{"title":"Fifteen Years of Defined Contributions: Assessing the Chilean Pension Experience","authors":"Hans Schlechter, B. Pagnoncelli, Arturo Cifuentes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3222793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222793","url":null,"abstract":"In 1980 Chile switched from a state-managed defined-benefit pension system to a defined-contribution scheme based on individual capital accounts. The new system was further refined in 2002 with the introduction of five investment funds, with, allegedly, different risk-return profiles. The funds differ in their portfolio composition which is driven by strict minimum and maximum limits (mostly related to stocks and bonds), dictated by the regulator. We have examined the performance of these funds over a fifteen-year period looking at their returns and actual risk profiles, aided by three rank-order metrics. Unfortunately, our results are unambiguously distressing: while the regulator succeeded in creating five funds with clearly different risk profiles, their risk-adjusted returns as well as their cumulative (absolute) returns are completely at odds with the desired goal. In fact, during long stretches of time the funds exhibited a performance that was exactly the opposite of what it was intended: an indictment on the idea of controlling portfolio risk via asset allocation limits.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122441148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Jets and Private Meetings with Investors","authors":"Brian J. Bushee, Joseph J. Gerakos, L. Lee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2141878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2141878","url":null,"abstract":"We use corporate jet flight patterns to identify private meetings with investors that are ex ante unobservable to non-participants. Using approximately 400,000 flights, we proxy for private meetings with “roadshows,” defined as three-day windows that include flights to money centers and to non-money centers in which the firm has high institutional ownership. Roadshows exhibit greater abnormal stock reactions, analyst forecast activity, and absolute changes in local institutional ownership than other flight activity. We also find positive trading gains in firms with more complex information and infrequent private meetings, suggesting that roadshows provide participating investors an advantage over non-participating investors.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130563163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Investor Monitoring Motivation and the Marginal Value of Cash","authors":"C. Ward, Chao Yin, Yeqin Zeng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3061155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061155","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether the motivation of institutional investors in monitoring a firm is positively related to the relative importance of the firm's stock in their portfolios. We find that greater motivated monitoring institutional ownership is associated with a higher marginal value of corporate cash holdings, which cannot be explained by other corporate governance measures and institution types. Further, we find that the economic effect of institutional monitoring on the marginal value of cash falls with decreasing institutions' monitoring motivation. Based on these findings, we construct a monitoring motivation-weighted institutional ownership measure and document a positive relation between it and the marginal value of cash. Our results are robust after controlling for the endogeneity of institutional ownership, three cash regimes, firm size, and changes in US public firms over time.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124775499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jillian Grennan, Roni Michaely, Christopher J. Vincent
{"title":"The Deleveraging of U.S. Firms and Institutional Investors' Role","authors":"Jillian Grennan, Roni Michaely, Christopher J. Vincent","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1941902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941902","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate leverage has decreased markedly in the U.S. since 1992. In contrast to press coverage of hedge funds increasing debt, increases in institutional investments, primarily by mutual funds, account for part of this deleveraging. We use implied mutual fund trades constructed from individual-investor flows as exogenous variation in institutional ownership for estimation. Supporting the hypothesis institutions contributed to deleveraging, our estimates increase significantly after regulatory reforms incentivized stronger institutional governance. Firms deleverage by reducing debt and transitioning to debt associated with enhanced monitoring and efficiency. Counterfactual simulations indicate aggregate leverage would have been eight percentage points higher without institutions' influence.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133750064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dismantling the Legal Myth of Shareholder Primacy: The Corporation as a Sustainable Market Actor","authors":"Beate Sjåfjell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2912141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2912141","url":null,"abstract":"The convergence of crises that we face as a global society, with its grand challenge of how to achieve social progress for all without destroying the very basis of our existence, emphasises the importance of discussing the role of the market actors. We cannot achieve environmental, social and economic sustainability of our societies without the contribution of the market actors (businesses, investors, consumers and the public sector in its many roles as market actor). With many difficult questions ahead, there is one thing we know for sure: the ‘business as usual’ path market actors in aggregate are on is not an option for sustainability; it is a very certain path towards a very uncertain future. A fundamental transition away from ‘business as usual’ and onto a sustainable path is necessary. Such a fundamental transition requires sustainable market actors. \u0000The paper focuses on what this means for business and more specifically, for the dominant business form of the corporation. In a time where social entrepreneurship in various shapes and sizes receives much (and undoubtedly warranted) attention, whether and how the dominant business form of the corporation fits into a sustainable future also needs to be discussed. This can be rephrased as a question of how to achieve corporate sustainability. \u0000The paper begins by discussing the role of the corporation in the unsustainable ‘business as usual’, based on the results of the Sustainable Companies Project (Section II), which shows that the main barrier to corporate sustainability is the social norm of shareholder primacy. This norm has become so dominant that it has turned into a legal myth, and corporate sustainability requires a dismantling of this myth. Section III presents a summary of the tentative reform proposal with this aim, while Section IV concludes with reflections on the work that needs to be done, where the mitigation of the legal myth of shareholder primacy is placed in the broader context of the ongoing research project Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART).","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130850250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on Mossin's Theorem for Deductible Insurance Given Random Initial Wealth","authors":"Liang Hong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3005626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3005626","url":null,"abstract":"Mossin's theorem for deductible insurance given random initial wealth is re-examined. For a fair premium, it is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition, in the spirit of the Generalized Mossin Theorem for coinsurance, is impossible using the notion of expectation dependence. Next, it is established that for a fair premium, full insurance will be optimal for a risk-averse individual if the random loss and the random initial wealth are negative quadrant dependent, improving upon an extant result in the literature. In view of a set of examples given in this paper, such a sufficient condition cannot be obtained using the notion of expectation dependence. Finally, for an unfair premium, it is shown that partial insurance will always be optimal, irrespective of the risk preference of the individual as well as the dependence structure between the random loss and the random initial wealth.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122831623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Determinants of Private Shareholder Engagement in Brazil and South Africa: The Role of Regulation","authors":"Camila Yamahaki, J. Frynas","doi":"10.1111/corg.12166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12166","url":null,"abstract":"Manuscript type. Empirical. Research Question/Issue. This study investigates to what extent regulation encourages private shareholder engagement attitudes and behavior (including behind‐the‐scenes consultations, letters, meetings, and ongoing dialogues) of pension funds and asset managers with listed investee companies on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues in Brazil and South Africa. Research Findings/Insights. Drawing on 44 in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with pension fund representatives, asset managers, and other investment players, the findings suggest that legislation provides limited direct encouragement to private engagement behavior. However, legislation encourages attitudes toward Responsible Investment by enhancing investor understanding of Responsible Investment, increasing the interest of pension funds and asset consultants in the Responsible Investment practices of asset managers, and reducing the fear of pension funds to violate their fiduciary duties, thereby promoting an enabling environment for ESG engagement. Theoretical/Academic Implications. This article adds to the literature on comparative corporate governance and shareholder engagement. To the best of our knowledge, this is first study that specifically analyzes how regulation affects private shareholder engagement behavior in emerging markets, providing empirical support for the institutional perspective. The findings also suggest that the sophistication of the legislation on ESG issues in Brazil and South Africa is more typical of developed countries, indicating the need for a more fine‐grained analysis of emerging markets in corporate governance studies. Practitioner/Policy Implications. This study draws investors' attention to the importance of understanding the national legal environment of the companies with which they engage and offers insights to governments interested in fostering ESG engagement practices.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128292106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Investors in Corporate Loans","authors":"Greg Nini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2349840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2349840","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the corporate financing implications of nonbank institutional investors entering the market for corporate loans. Institutional loans have served primarily as a substitute for bank debt and corporate bonds rather than increasing leverage. When the supply of institutional loans increased in the years before 2008, firms decreased their use of other debt, a pattern that was reversed in the years immediately after 2008. The results have implications for understanding how shocks to the supply of credit affect corporate balance sheets and how to view the emergence of institutional investors into the market for corporate loans.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116982185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence","authors":"Mozaffar Khan, Suraj Srinivasan, Liang Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2779809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2779809","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, and a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively, the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121042128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Technical Appendix to Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting","authors":"Lynne L. Dallas, J. Barry","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2746638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2746638","url":null,"abstract":"This document is a technical appendix containing supplemental information for the regressions that appear in Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625926.","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125330773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}