and artifacts are merely indicating proximal stimulation rather than representing the distal causes of stimulation. Yet, the author does not believe that this presents an unsurmountable obstacle for the naturalizing program when what is in question is genuine sensory representation, namely perception. In the author’s view, what matters for the naturalizing program are not cases in which the concept of representation is misemployed, but rather cases in which the focus is genuine sensory representation, that is, genuine perceptions; or so he shall argue.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43445026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs 史密斯偶然的真实信仰没有正当理由
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-05-12 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000135
Alfred Schramm
{"title":"No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs","authors":"Alfred Schramm","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000135","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Edmund Gettier (1963) argued that there can be justified true belief (JTB) that is not knowledge. The correctness of Gettier’s argument is questioned by showing that Smith of his famous examples does not earn justification for his incidentally true beliefs, while a doxastically more conscientious person S would come to hold justified but false beliefs. So, Gettier’s (and analogous) cases do not result in justified and true belief. This is due to a tension between deductive closure of justification and evidential support. For being justified, any believing, disbelieving, or withholding of deductively inferred propositions must be distributed proportionally to given evidential support. This proportionality principle has primacy over deductive closure in case of conflict. Although the author’s argument does not save the JTB-account, it explains why subjects in Gettier situations do not earn knowledge.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43504899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Long and Winding Road 漫长而曲折的道路
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-15 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000128
P. Simons
{"title":"The Long and Winding Road","authors":"P. Simons","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000128","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Following its welcome revival in the late twentieth century, metaphysics in the analytic tradition has succumbed to decadence, with an astonishing variety of outlandish and extreme positions or “metaphysical follies” being taken seriously. This has caused an inevitable backlash among more scientifically-minded philosophers and incurred the scorn of scientists. Much of the reason for this is the blithe ignoring of empirical science by armchair metaphysicians. The roles of empirical knowledge in good, scientific metaphysics are however unclear. In virtue of its maximal generality, metaphysics is remote from straightforward empirical checks. This article explores, with historical and contemporary examples, the ways in which empirical information may inform and be fed back into metaphysics, the disputed role of common sense, and the delicate balance to be maintained, within a fallibilist, scientific metaphysics, between speculative, categorial and empirical elements.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47810231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Inductive Metaphysics 归纳形而上学
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-15 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000129
K. Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, Ansgar Seide
{"title":"Inductive Metaphysics","authors":"K. Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, Ansgar Seide","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000129","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"98 1","pages":"1-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2021-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64935562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Frege on Singular Senses 奇异感觉上的怪癖
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-12-21 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000118
Marco Ruffino
{"title":"Frege on Singular Senses","authors":"Marco Ruffino","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000118","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this article the author discusses what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses (i.e., the senses of singular terms), in particular senses of definite descriptions. These senses are supposed to be complete (or saturated), but they are composed of the incomplete (unsaturated) senses of conceptual terms (i.e., conceptual senses). The author asks how the definite article (or what it expresses) transforms an unsaturated sense into a saturated one and reviews some attempted explanations in the literature. He argues that none of them is compatible with Frege’s views in semantics. Next, he discusses an alternative that Frege himself endorses and argues that it is also incompatible with his semantics. The author concludes that Frege has no coherent view on the senses of definite descriptions. If we assume that every name expresses a descriptive sense, then we must conclude that Frege has no coherent explanation for singular senses in general.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44531096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ultimate Preference and Explanation 终极偏好与解释
IF 0.5
Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-11-24 DOI: 10.1163/18756735-00000125
K. Lehrer
{"title":"Ultimate Preference and Explanation","authors":"K. Lehrer","doi":"10.1163/18756735-00000125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000125","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The articles by Corlett, McKenna and Waller in the present issue call for some further enlightenment on Lehrer’s defense of classical compatibilism. Ultimate explanation in terms of a power preference, which is the primary explanation for choice, is now the central feature of his defense. This includes the premise that scientific determinism may fail to explain our choices. Sylvain Bromberger (1965) showed that nomological deduction is not sufficient for explanation. A power preference, which is by definition a preference over alternatives, is the primary explanation when the power preference explains the choice without the need to appeal to anything else, including even anything that explains it. The author notes that explanation is not generally transitive. The power preference must stand alone as an ultimate explanation independent of other explanations. It is thus the ultimate preference over alternatives of choice.","PeriodicalId":43873,"journal":{"name":"Grazer Philosophische Studien-International Journal for Analytic Philosophy","volume":"97 1","pages":"600-615"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47734595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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