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CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)最新文献

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Voting Methods for Director Election, Monitoring Costs, and Institutional Ownership 董事选举的投票方法、监督成本和机构所有权
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3206074
Kee H. Chung, Choonsik Lee
{"title":"Voting Methods for Director Election, Monitoring Costs, and Institutional Ownership","authors":"Kee H. Chung, Choonsik Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3206074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3206074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We show that firms that employ the majority voting method for director election exhibit higher institutional ownership than firms that employ the plurality voting method, especially after the 2010 amendment to NYSE Rule 452. Firms that adopt majority voting in a bylaw or charter exhibit increases in institutional ownership and share price. These results are consistent with our conjecture that institutional investors favor companies with majority voting and investors react favorably to the adoption of majority voting because it reduces management monitoring costs by improving the accountability of elected board members.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130978676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
The Structure of Private Funds, Their Relation to Private Firms, and the Implications for Accounting, Economics, and Finance Research 私募基金的结构，它们与私营企业的关系，以及对会计、经济和金融研究的影响
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-06-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3403702
Paul J. Mason, Steven Utke
{"title":"The Structure of Private Funds, Their Relation to Private Firms, and the Implications for Accounting, Economics, and Finance Research","authors":"Paul J. Mason, Steven Utke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403702","url":null,"abstract":"Private equity and venture capital funds (“private funds”) are an increasingly important component of the economy and hold substantial ownership in other private firms. These funds have unique legal organizational structures, which academic literature has not yet accounted for. This paper has three main goals. First, we lay out the basic legal structure of private funds and describe how these funds interact with the firms they own (“portfolio companies”). Second, we explain the implications of this structure for recent finance research, focusing on how funds’ structure affects secondary market pricing of funds. Third, we discuss how both private fund and private firm structure affects accounting and economics research on private firms. Because a large number of private firms are now owned by private funds, falling under the funds’ unique organizational structure, we urge caution in drawing conclusions regarding private firms when researchers are unable to clearly distinguish between stand-alone private firms and those private firms owned and controlled by private funds (or other parent entities). We also specifically discuss the use of tax return data to study private firms; under the current laws of the U.S., these data are unlikely to allow researchers to isolate stand-alone firms, making these data unreliable for evaluating certain private firm attributes in economics, as well as private firm financial reporting choices in accounting.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121558688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Factors Affecting Financial Performance of Life Insurance Sector in Pakistan 影响巴基斯坦人寿保险行业财务绩效的因素
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3400728
Nazish Ishtiaq, D. Siddiqui
{"title":"Factors Affecting Financial Performance of Life Insurance Sector in Pakistan","authors":"Nazish Ishtiaq, D. Siddiqui","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3400728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400728","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this research is to investigate the factors that affect the financial performance of the life insurance sector in Pakistan. Possible internal and external factors that include liquidity, net premium, and premium growth, underwriting risk, debt to equity, insurance leverage, tangibility, equity capital, capital surplus, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation and market share have been used to assess their effect, whereas sector Return on Assets (ROA) has been used to assess the performance. The data has been gathered from 2008 to 2017 from 09 life insurance companies including 01 public and 08 private life insurance companies. In these observations, there are 02 companies that solely conduct their business on takaful life insurance while others are conventional based or both. Results have been analyzed using panel regression to panel the ordinary least square regression model and the generalized method of the moment is used to estimate the results. The outcome of this study shows that tangibility, market share, net premium, insurance leverage and GDP is insignificantly or negatively related to the financial performance of Pakistani Life Insurance Company, whereas, the other independent variables such as liquidity, underwriting risk, debt to equity, equity capital, capital surplus and inflation are positively and significantly related. This research should support the insurance industry in increasing their premium collecting activities and active participation in the market through increased awareness of life insurance to its beneficiary. The newcomers can also use this research as a beneficial survey for capturing the market. This research may also prove handy for the shareholders/investors and/or also for the insured to find out soundness and solvency of their insurer.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"17 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131454102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Interest Rates and Insurance Company Investment Behavior
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3479663
Ali K. Ozdagli, Zixuan Wang
{"title":"Interest Rates and Insurance Company Investment Behavior","authors":"Ali K. Ozdagli, Zixuan Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3479663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3479663","url":null,"abstract":"Life insurance companies, the largest institutional holders of corporate bonds, tilt their portfolios towards higher-yield bonds when interest rates decline. This tilt seems to be primarily driven by an increase in duration rather than credit risk and insurers do not seem to increase the credit risk of their bonds as interest rates decline. Moreover, the duration gap between their assets and liabilities deviates from zero for extended periods of time in either direction. These patterns cannot be explained by incentives to reach for yield. We propose a new model of duration-matching under adjustment costs that conforms with these patterns and test other implications of this model. The gradual duration matching poses financial stability challenges distinct from reaching for yield.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125122337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
A Real Threat? Short Selling and CEO Turnover 真正的威胁?卖空和CEO更替
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-11-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2980450
Anja Kunzmann, K. Meier
{"title":"A Real Threat? Short Selling and CEO Turnover","authors":"Anja Kunzmann, K. Meier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2980450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2980450","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of short sellers in forced turnovers. Controlling for various stock return measures, short interest predicts forced turnovers and is higher before turnovers that reveal more private information. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we show that unrestricted short selling increases the probability of forced turnovers for large firms. The effect is emph{not} driven by a higher informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between short interest and forced turnovers is stronger in the presence of shareholder activism, while it does not vary with different board characteristics, suggesting activist shareholders are one channel for the effect.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133590006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Equity Pricing: Evidence from Implied Cost of Equity of Publicly Traded Target 主权财富基金与股权定价:来自上市公司隐含股权成本的证据
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-10-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3304089
Sabri Boubaker, Narjess Boubakri, Jocelyn Grira, Asma Guizani
{"title":"Sovereign Wealth Funds and Equity Pricing: Evidence from Implied Cost of Equity of Publicly Traded Target","authors":"Sabri Boubaker, Narjess Boubakri, Jocelyn Grira, Asma Guizani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304089","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investment on the ex ante (implied) cost of equity capital of targeted firms. Using an international sample of 310 targets involved in 403 SWF deals and their matched firms, we find that targeted firms exhibit, on average, a higher cost of equity financing than their peers after the announcement date. Firms involved in domestic deals and deals concluded during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) exhibit a lower implied cost of equity financing, while those involved in cross-border deals are associated with a higher implied cost of equity capital.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133607324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tax Incentive Heterogeneity Between Shareholders, Voting Rights Power, and Capital Structure 股东、表决权和资本结构之间的税收激励异质性
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3277420
Michael Babbel, Paul Pronobis, Jochen Hundsdoerfer
{"title":"Tax Incentive Heterogeneity Between Shareholders, Voting Rights Power, and Capital Structure","authors":"Michael Babbel, Paul Pronobis, Jochen Hundsdoerfer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3277420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277420","url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of public European firms and a multitude of shifts in cross-country taxation data, we examine the influence of individual shareholders’ tax incentives on capital structure. We find that the largest shareholder’s tax incentive for debt positively influences leverage. We also find that the second-largest shareholder’s tax incentive for debt is incrementally relevant for leverage. However, tax incentive heterogeneity between shareholders reduces the positive influence of the largest shareholder’s tax incentive on leverage. Finally, we document that the relevance of the largest shareholder’s tax incentive for capital structure decisions is increasing in the level of voting rights power.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134477011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Passive Institutional Investors and Corporate Innovation 被动机构投资者与企业创新
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-09-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3415513
Yang Liu, Yaokan Shen, Jun Wang, Qijian Wang
{"title":"Passive Institutional Investors and Corporate Innovation","authors":"Yang Liu, Yaokan Shen, Jun Wang, Qijian Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3415513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415513","url":null,"abstract":"Using an instrumental variable approach that exploits an exogenous variation of passive institutional ownership caused by Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitution, we find that greater passive institutional ownership leads to improvement in corporate innovation measured by patent quantity and quality. Our results are robust to alternative setup of regression discontinuity design and a refinement to improve the approximation of the end-of-May market capitalization that Russell uses for index assignment. We identify three channels for such effect: first, the increased presence of passive institutional investors transfers more power to the manager; second, passive institutional ownership reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover especially for firms that outperform their industry peers; third, greater passive institutional ownership is associated with a wider adoption of non-executive employee stock options, which helps incentivize innovative activities.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133141624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Internalizing Governance Externalities: The Role of Institutional Cross-Ownership 内部化治理外部性:机构交叉所有制的作用
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2940227
Jie He, Jiekun Huang, Shan Zhao
{"title":"Internalizing Governance Externalities: The Role of Institutional Cross-Ownership","authors":"Jie He, Jiekun Huang, Shan Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940227","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the role of institutional cross-ownership in internalizing corporate governance externalities using granular mutual fund proxy voting data. Exploiting within-proposal and within-institution variation, we show that an institution's holdings in peer firms are positively associated with the likelihood that the institution votes against management on shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. We further find that high aggregate cross-ownership positively predicts management losing a vote. Overall, our results provide evidence that cross-ownership incentivizes institutional investors to play a more active monitoring role, suggesting that institutional cross-ownership serves as a market-based mechanism to alleviate the inefficiency induced by governance externalities.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1034 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120971933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 142
Institutional Ownership in Financial Services: Performance and Risk 金融服务中的机构所有权:绩效与风险
CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3174755
James Barrese, David M. Pooser, Ping Wang
{"title":"Institutional Ownership in Financial Services: Performance and Risk","authors":"James Barrese, David M. Pooser, Ping Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3174755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3174755","url":null,"abstract":"Institutional investor ownership has often been considered a corporate governance variable, typically used to proxy those investors’ ability to influence managers and to expropriate wealth from smaller shareholders. Large institutional investors have developed common holdings across numerous firms within industries. We consider the effects of institutional investor ownership with risk on the performance of banks and insurance companies. Using a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model with firm- and year-fixed effects, we find strong statistical relation between performance and individual firm’s ownership stakes by Blackrock and Fidelity. Moreover, we find a positive and statistically significant relation between performance and the percentage of the industry’s equity owned by the four organizations together. The findings suggest that some organizations like Blackrock are successful in obtaining long-term returns by exerting influence over the management of their invested firms, which is consistent with recent statements by the Blackrock CEO.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127844593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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