{"title":"Making Sense of Doing Wrong: On the Justification of Compromise Decisions","authors":"R. Córdoba","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2013.670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2013.670","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEl articulo defiende que los compromisos son tanto un tipo de acuerdo como un tipo de decision. Los principales objetivos son: 1) identificar la estructura formal de las situaciones de compromiso en las que alguna decision de compromiso (CD) es inevitable, incluyendo CDs que ponen en riesgo la integridad del decisor; 2) mediante las nociones de juicio basico y compulsivo propuestas por Amartya Sen, establecer cuando una CD en una situacion de compromiso podria estar moralmente justificada. Se concluye que las CDs justificadas implican una contricion moral que ayuda a salvar la distancia entre deontologia y consecuencialismo. EnglishThis paper holds that compromises are a kind of agreement and also a kind of decision. The main objectives are: 1) to identify the formal structure of compromise situations, or predicaments where some compromise decision (CD) is unavoidable, including CDs that jeopardize the decision-maker�s integrity; 2) through Amartya Sen�s notions of basic and compulsive judgments, to establish when a CD in a situation of compromise could be morally justified. It concludes that justified CDs involve a rationally justified moral regret which helps to bridge the gap between deontology and consequentialism.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"15 1","pages":"29-53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88238174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mauricio Suárez (comp.), “Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization”, Routledge, Londres / Nueva York (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4), 2009, 282 pp.","authors":"Diego Méndez Granados","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2013.707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2013.707","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"30 1","pages":"109-114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77110247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"El argumento contra la suerte moral: articulación y respuesta","authors":"Sergi Rosell","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.772","url":null,"abstract":"En la primera parte del articulo se reconstruye detalladamente el argumento global contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos, distinguiendo dos estrategias principales (moderada y radical). A continuacion se defiende que ninguna de ellas es sostenible, pues si la primera resulta insuficiente, la segunda es impractica y finalmente incoherente. Fundamentalmente se intenta mostrar que un argumento definitivo contra la suerte moral en todos sus tipos dependera por necesidad de la nocion imposible de merecimiento incondicionado, o merecimiento verdadero (esencial), en el sentido especialmente fuerte de funcion estricta del control del agente (o estrictamente proporcional a dicho control).","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"67 1","pages":"3-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87157472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Daniel Quesada (coord.), Cuestiones de teoría del conocimiento","authors":"Miltón Laufer","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.784","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"1996 1","pages":"97-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82467895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La estructura lógica de la teoría del valor trabajo","authors":"A. G. D. L. Sienra","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.782","url":null,"abstract":"La finalidad de este articulo es proveer una reconstruccion logica del elemento teorico basico de la teoria del valor trabajo desde la perspectiva de la metateoria estructuralista. Las metas son esbozar con alguna precision la ley fundamental de la teoria �la ley del valor� asi como la asercion empirica.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"44 1","pages":"69-95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84634860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE AND COGNITIVE INTEGRATION","authors":"Edison Barrios","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.780","url":null,"abstract":"Segun la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramatica interna. En este articulo desarrollo una objecion a PAV, llamada “el reto de la integracion”, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que esta constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integracion inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen informacion gramatical no estan inferencialmente integrados. En este articulo considero y rechazo las respuestas a este argumento formuladas por Dwyer y Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham (1987) y Knowles (2000)","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"2 1","pages":"35-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73334506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"C. Ulises Moulines, “El desarrollo moderno de la filosofía de la ciencia (1890–2000)”, trad. Xavier de Donato, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, México (Filosofía de la Ciencia), 2011, 186 pp.","authors":"A. A. D. Palacio","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2012.746","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2012.746","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"18 1","pages":"101-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73187616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Una imagen de la realidad geométrica\": La concepción axiomática de la geometría de Hilbert a la luz de la \"Bildtheorie\" de Heinrich Hertz","authors":"E. Giovannini","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.762","url":null,"abstract":"El articulo presenta una interpretacion del abordaje axiomatico temprano a la geometria de David Hilbert, i.e., el desarrollado entre 1891 y 1905. Se sostiene que diversos aspectos de este abordaje, a primera vista problematicos, se pueden comprender mejor si se contrastan con una de sus influencias mas importantes en este periodo: la teoria pictorica [Bildtheorie] de Heinrich Hertz. En particular se argumenta que un analisis de la concepcion axiomatica de Hilbert a la luz de la teoria de Hertz permite aliviar ciertas tensiones en la concepcion hilbertiana; mas precisamente, las tensiones que surgen de mantener, al mismo tiempo, una posicion axiomatica abstracta o formal y una concepcion empirista de la geometria, que la considera una ciencia natural","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"46 1","pages":"27-53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77630391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Autorreferencia, autoconciencia y la paradoja de Moore","authors":"Javier Vidal","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2012.765","url":null,"abstract":"La paradoja de Moore es el tipo de absurdo de, entre otras cosas, la asercion de una oracion de la forma �p pero yo no creo que p�. Propongo una explicacion de la paradoja en terminos del uso del pronombre personal �yo�. Mas aun, recurro a un modelo del uso competente al que me referire como modelo de la autorreferencia autoconsciente. A continuacion, muestro que la explicacion introducida es independiente de otras explicaciones recientes basadas en la naturaleza consciente de la asercion y de la creencia. Pero, ademas, concluyo que esta justificado pensar que ni la asercion ni la creencia son de naturaleza consciente.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"34 1","pages":"55-81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2012-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77515748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}