{"title":"Dewey’s Notion of Intelligent Habit as a Basis for Ethical Assessment of Technology","authors":"Michał Wieczorek","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10074","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses how John Dewey’s notion of intelligent habit could contribute to technology ethics. For Dewey, intelligent (i.e., desirable) habits are reflective – arising from inquiry into the appropriate courses of action in each situation – and flexible – easily adaptable to the changing circumstances. We should strive to develop intelligent habits as they are the best tools for the achievement of our goals and are necessary for individual and societal flourishing. I argue that Dewey’s notion of intelligent habit makes it possible to identify the impact of technology on users’ identity and self-determination, advocate for the extension of user choice and malleability of technologies, and analyse the connections between the epistemic dimension of technology and users’ ability to flourish.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neither Wisdom Nor Folly","authors":"Paul Howatt","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10073","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to reframe the debate over the intelligence of democracy by revisiting the classic Dewey/Lippmann debate. I argue that Dewey’s way of addressing this problem is better than both dominant approaches today (as exemplified by Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore), since it acknowledges the intellectual obstacles democracy faces while keeping faith with democracy as an ethical ideal. I also illustrate how Dewey’s ideas in <jats:italic>The Public and its Problems</jats:italic> can serve as the foundation for building a response to the challenge thinkers like Lippmann and Brennan pose for democracy. Dewey’s pragmatist orientation toward this challenge, along with his idea of the “Great Community”, offer us a promising path to building an intelligent and empowering democratic society.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Only Words Apart? Talking About “The World” in Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion","authors":"L. Hedrick","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10067","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In his well-known critique of conceptual relativism, Donald Davidson declared that we are not worlds but “only words apart.” His interpretive principle of charity asserts that the transcendental condition of disagreement is agreement. Pragmatist philosophers of religion have relied upon the principle of charity to argue against a framework theory of religion. They use the notion of a scale of observationality to illustrate where broad-scale agreement lies and place disagreement (and specifically convictional difference qualifying as “religious”) at the higher reaches, considering it interpretively parasitic. In this article, I problematize the ontological premises of construing difference in this way (specifically insofar as they betray traces of positivism) and the uses of ethnography to substantiate it. I draw on the work of contemporary anthropologists who identify with the so-called ontological turn in ethnography to help think differently about difference—about what it means to be “only words apart.”","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42508026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Yet a New Phase, Wherein the Abstract Become Concrete”. Josiah Royce’s Theory of Experience Between Philosophy and Psychology","authors":"Rocco Monti","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10070","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper aims to focus on the concept of experience and reconstruct its evolutions within Royce’s thought. To do so, I divide this paper in three parts. I begin by analysing Royce’s concept of experience, which takes roots in his interpretation of the British empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892). In the second part I outline Royce’s theory of experience from a philosophical and psychological point of view. My claim is that, in his philosophical writings, Royce argues that cognitions are not abstract ideas but plans of actions: meanings and concepts are embodied, situated and time-oriented. I refer also to Royce’s contribution to the psychological field, with regard to embodied aspects of cognitions. According to Royce, cognitions are enriched with elements related to sensorimotor, imaginative and perceptual faculties. Action and perception are no separated aspects of cognitions, because perception implies sensorimotor dynamics. At the same time, the perception of the object is entangled with the imagination of the would be, i.e., the result of doing different actions with the object.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47833078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B. Taye, Abayneh Atnafu, Yihenew Wubu Endalew, S. Beyene
{"title":"Organ Trafficking in Africa: Pragmatist Ethical Reconsiderations","authors":"B. Taye, Abayneh Atnafu, Yihenew Wubu Endalew, S. Beyene","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10066","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article focuses on examining the situation of organ trafficking in Africa from the aspect of pragmatist ethics. In the mainstream thought, the broader ethical dilemma of organ trafficking is viewed within the moral contestation of altruism as a rule for organ procurement and the resulting worldwide organ shortage. The incapability of altruistic transplant orthodoxy to serve as an applicable foundation for a public policy is considered as a reason for organ trafficking. In fact, to battle organ trafficking, utilitarian-inclined studies suggest organ selling, compensated donations, and non-directed paid donations as practical alternatives. However, when investigating the context of organ trafficking in Africa, the issue goes beyond the mere moral dilemma of altruism and organ shortage. In the region, organ trafficking is rooted within more systemic, structural, socio-economic, and political problems, grounded in the abuse of transplantation, and connected to transplant tourism and migration, which needs a pragmatic multimodal solutions than the earlier mainstream pathways. In pragmatist ethics, the moral assessment and solutions to the underlying problems depend on the context wherein the moral problem arises. Pragmatist ethics does not stick to absolute moral theories; instead, it focuses on the relevant assessment of the felt moral problem in a given context and aims at seeking solutions afresh. Thus, in the subsequent sections, this article looks at the context of organ trafficking in Africa and reassesses it by incorporating it into the ethical debates of transplantation and organ procurements and trading. The final part of this article reflects on solutions with the reconsideration of the context of transplantation and organ trafficking in the region.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43179748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vigilant Inquiry and Qualitative Disunity","authors":"Devin Robinson Fitzpatrick","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10069","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000John Dewey’s concept of the “problematic situation” is a core component of his epistemology and his social philosophy, grounding his anti-elitist view of inquiry as initially hunch-guided and aiming toward growth in meaning and control. I consider two novel counterarguments to Dewey’s definition of a situation, the “Cunning Manipulator,” which refutes his delimitation of a problematic situation in terms of qualitative experience, and the “Anxious Compulsion,” in which following one’s hunches causes a downward spiral. Given these challenges, I propose a revised Deweyan epistemology that recognizes the possibility of “qualitative disunity” and of “vigilant inquiry” as a response to it. The concept of “qualitative disunity” sheds light on disagreements on the topic of normativity between classical and neopragmatism.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49154340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Irrationality of Inter-vocabulary Change: A Reply to Shields","authors":"K. Phelan","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10071","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The pragmatist rejects the possibility that we can step outside our conceptual scheme in order to assess its correspondence to an unconceptualized reality. Consequently, it seems, she can describe a certain sort of conceptual change, namely, inter-vocabulary change, as rational only retrospectively. In a recent paper, Matthew Shields attempts to show otherwise. He argues that the speaker of such change ought to be understood as performing the speech act of metalinguistic proposal, supposition, or stipulation, and that, thus understood, her utterance is amenable to rational analysis. In this paper, I argue that Shields’ attempt fails. My aim is to show not that we pragmatists remain in search of a solution to this problem but rather that we do not need one.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45582047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Pragmatist Reboot of William Whewell’s Theory of Scientific Progress","authors":"R. van der Merwe","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10068","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000William Whewell’s philosophy of science is often overlooked as a relic of 19th century Whiggism. I argue however that his view – suitably modified – can contribute to contemporary philosophy of science, particularly to debates around scientific progress. The reason Whewell’s view needs modification is that he makes the following problematic claim: as science progresses, it reveals necessarily truths and thereby grants a glimpse of the mind of God. Modifying Whewell’s view will involve reinventing his notion of necessary truth as the pragmatist notion of superassertibility. And, if scientific progress does not uncover necessary truths, then it does not reveal the mind of God. The result is an outline of an account of scientific progress that is piecemeal and fallibilist in nature, yet at the same time maintains key Whewellian themes of consilience and the unity of science.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45113438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bibliometrics and Qualitative Assessment: a Pragmatist Approach","authors":"L. Waks, Elizabeth Kramer","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10060","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this essay we explore whether and how we should use bibliometrics in hiring, promoting, and granting in the academy. We suggest a Deweyan-Hickmanian pragmatist approach to reflecting on the technology of bibliometrics as a resource for inherently qualitative judgements in these deliberations. We begin with a literature review of current work evaluating the role and use of bibliometrics in the academy, from advocating for them to questioning their construct validity and assessing their limitations and/or dangerous consequences. In the next section, we take a step back and provide a Deweyan philosophical analysis of the validity and practical use of qualitative assessment. In our conclusion we reflect on what pragmatism can teach about recent algorithmic tools used for faculty evaluation.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43142457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}