CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA最新文献_第3页

Las normas y su puesta en vigor: respuesta a Josep Corbí 规则及其实施:对Josep corbi的回应

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.207

Manuel García-Carpintero

引用次数: 0

Carlos Montemayor, “Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time”, Brill, Leiden, 2011, XIV + 154 pp. Carlos Montemayor:《思考时间:时间心理学的哲学与理论研究》，莱顿，2011年，第14期，154页。

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.210

Carla Merino-Rajme

引用次数: 0

On Imagination and Convention. Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language 论想象与习俗。区分语言中的语法和推理

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.185

R. Mena

引用次数: 0

On Deontic Truth and Values 论道义真理与价值

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181

J. Moreso

{"title":"On Deontic Truth and Values","authors":"J. Moreso","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo analiza la tesis del relativismo etico, tal y como se defiende en Alchourron y Bulygin 1983. En ese trabajo, los autores plantean, por una parte, una sugerente concepcion conforme a la cual considerar cuales son nuestras obligaciones es equivalente a pensar que hemos de hacer y, por otra, una concepcion relativista de la etica. Presentan tres objeciones a las concepciones constructivistas de la etica que no son relativistas: a) el argumento de la carga de la prueba, b) una version del dilema de Eutifron y c) el argumento del particularismo. En este articulo se presentan contraargumentos a estas objeciones tratando de mostrar que no son concluyentes y que, por lo tanto, queda un espacio para la objetividad en el ambito normativo. EnglishThis article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourron and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"23 1","pages":"61-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90514784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

On Some Objections to The Deductive Closure of Legal Systems 对法律制度的演绎封闭性的若干异议

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.184

Hugo R. Zuleta

引用次数: 0

Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo 有很多事情我相信自己(有意识的和无意识的)，却不知道我相信它们

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180

M. Sebastián

{"title":"Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo","authors":"M. Sebastián","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.180","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn un articulo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusion que pone en jaque ciertas teorias de la consciencia, como el mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es solido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relacion ampliamente aceptada en epistemologia entre creencia y conocimiento. Ademas, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestion o bien involucra una nocion de consciencia no relevante para la discusion. EnglishIn a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"38 1","pages":"37-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85048456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bulygin-redondo: desencuentros cercanos sobre enunciados Hartianos del tercer tipo 布里金-雷东多:关于第三种哈坦陈述的亲密分歧

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.183

María Gabriela Scataglini

引用次数: 0

Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura 小说作品、意识形式和文学

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-31 DOI: 10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204

Josep Corbí

{"title":"Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura","authors":"Josep Corbí","doi":"10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2017.204","url":null,"abstract":"espanol\"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)\" ofrece al lector en castellano una magnifica oportunidad para familiarizarse con algunos aspectos centrales de la filosofia del lenguaje contemporanea y sus implicaciones para la teoria de la ficcion. Garcia-Carpintero recorre los argumentos fundamentales en favor y en contra de cada una de las posiciones relevantes, y nos propone finalmente un analisis alternativo de la norma de la ficcion y una teoria neofregeana de los terminos referenciales que logra esquivar algunas objeciones tradicionales. Esta discusion incluye, no obstante, dos objeciones a su norma de la ficcion: una se refiere a las formas de la conciencia que esa norma presupone y la otra a la naturaleza del interes que suscitan los proyectos imaginativos vinculados a las obras de ficcion. English\"Relatar lo ocurrido como invencion: una introduccion a la filosofia de la ficcion contemporanea (2016a)\" offers to the Spanish reader an excellent opportunity to get in touch with central aspects in the current philosophy of language and their implications for fiction theory. In his book, Garcia-Carpintero carefully presents the fundamental lines of argument for and against the most relevant views and, on this basis, defends his own analysis of the norm of fiction as well as a neo-Fregean theory of referential terms that averts some traditional objections. My review includes, however, two objections concerning Garcia-Carpintero’s norm of fiction, one relative to the forms of awareness that it seems to presuppose, and the other regarding the nature of the interest associated with the imaginative projects that are constitutive of fictional works.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"55 1","pages":"91-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89833294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Enunciados no comprometidos y punto de vista jurídico: una perspectiva renovada 非约束性声明和法律观点:一个新的视角

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-10-29 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.118

Diego Dei Vecchi

{"title":"Enunciados no comprometidos y punto de vista jurídico: una perspectiva renovada","authors":"Diego Dei Vecchi","doi":"10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.118","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEl autor pone en duda la posibilidad de una ciencia juridica acorde a las exigencias del positivismo juridico normativista, segun el cual describir el derecho es dar cuenta neutralmente de lo que juridicamente se debe hacer. Replantea la tesis de Joseph Raz de que, para proferir enunciados descriptivos tales, debe adoptarse hipoteticamente el punto de vista juridico, en si mismo moralmente comprometido; segun esa tesis, una ciencia juridica acorde a las exigencias ha de pronunciarse profiriendo enunciados de un tipo que Raz denomina “no comprometidos”. El texto aborda varias posturas criticas contra esta vision y muestra que si bien es posible rechazar la tesis de Raz tal como la postula, se corre el peligro de descartar como no problematico mas de lo plausiblemente descartable. Asi, recurriendo a dos viejas discusiones de la filosofia del derecho reformula y da plausibilidad a la tesis de la necesidad de asumir el punto de vista juridico. EnglishThe author calls into question the possibility of a legal science in accordance with the requirements of normative legal positivism, which holds that to describe the law is to give an account of legal rights and duties. To evaluate the possibility of this program the author reformulates Joseph Raz’s thesis which states that legal scientists must adopt the legal point of view; to this end they must proffer statements of a peculiar type, which Raz has called detached legal statements. This paper attempts to show that even though the thesis can be rejected as Raz postulates it, this would risk discarding as “non-problematic” more than what is reasonable to discard. Thus, resorting to two familiar discussions in the philosophy of law, the “legal point of view thesis” is reformulated and shown as plausible.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"15 1","pages":"91-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78109893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Why General Jurisprudence Is Interesting 为什么普通法理学有趣

IF 0.3 4区哲学

CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA Pub Date : 2017-02-11 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2921820

J. Dickson

{"title":"Why General Jurisprudence Is Interesting","authors":"J. Dickson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2921820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2921820","url":null,"abstract":"espanolEn un articulo reciente titulado “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch responde su propia pregunta de forma sonoramente negativa. Este articulo examina criticamente la naturaleza de la afirmacion de Enoch, las presuposiciones sobre las que descansa y la manera en la que intenta mostrar que tal es el caso. Habiendo arguido que muchas de las visiones al respecto dependen de un entendimiento pobre e idiosincrasico de las cuestiones de las que se ocupa la teoria general del derecho, asi como de las relaciones entre esas cuestiones y muchas otras investigaciones acerca de la naturaleza del derecho, el articulo concluye ofreciendo la propia version de la autora acerca de aquello que hace de la teoria general del derecho algo intrigante, cautivador y. . . tambien. . . interesante. EnglishIn a recent article entitled, “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?”, David Enoch answers his own question resoundingly in the negative. This article critically examines the character of Enoch’s claim, the presuppositions it rests on, and the way in which he seeks to establish it. Having argued that many of Enoch’s views in this regard hinge on a narrow and idiosyncratic understanding of the questions that general jurisprudence addresses, and of the relations between those questions and many other inquiries concerning the character of law, the article concludes by offering its author’s own vision of what makes general jurisprudence engaging, intriguing, and. . . well. . . interesting.","PeriodicalId":43820,"journal":{"name":"CRITICA-REVISTA HISPANOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFIA","volume":"46 1","pages":"11-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2017-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83684975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0