Journal of Dynamics and Games最新文献

{"title":"Permanence in polymatrix replicators","authors":"Telmo Peixe","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020032","url":null,"abstract":"Generally a biological system is said to be permanent if under small perturbations none of the species goes to extinction. In 1979 P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, and R. Wolff [14] introduced the concept of permanence as a stability notion for systems that models the self-organization of biological macromolecules. After, in 1987 W. Jansen [8], and J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund [5] give sufficient conditions for permanence in the usual replicators. In this paper we extend these results for polymatrix replicators.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A dynamic for production economies with multiple equilibria","authors":"E. Accinelli, H. Muñiz","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021002","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we extend to private ownership production economies, the results presented by Bergstrom, Shimomura, and Yamato (2009) on the multiplicity of equilibria for the special kind of pure-exchanges economies called Shapley-Shubik economies. Furthermore, a dynamic system that represents the changes in the distribution of the firms on the production branches is introduced. For the first purpose, we introduce a particular, but large enough, production sector to the Shapley-Shubik economies, for which a simple technique to build private-ownership economies with a multiplicity of equilibria is developed. In this context, we analyze the repercussions on the behavior of the economy when the number of possible equilibria changes due to rational decisions on the production side. For the second purpose, we assume that the rational decisions on the production side provoke a change in the distribution of the firms over the set of branches of production.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Copositivity meets D. C. optimization","authors":"A. Moudafi, P. Maingé","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021022","url":null,"abstract":"<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Based on a work by M. Dur and J.-B. Hiriart-Urruty[<xref ref-type=\"bibr\" rid=\"b3\">3</xref>], we consider the problem of whether a symmetric matrix is copositive formulated as a difference of convex functions problem. The convex nondifferentiable function in this d.c. decomposition being proximable, we then apply a proximal-gradient method to approximate the related stationary points. Whereas, in [<xref ref-type=\"bibr\" rid=\"b3\">3</xref>], the DCA algorithm was used.</p>","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A zero sum differential game with correlated informations on the initial position. A case with a continuum of initial positions","authors":"C. Jimenez","doi":"10.3934/JDG.2021009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2021009","url":null,"abstract":"We study a two player zero sum game where the initial position begin{document}$ z_0 $end{document} is not communicated to any player. The initial position is a function of a couple begin{document}$ (x_0,y_0) $end{document} where begin{document}$ x_0 $end{document} is communicated to player Ⅰ while begin{document}$ y_0 $end{document} is communicated to player Ⅱ. The couple begin{document}$ (x_0,y_0) $end{document} is chosen according to a probability measure begin{document}$ dm(x,y) = h(x,y) dmu(x) dnu(y) $end{document} . We show that the game has a value and, under additional regularity assumptions, that the value is a solution of Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equation in a dual sense.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Explaining the definition of wholesale access prices in the Portuguese telecommunications industry","authors":"V. Ribeiro, F. L. Pereira, Rui Gonçalves","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021024","url":null,"abstract":"The 2016–2018 triennium was a period marked by a fierce dispute between the European Commission and Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações, Portugal, on the need to regulate wholesale access prices. While the European Commission defended the imposition of Fiber-To-The-x regulation in non-competitive areas, the Portuguese sectoral regulator argued in favor of the persistence of Fiber-To-The-x deregulation. Following a Game Theory approach, the present study demonstrates that the transition from Fiber-To-The-x deregulation to Fiber-To-The-x regulation should only occur when a given territorial unit becomes a competitive area since the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium captures a regulatory framework optimally characterized by the imposition of active access price deregulation (regulation) in non-competitive (competitive) areas, that is, local administrative units characterized by a weak (strong) degree of vertical spillover, respectively. Meanwhile, ducts access regulation must be permanently imposed throughout the national territory, despite it can be relaxed in competitive areas if the regulator imposes intra-flexibility to establish a monopolistic bottleneck to ensure social welfare maximization. Previous conclusions require to introduce both facility-based and service-based competition at the entry stage as well as active and passive obligations at the regulation stage in a multi-stage game with complete information. The present analysis legitimizes the emergence of a new optimization theory in the telecommunications literature, whose modus operandi is contrary to (coincident with) the ladder of investment theory in non-competitive (competitive) areas, respectively. Differently from the view sustained by the ladder of investment theory, which defends that a short-term regulatory touch combined with long-term market deregulation is a socially optimal strategy, the new theory confirms that a regulatory intervention is socially desirable only in the long run. The conceptual refinement is meticulously explained and labeled as the theory of creative creation because, differently from the Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction, whose processes of industrial mutation are permanently market-driven by assumption, a period of regulatory holidays followed by successive regulatory interventions dependent on the degree of vertical spillover observed in the telecommunications industry can effectively promote investment realization that continuously revolutionizes the market structure from within, incessantly destroying the old technology. The theory of creative creation reflects the regulatory framework currently in force in the Portuguese Telecommunications Industry.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Preface: Mean field games: New trends and applications","authors":"Adriano Festa, D. Gomes, Francisco J. Silva, D. Tonon","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021025","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p xml:lang=\"fr\" />","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming","authors":"P. Neme, San Luis Argentina Av. Italia, J. Oviedo","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021001","url":null,"abstract":"Given two stable matchings in a many-to-one matching market with begin{document}$ q $end{document} -responsive preferences, by manipulating the objective function of the linear program that characterizes the stable matching set, we compute the least upper bound and greatest lower bound between them.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Systems theory and analysis of the implementation of non pharmaceutical policies for the mitigation of the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"J. Leventides, C. Poulios, Georgios Alkis Tsiatsios, M. Livada, Stavros Tsipras, Konstantinos Lefcaditis, P. Sargenti, A. Sargenti","doi":"10.3934/JDG.2021004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2021004","url":null,"abstract":"We utilize systems theory in the study of the implementation of non pharmaceutical strategies for the mitigation of the COVID-19 pandemic. We present two models. The first one is a model of predictive control with receding horizon and discontinuous actions of unknown costs for the implementation of adaptive triggering policies during the disease. This model is based on a periodic assessment of the peak of the pandemic (and, thus, of the health care demand) utilizing the latest data about the transmission and recovery rate of the disease. Consequently, the model seems to be suitable for discontinuous, non-mechanical (i.e. human) actions with unknown effectiveness, like those applied in the case of COVID-19. Secondly, we consider a feedback control problem in order to contain the pandemic at the capacity of the NHS (National Health System). As input parameter we consider the value begin{document}$ p $end{document} that reflects the intensity-effectiveness of the measures applied and as output the predicted maximum of infected people to be treated by NHS. The feedback control regulates begin{document}$ p $end{document} so that the number of infected people is manageable. Based on this approach, we address the following questions: (a) the limits of improvement of this approach; (b) the effectiveness of this approach; (c) the time horizon and timing of the application.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the equal surplus sharing interval solutions and an application","authors":"O. Palanci, M. Eki̇ci̇, S. Z. A. Gök","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020023","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we focus on the equal surplus sharing interval solutions for cooperative games, where the set of players are finite and the coalition values are interval numbers. We consider the properties of a class of equal surplus sharing interval solutions consisting of all convex combinations of them. Moreover, an application based on transportation interval situations is given. Finally, we propose three solution concepts, namely the interval Shapley value, ICIS-value and IENSC-value, for this application and these solution concepts are compared.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New solutions of hyperbolic telegraph equation","authors":"Mohammad Partohaghighi, M. Akinlar, G. Weber","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020029","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new method based on unification of fictitious time integration (FTI) and group preserving (GP) methods. The GP method is applied in numerically discretized ordinary differential equations obtained from application of FTI method to a given partial differential equation (PDE). The algorithm is applied to hyperbolic telegraph equation and utilizes the Cayley transformation and the Pade approximations in the Minkowski space. It avoids unauthentic solutions and ghost fixed points which is one of the advantages of the present method over other related numerical methods in the literature. The technique is tested on three specific examples for various parameter values appearing in the telegraph equation and discretization steps. Such solutions of the telegraph equation are obtained first time in this paper. Illustrative figures are provided. Efficiency of the method is determined by an error analysis which is achieved by comparing numerical solutions with exact solutions.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}