{"title":"成熟上市公司的风险投资家","authors":"Uğur Çelikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2051522","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Venture Capitalists in Mature Public Firms\",\"authors\":\"Uğur Çelikyurt, Merih Sevilir, Anil Shivdasani\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2051522\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.\",\"PeriodicalId\":429515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2051522\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2051522","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Using data on the backgrounds of board members of S&P companies, we show that venture capitalists (VCs) play an important role in mature public firms long after their initial public offering (IPO). Almost one-third of mature public companies have at least one VC director on their board. VC presence on the board is not limited to mature companies that were VC-backed at the time of their IPO – over one-third of mature firms with VC directors were not VC-backed at the time of their IPO. Appointments of VC directors to the board are followed by increases in R&D intensity, innovation output, and greater deal activity with other VC-backed firms. VC director appointments are associated with positive announcement returns and are followed by an improvement in operating performance. Finally, firms experience higher announcement returns from acquisitions of VC-backed targets following the appointment of a VC director to the board. Our results show that in addition to their function as providers of finance, monitoring and advice for small private firms, VCs play a significant role in mature public firms as well. Hence, we illustrate a much broader role for VCs than has been established in the literature.