{"title":"Venture Capitalists in Mature Public Firms","authors":"Uğur Çelikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2051522","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2051522","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.