CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Institutional Investors and Corporate Investment","authors":"Cristina Cella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1514916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1514916","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether institutional investors influence firms’ investment policies. By virtue of their significant ownership stakes and investment horizons, long-term institutional investors should closely monitor management and thus reduce agency conflicts in investment choices. Using a panel dataset of 2,511 U.S. manufacturing firms that went public between 1980 and 2003, I find that firms with long-term institutional investors tend to have lower capital expenditure than widely-held firms. Investment is reduced precisely in firms that are more exposed to the danger of over-investment: (a) firms that invest too much after controlling for their growth opportunities, financing constraints and industry affiliation, and (b) firms that have few investment opportunities but large cash flows. Most importantly, a reduction in capital expenditure in these firms leads to higher subsequent firm profitability and stock market performance, confirming that institutional investors’ actions aimed at removing over-investment are value-enhancing.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131151985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Valuing the First Negotiated Repurchase of the TARP Warrants","authors":"Linus Wilson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1404069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1404069","url":null,"abstract":"Old National Bancorp was the first publicly traded bank to buy back its Capital Purchase Program (CPP) warrants. It paid $1.2 million, which is below the low-end of this paper’s estimates of the fair market value of the warrants. This paper estimates the warrants are worth between $1.9 and $6.9 million. This low negotiated price from the perspective of taxpayers indicates that the U.S. Treasury would have probably gotten a better price marketing those warrants to third party investors.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131499356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Venture Capitalists in Mature Public Firms","authors":"Uğur Çelikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2051522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2051522","url":null,"abstract":"Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130189962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Emergence of State Owned Financial Power Brokers","authors":"J. Braunstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1452797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1452797","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a comprehensive empirical survey which investigates the phenomenon of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in an International Political Economy context. SWFs can be defined as state related pools of capital which derive most of their capital from external resources, and reinvest a large part of this capital internationally. These powerful financial brokers impact international finance in a number of ways. Due to their sheer size, SWFs influence global financial stability. Even if the financial crisis 2008 has substantially reduced their volume, SWFs will continue to have immense financial influence. SWFs constitute a heterogenous group of actors, but there are distinct intersections between them and other financial players, such as central banks and pension funds. Despite these overlappings, SWFs can be clearly operationally differentiated into subcategories, and furthermore, can be clearly differentiated from other financial actors. Hence, knowing the position of SWFs in financial markets is critical in evaluating the effects that they may have on various dynamics related to financial markets. Pure economic approaches struggle with the obvious intersection of states and funds in an international financial environment. Therefore, an analysis through an International Political Economy perspective has significant advantages.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128449129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Influence of Share Ownership on Repeat Patronage","authors":"J. Aspara, Henrich Nyman, H. Tikkanen","doi":"10.1362/147539208X325920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1362/147539208X325920","url":null,"abstract":"Business researchers have begun to pay attention to how an individual’s share ownership in a publicly-listed company may influence his/her repeat patronage towards the company’s products and services. This article investigates the influence of share ownership on repeat patronage, in conjunction with the influence of customer satisfaction. Survey data of a large sample of customers of a retail bank is examined. The results of the study suggest that an individual’s share ownership in a company positively motivates his/her repeat patronage towards the company’s services, independently of customer satisfaction. The results also suggest that customers who are simultaneously share-owners of the company will, on average, accept a lower level of customer satisfaction to repeatedly patronize the company and its services than non-share-owning customers.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"73 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131588948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Consolidation of the Banking System in Europe: The Acquisition of ABN AMRO","authors":"R. J. Santillán-Salgado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2366085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366085","url":null,"abstract":"The widely publicized banking takeover battle sustained by the British Barclays and a consortium led by the Royal Bank of Scotland that included the Dutch Fortis and the Spanish Santander, for the Dutch ABN AMRO, took place during six months, from March through October of 2007. The myriad legal and economic complexities involved and the mammoth size of the transaction (more than $100 billion) that made of it the largest banking industry M&A ever, illustrates the kind of operations that are likely to reconfigure the European banking scene during the coming years. After an intense period of M&As of EU banks at a domestic level, that was, arguably, detonated by technological, political and economic factors, it is only during most recent times that cross-border transactions have represented a significant participation in the consolidation process. ABN’s acquisition and later carve out represented a cap to the series of transactions that took place in recent years and will likely keep the top place for years to come. In the following sections, this paper discusses the recent trends towards increasing concentration in the EU, the most important cross-border M&As of banks and finally the acquisition of ABN AMRO. The paper closes with conclusions on what this mega-transaction represented and how will it likely influence the future evolution of that region’s banking industry.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129311896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"La reazione del mercato borsistico Italiano ad annunci relativi a patti parasociali (Impact of the Announcement of Shareholders’ Agreements on the the Italian Stock Market)","authors":"R. Bossi, G. Giudici, M. Minenna","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2567330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2567330","url":null,"abstract":"Italian Abstract: I patti parasociali sono ampiamente diffusi in Italia, dove molte societa quotate sono controllate da patti di blocco. Questo studio ha due obiettivi principali: 1) effettuare un'analisi empirica della varieta dei patti parasociali in societa quotate italiane; 2) valutare l’impatto che gli annunci relativi ai patti parasociali hanno sul prezzo delle azioni. Con riguardo alle clausole dei patti parasociali, le piu comuni sono costituite dalle restrizioni al trasferimento delle azioni. Spesso vengono introdotte anche clausole di voto, di consulenza e di nomina degli amministratori. L’effetto degli annunci relativi ai patti parasociali e stato studiato attraverso due metodologie basate sulla teoria del limite stocastico. Inoltre, per la prima volta, e stata considerata la variabile ‘volume scambiato’ nella rilevazione dell’effetto annuncio. Viene provato che, in media, le reazioni nei giorni dell’evento non sono statisticamente significative. I rumors sono infatti una possibile spiegazione, dato che si rilevano andamenti anomali nel periodo antecedente alla pubblicazione ufficiale. Gli effetti annuncio sono piu significativi se l’accordo presenta clausole di voto. Inoltre, gli andamenti anomali sono positivi quando viene annunciato un patto di voto (stipulato ex-novo o rinnovato) in cui il primo azionista e un individuo. Una possibile spiegazione e che attraverso il patto tale individuo mostra la propria debolezza: egli non riesce a controllare da solo la societa, quindi il mercato percepisce che il controllo e maggiormente contendibile. I risultati della ricerca suggeriscono che le caratteristiche dei patti parasociali sono molto eterogenee e hanno impatti differenti sull’attivita del mercato. English Abstract: Shareholders’ agreements are widely diffused in Italy, where many listed companies are controlled by coalitions of block shareholders. This study has two main objectives: 1) to carry out an empirical analysis of the variety of shareholders’ agreements in Italian listed companies; 2) to evaluate the impact on the stock price of the announcements related to shareholders’ agreements. Regarding the clauses of shareholders’ agreements, the most common are restrictions on the transfer of shares. Voting, consulting and directors appointment clauses are often introduced as well. The effect of announcements related to shareholders’ agreements has been studied through two methodologies based on stochastic limit theory. Moreover, for the first time, the variable ‘traded volume’ has been considered in the announcement effect detection. We find that on the average the reactions in the event days are not statistically significant. Rumors are indeed a possible explanation, since abnormal returns are detected in the period before the official publication. Announcement effects are more significant if the agreement has voting clauses. Moreover, abnormal returns are positive when a brand new (or renewed) voting agreement whose main member is ","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116444613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Europe and the United States","authors":"Armin Schwienbacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.302001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on exits by venture capitalists from their portfolio companies. Using a unique self-collected data set, we provide new stylized facts about the venture capital industry in Europe and in the US. Although there are numerous similarities between the US and Europe, there are also important differences, in particular with respect to the duration of exit stage, the use of convertible securities, the replacement of former management and deal syndication. Much of these differences can be brought to a common denominator, namely that European venture capitalists face a less liquid market for the human resources that go into the ventures as well as for the exit opportunities. The most striking difference is with respect to the use of convertible securities, which are by far less often used in Europe as compared to the US. Overall, we show that European venture capitalists monitor less. Finally, the paper analyzes the impact of venture capital firms' characteristics and the use of different monitoring devices (stage financing, board representation, use of convertible securities and reporting of activities) on the exit route. Some aspects of close monitoring seem to significantly affect the venture's likelihood of going public.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132297046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comparative Analysis of Asian EXIM Banks","authors":"Yibin Mu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2165487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2165487","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares funding structure, financial facilities, and evolution of roles and activities of Export-Import Banks (EXIMs) in six Asian economies -- Japan, Korea, Taiwan of China (hereinafter referred as Taiwan), India, Thailand, and China. It examines the similarities and differences between these EXIMs and how they have changed over time. The purpose of the paper is to explore and identify benchmarks for younger EXIMs and for countries intending to establish such institutions.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133210368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shareholder Engagement and Stewardship: The Realities and Illusions of Institutional Share Ownership","authors":"J. Winter","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1867564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1867564","url":null,"abstract":"Modern perceptions of good corporate governance assume that the general meeting has a meaningful role in the governance of listed companies and that shareholders make responsible use of their voting rights. Assessments after the financial crisis, however, indicate that institutional investors by and large are not engaged in any meaningful way. This paper analyses various factors that may lead institutional investors to be uninterested and unknowledgeable, including standard investment practices based on modern portfolio theory, diversification, prudency and solvency rules, intermediation through asset managers, fiduciary duties and portfolio manager remuneration. The paper distinguishes three types of engagement: Compliance, intervention and stewardship and argues that stewardship by institutional investors requires a radical rethinking and redesigning of institutional investment. Measures suggested by the European Commission in its Green Paper on Governance of Listed Companies may remove some obstacles and provide for some incentives but will not be enough to affect such transformation.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130612415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}