{"title":"Call for Commentaries","authors":"","doi":"10.1163/18758185-20240001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-20240001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140080179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pragmatism as a Mediator – Seeking an Illusory Harmony?","authors":"Sami Pihlström","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10078","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the well-known pragmatist claim to mediate between philosophical disputes. While recognizing the reconciliatory and harmonizing role that pragmatism plays in traditional debates between, for example, realism and antirealism, naturalism and culturalism, or science and religion, it is argued that the pragmatist also needs to acknowledge that there are situations in which no such mediation is reasonably possible, such as the conflict between racism and antiracism. The metaphilosophical question to be raised is how – in terms of pragmatism itself – we are able to distinguish between these different cases and what exactly it means to apply the pragmatic method to resolving <em>this</em> meta-level issue. Pragmatism here emerges as a thoroughly fallible and antifoundationalist reflexive inquiry into what it means, and what it ought to mean, for us to view philosophical issues in terms of their conceivable practical consequences. The project of mediation must be subordinated to this more fundamental understanding of pragmatist methodology.</p>","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-12-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139054365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pirates and Parrots. On the Pragmatics of Reading","authors":"Chiel Martien van den Akker","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10077","url":null,"abstract":"At times we are told that our habitual way of thinking has become obsolete given the new challenge we are facing. Some of the conceptual resources at our disposal are no longer capable of addressing the challenge at hand. Therefore, they lose their appeal and are rejected. But only in contrast to these intellectual resources does the challenge appear as a challenge. So it seems that we are confronted with a paradox: we need the intellectual resources for their uselessness. For a proper understanding of this paradox and to unravel it, I will distinguish between <jats:italic>de dicto</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic> readings of philosophical texts. This distinction is borrowed from the neo-pragmatist Robert Brandom. A de dicto reading of a text is concerned with what its author <jats:italic>says</jats:italic>. A de re reading of a text is concerned with what its author <jats:italic>talks about</jats:italic>. Unpacking this distinction allows us to evaluate the <jats:italic>method</jats:italic> of engaging with our stock of conceptual resources as part of scholarly argument.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Certainty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt","authors":"Giovanni Tuzet","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10076","url":null,"abstract":"The paper argues for a pragmatist understanding of the reasonable doubt standard in law. It builds on the idea that our dispositions to act signal the epistemic states we are in. This helps clarify the notion of a reasonable doubt and the idea of being certain beyond it. More specifically, the paper points out three major standards of proof used in legal contexts and the rationale of their distinction. It articulates the received view according to which the reasonable doubt standard is superior to allegedly subjective standards as the French “intime conviction”; then it addresses what I call the “rampant critique” of the reasonable doubt standard, namely the view that, as the notion of a reasonable doubt is obscure and undetermined, the standard is irremediably subjective. The paper finally presents a pragmatist understanding and defense of the standard, building on the idea of beliefs as dispositions to act.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Addressing Common Misunderstandings of Somaesthetics","authors":"T.J. Bonnet","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10075","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews and corrects frequent misunderstandings of somaesthetics, the multidisciplinary field of study of the lived body conceived by Richard Shusterman. After responding to an article published in <jats:italic>Contemporary Pragmatism</jats:italic>, I extend the discussion to cover larger topics of discussion related to somaesthetics and misapprehensions by its critics, including the nature of somatic experience, the role of pleasure, and the relevance of culture. In rectifying mistakes of understanding, it is hoped the effort will foster better understanding and better critique.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"History and Power in Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’: A Pragmaticist-Historicist Account","authors":"Andre C. Willis","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10072","url":null,"abstract":"This reconsideration of Hume’s classic essay “Of Miracles” via the lens of American pragmatist ways of thinking about history and power shifts our attention from Hume’s epistemic concerns about the legitimacy of witnesses and testimony to his distaste for sacred history, his critical stance regarding the social force of revelation, and his disdain for religious authority. To view Hume’s essay both as an articulation of a critical philosophy of history and as an exercise in moral dynamism (social power or, authority, is a result of epistemic transactions), is to intervene in both Hume studies and Contemporary Pragmatism.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dewey’s Notion of Intelligent Habit as a Basis for Ethical Assessment of Technology","authors":"Michał Wieczorek","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10074","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses how John Dewey’s notion of intelligent habit could contribute to technology ethics. For Dewey, intelligent (i.e., desirable) habits are reflective – arising from inquiry into the appropriate courses of action in each situation – and flexible – easily adaptable to the changing circumstances. We should strive to develop intelligent habits as they are the best tools for the achievement of our goals and are necessary for individual and societal flourishing. I argue that Dewey’s notion of intelligent habit makes it possible to identify the impact of technology on users’ identity and self-determination, advocate for the extension of user choice and malleability of technologies, and analyse the connections between the epistemic dimension of technology and users’ ability to flourish.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neither Wisdom Nor Folly","authors":"Paul Howatt","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10073","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to reframe the debate over the intelligence of democracy by revisiting the classic Dewey/Lippmann debate. I argue that Dewey’s way of addressing this problem is better than both dominant approaches today (as exemplified by Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore), since it acknowledges the intellectual obstacles democracy faces while keeping faith with democracy as an ethical ideal. I also illustrate how Dewey’s ideas in <jats:italic>The Public and its Problems</jats:italic> can serve as the foundation for building a response to the challenge thinkers like Lippmann and Brennan pose for democracy. Dewey’s pragmatist orientation toward this challenge, along with his idea of the “Great Community”, offer us a promising path to building an intelligent and empowering democratic society.","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138537341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Only Words Apart? Talking About “The World” in Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion","authors":"L. Hedrick","doi":"10.1163/18758185-bja10067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10067","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In his well-known critique of conceptual relativism, Donald Davidson declared that we are not worlds but “only words apart.” His interpretive principle of charity asserts that the transcendental condition of disagreement is agreement. Pragmatist philosophers of religion have relied upon the principle of charity to argue against a framework theory of religion. They use the notion of a scale of observationality to illustrate where broad-scale agreement lies and place disagreement (and specifically convictional difference qualifying as “religious”) at the higher reaches, considering it interpretively parasitic. In this article, I problematize the ontological premises of construing difference in this way (specifically insofar as they betray traces of positivism) and the uses of ethnography to substantiate it. I draw on the work of contemporary anthropologists who identify with the so-called ontological turn in ethnography to help think differently about difference—about what it means to be “only words apart.”","PeriodicalId":42794,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Pragmatism","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42508026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}