{"title":"Explicar y contrastar","authors":"Santiago Ginnobili, C. Carman","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolUsualmente se ha asumido que una unica distincion puede dar cuenta del papel que cumplen los conceptos en una teoria respecto de la contrastacion y respecto de la explicacion. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asuncion es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse y, por otra, como pretenderemos probar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastacion de una teoria no tiene por que coincidir con el explanandum de la teoria. Para defender este punto asumiremos el estructuralismo metateorico, y se extraeran consecuencias para la concepcion metateorica presupuesta. EnglishIt is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse the metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"214 1","pages":"57-86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2016.236","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
摘要
然而,在实践中,人们普遍认为,只有一种区别才能解释概念在对比和解释理论中的作用。我们将试图证明这次亚松森会议是错误的。一方面,没有理由认为这种巧合一定会发生,另一方面,正如我们将从几个例子中证明的那样,事实上,它并不发生。一个理论的对比基础不一定要与理论的解释相一致。在这一点上,我们将假定元理论结构主义,并对假定的元理论概念得出结论。通常EnglishIt is that one distinction can account for the role举行概念play in a theory关于both test和解释。我们将证明这个假设是错误的。在一个方面,没有理由认为这个巧合应该存在。另一方面,这不是情况,因为我们将展示分析几个例子。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查,这个县的面积为。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查,这个县的面积为。此外,我们将考虑这一讨论对假定的元理论框架的一些影响。
espanolUsualmente se ha asumido que una unica distincion puede dar cuenta del papel que cumplen los conceptos en una teoria respecto de la contrastacion y respecto de la explicacion. Intentaremos mostrar que esta asuncion es incorrecta. Por una parte, no hay razones para considerar que esta coincidencia deba darse y, por otra, como pretenderemos probar a partir de varios ejemplos, de hecho, no se da. La base de contrastacion de una teoria no tiene por que coincidir con el explanandum de la teoria. Para defender este punto asumiremos el estructuralismo metateorico, y se extraeran consecuencias para la concepcion metateorica presupuesta. EnglishIt is usually held that one distinction can account for the role that concepts play in a theory regarding both test and explanation. We will demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect. On the one hand, there is no reason to think that this coincidence should exist. On the other, this is not the case, as we will show analysing several examples. The testing basis of a theory does not have to coincide with the explanandum of the theory. To defend this point we will endorse the metatheoretical structuralism. In addition, we will consider some repercussions that this discussion has for the assumed metatheoretical framework.