{"title":"真正的威胁?卖空和CEO更替","authors":"Anja Kunzmann, K. Meier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2980450","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of short sellers in forced turnovers. Controlling for various stock return measures, short interest predicts forced turnovers and is higher before turnovers that reveal more private information. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we show that unrestricted short selling increases the probability of forced turnovers for large firms. The effect is \\emph{not} driven by a higher informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between short interest and forced turnovers is stronger in the presence of shareholder activism, while it does not vary with different board characteristics, suggesting activist shareholders are one channel for the effect.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Real Threat? Short Selling and CEO Turnover\",\"authors\":\"Anja Kunzmann, K. Meier\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2980450\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine the role of short sellers in forced turnovers. Controlling for various stock return measures, short interest predicts forced turnovers and is higher before turnovers that reveal more private information. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we show that unrestricted short selling increases the probability of forced turnovers for large firms. The effect is \\\\emph{not} driven by a higher informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between short interest and forced turnovers is stronger in the presence of shareholder activism, while it does not vary with different board characteristics, suggesting activist shareholders are one channel for the effect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":429515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2980450\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2980450","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the role of short sellers in forced turnovers. Controlling for various stock return measures, short interest predicts forced turnovers and is higher before turnovers that reveal more private information. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, we show that unrestricted short selling increases the probability of forced turnovers for large firms. The effect is \emph{not} driven by a higher informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between short interest and forced turnovers is stronger in the presence of shareholder activism, while it does not vary with different board characteristics, suggesting activist shareholders are one channel for the effect.
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