CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA最新文献

{"title":"Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole","authors":"David Frydrych","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.116","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo revisa cuestiones metodologicas que han guiado, moldeado y plagado las discusiones de la filosofia analitica del derecho. Explica brevemente los conceptos de analisis conceptual, definiciones analiticas y parecidos de familia, y sostiene que los casos centrales se usan de mas de una manera. Presenta criticas a esos conceptos y metodos, cuyos defectos se deben a la falta de un paradigma comun acerca del impacto de los contraejemplos. Explica sucintamente desiderata “metateoricos” y sostiene que, hasta la fecha, recurrir a estas normas no ha sido de tanta ayuda para la filosofia del derecho como algunos sugieren. Finalmente, el texto vuelve a la seleccion de conceptos preguntandose si la teorizacion legal es una empresa invariablemente “normativa”, y concluye que ciertas metodologias “normativistas”, como la interpretacion constructivista de Dworkin o la invocacion al caso central del punto de vista interno de Finnis, son innecesarias. EnglishThis article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “metatheoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Section 5 returns to the issue of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably “normative” enterprise. It argues that certain “normativist” methodologies, such as Dworkin’s constructive interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"298 1","pages":"41-73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73653109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sutton’s Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects","authors":"Marta Campdelacreu Arqués","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.223","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton presenta una nueva e interesante solucion al mayor problema al que se enfrenta el co-ubicacionismo (colocationism): el problema de la fundamentacion. Sin embargo, si es correcto rechazar (como se defiende en este articulo) la tesis defendida por Sutton segun la cual los trozos o pedazos de materia estan extrinsecamente compuestos, entonces su respuesta al problema de la fundamentacion resulta incompleta. Ademas, es dificil ver como podria completarse. EnglishIn Sutton 2012, Catherine Sutton offers a new and very interesting solution to the most challenging problem facing colocationism: the grounding problem. However, if I am right in rejecting her thesis that lumps or pieces of matter are extrinsically composed, then her proposal is no longer a complete answer to the grounding problem, and it is difficult to see how it might be supplemented.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"89 1","pages":"77-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86056642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Vindicating Chance: On the Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate","authors":"R. Caso","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.234","url":null,"abstract":"One of the issues concerning a strictly objective interpretation of probability is the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance. In section 1, we introduce the debate between these two camps, and identify the main challenges each of them face. As is well known, the discovery of the incompatibility between reductionist positions concerning chance and an intuitive credence-chance principle, namely Lewis [1980]'s Principal Principle, generated a new, two-pronged way of addressing this debate. Reductionists face the motivation problem: they are required to provide motivation for alternative credence-chance principles compatible with their metaphysical assumptions. Non-reductionists face the explanation problem: they are required explain why it is rational for us to let chance guide credence in the way specified by her favored credence-chance norm. In section 2, we revisit some known background in order to set the scene for the discussion to follow. In section 3, we follow Briggs [2009] in identifying further problems for the reductionist, and argue that, in view of these, the reductionist's prospects of being able to meet the motivation problem are slim at best. In section 4, we turn to a fuller discussion of the explanation problem. As Hall [2004] argues, it turns out that the reductionist faces this problem too. In 4.1, we delineate a formal strategy for justifying any favored credence-chance norm. In 4.2, we show how the anti-reductionist is able to put in motion this formal strategy by providing a motivation for a key assumption upon which the strategy relies. In 4.3, we argue that the reductionist's prospects of being able to provide a similar justification of the assumption are also slim. We claim that these considerations provide a dialectical advantage to the anti-reductionist camp. 1. Reductionism and anti-reductionism about chance According to a broad class of reductionist views on chance, facts about chance at a world supervene upon (or at any rate are reducible to) the global distribution of categorical facts throughout the entire history of that world. Variation with respect to the nature of the supervenience base is possible, as long as no modal facts, no primitive dispositions or propensities are allowed among the fundamental properties of the","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"70 1","pages":"3-33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76543344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Propositions, The \"Tractatus\", and \"The Single Great Problem of Philosophy\"","authors":"S. Soames","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.215","url":null,"abstract":"El proyecto de Wittgenstein en el Tractatus consistia en reemplazar las proposiciones de Frege y Russell con una nueva concepcion que capturara la esencia del pensamiento y el lenguaje representacionales. Segun creia, esta era la unica tarea real de la filosofia. Argumento aqui que su explicacion de las proposiciones atomicas fue una implementacion incompleta de intuiciones valiosas, que, si hubieran sido ligeramente revisadas, podrian haberse extendido a todas las proposiciones tractarianas. Si Wittgenstein hubiera seguido este camino, habria hecho descubrimientos en el estudio del lenguaje y la mente que apenas empiezan a emerger hoy en dia. Sin embargo, hacerlos habria implicado quitarle al Tractatus sus pretensiones de reconstruir de manera fundamental la filosofia","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"4 1","pages":"3-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88484064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisiting Frankfurt on freedom and responsibility","authors":"L. Ribeiro","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.235","url":null,"abstract":"espanolDe acuerdo con la explicacion de la responsabilidad moral de Harry Frankfurt, un agente es moralmente responsable solo si sus elecciones y acciones reflejadas no estan constrenidas por una irresistible fuerza —ya sea de la perspectiva de primera o de tercera persona—. Argumentare aqui que esta afirmacion es problematica. Teniendo en cuenta algunos de los presupuestos de la discusion de Frankfurt, parece que hay casos segun los cuales uno puede ser considerado responsable, aunque las elecciones y acciones reflejadas esten constrenidas por una fuerza irresistible. La conclusion es que Frankfurt deberia haber admitido que la ausencia de una fuerza irresistible no es una condicion necesaria para la responsabilidad. EnglishAccording to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"32 1","pages":"35-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89187743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Flogisto versus oxígeno: una nueva reconstrucción y su fundamentación histórica","authors":"J. L. F. López, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.237","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn este trabajo desarrollamos reconstrucciones estructuralistas de las teorias del flogisto, de Priestley, y del oxigeno, de Lavoisier. Nuestra propuesta es una alternativa a la de Caamano (2009 y 2011) en una pretension de ajustarnos mas a las formulaciones de esas teorias tal y como se dieron historicamente. EnglishIn this work we develop structuralist reconstructions of phlogiston theory, by Priestley, and oxygen theory, by Lavoisier. Our proposal is an alternative to that offered by Caamano (2009 and 2011) in an attempt to adjust better to the actual historical formulations of these theories.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"33 1","pages":"87-116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74659603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pueden los derechos naturales hacer alguna contribución a la filosofía de los derechos humanos","authors":"Julio Montero","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.213","url":null,"abstract":"espanolDurante decadas, los filosofos han concebido los derechos humanos como una clase de derechos naturales de los que gozamos por el mero hecho de ser seres humanos. Sin embargo, esta interpretacion ha sido severamente cuestionada en los ultimos anos. Toda una familia de autores, identificados con una concepcion “practico-dependiente”, asevera que los derechos humanos constituyen una practica sui generis completamente ajena a la tradicion del derecho natural. En contra de esta postura, este articulo argumenta que el discurso de los derechos naturales es parte constitutiva de la doctrina actual de los derechos humanos y que puede hacer un aporte crucial a la adecuada justificacion y comprension de sus funciones, su contenido y su alcance normativo. Mas concretamente, mi tesis sera que si bien los derechos humanos no pueden reducirse a derechos naturales, bien podrian derivar de derechos naturales previos. EnglishFor decades, philosophers tended to think about human rights as natural rights that we enjoy just in virtue of our common humanity. However, in recent years, this view has been persistently challenged by a group of authors defending an alternative “practice-dependent” approach. According to them, contemporary human rights constitute a sui generis practice which is completely foreign to the natural rights tradition. Contrary to this claim, this article argues that natural rights discourse is an integral part of current human rights doctrine and that it may help us understand and justify the functions, content and normative reach of human rights norms. More concretely, my thesis is that although human rights are not reducible to natural rights, they may nevertheless derive from natural rights which are prior to them.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"124 1","pages":"61-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88634986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Kripke on Functionalism","authors":"J. Burgess","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.211","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn el texto se exponen las opiniones de Saul Kripke acerca del funcionalismo en la filosofia de la mente, que aun permanecen en gran parte sin publicarse, con base en la transcripcion de una charla suya de 1984 sobre este tema, y se identifican algunas preguntas sin resolver. EnglishSaul Kripke’s still largely unpublished views on functionalism in the philosophy of mind are expounded on the basis of a transcript of a 1984 lecture of his on the topic, and some unresolved questions identified.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"27 1","pages":"3-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83008405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"El problema de las clases naturales en química: algunas dificultades para el microestructuralismo","authors":"J. González, Mariana Córdoba","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.214","url":null,"abstract":"espanolNuestro proposito es trastornar el tratamiento habitual del problema de las clases naturales en filosofia de la ciencia, analizandolo sincronicamente y poniendo la quimica en el foco. Analizaremos tres problemas que la disciplina presenta al microesencialismo: (1) la insuficiencia del numero atomico como propiedad y criterio esencial, (2) la imposibilidad de la mecanica cuantica de dar cuenta de la estructura molecular y, por consiguiente, de importantes propiedades macroscopicas de las sustancias, (3) la imposibilidad de definir propiedades centrales, como la acidez, a partir de las propiedades microscopicas. Argumentaremos que, sin embargo, cabe mantener la nocion de clase natural en quimica, pero reformulandola desde la perspectiva del realismo activo y el pluralismo ideologico de Hasok Chang. Esta propuesta permite pensar que si bien las clasificaciones no deben ser interpretadas en un sentido esencialista, no son arbitrarias ni meramente convencionales, porque la realidad puede hacer fracasar un sistema de clasificacion y dar exito a otro. EnglishOur purpose is to subvert the traditional analysis of the problem of natural kinds in philosophy of science, which will be analyzed from a synchronic perspective and focusing on chemistry. Three problems of essentialist microstructuralism in chemistry will be considered: (1) the atomic number is insufficient as an essential property and criterion, (2) quantum mechanics cannot account for molecular shape and, hence, for important macroscopic properties of substances, (3) it is not possible to define relevant properties, as acidity, from microscopic ones. We will argue it is convenient to maintain the notion of natural kind, though, but it can be redefined from the perspective of active realism and ideological pluralism proposed by Hasok Chang. This approach allows us to think that classifications must not be considered from an essentialist approach, but they are not arbitrary or merely conventional either, since reality can make a classification system fail and make another one work.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"17 1","pages":"89-117"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82736543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Explicar y contrastar","authors":"Santiago Ginnobili, C. Carman","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","url":null,"abstract":"espanolUsualmente se ha asumido que una unica distincion puede dar cuenta del papel que cumplen los conceptos en una teoria respecto de la contrastacion y respecto de la explicacion. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asuncion es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse y, por otra, como pretenderemos probar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastacion de una teoria no tiene por que coincidir con el explanandum de la teoria. Para defender este punto asumiremos el estructuralismo metateorico, y se extraeran consecuencias para la concepcion metateorica presupuesta. EnglishIt is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse the metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"214 1","pages":"57-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79539869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}