Journal of Dynamics and Games最新文献_第5页

Shapley value for differential network games: Theory and application 差分网络博弈的Shapley值:理论与应用

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020021

L. Petrosyan, D. Yeung

引用次数: 8

Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory 用化学反应网络理论说明博弈论中分布动力学的稳定性

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2021030

R. Cressman, V. Křivan

{"title":"Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory","authors":"R. Cressman, V. Křivan","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021030","url":null,"abstract":"This article shows how to apply results of chemical reaction network theory (CRNT) to prove uniqueness and stability of a positive equilibrium for pairs/groups distributional dynamics that arise in game theoretic models. Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals accrue their fitness through interactions with other individuals. When there are two or more different strategies in the population, this theory assumes that pairs (groups) are formed instantaneously and randomly so that the corresponding pairs (groups) distribution is described by the Hardy–Weinberg (binomial) distribution. If interactions times are phenotype dependent the Hardy-Weinberg distribution does not apply. Even if it becomes impossible to calculate the pairs/groups distribution analytically we show that CRNT is a general tool that is very useful to prove not only existence of the equilibrium, but also its stability. In this article, we apply CRNT to pair formation model that arises in two player games (e.g., Hawk-Dove, Prisoner's Dilemma game), to group formation that arises, e.g., in Public Goods Game, and to distribution of a single population in patchy environments. We also show by generalizing the Battle of the Sexes game that the methodology does not always apply.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A graph cellular automaton with relation-based neighbourhood describing the impact of peer influence on the consumption of marijuana among college-aged youths 基于关系邻域的元胞图自动机描述同伴影响对大学生大麻消费的影响

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2021011

Y. B. Ruhomally, M. Z. Dauhoo, Laurent Dumas

{"title":"A graph cellular automaton with relation-based neighbourhood describing the impact of peer influence on the consumption of marijuana among college-aged youths","authors":"Y. B. Ruhomally, M. Z. Dauhoo, Laurent Dumas","doi":"10.3934/JDG.2021011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2021011","url":null,"abstract":"A novel approach depicting the dynamics of marijuana usage to gauge the effects of peer influence in a school population, is the site of investigation. Consumption of drug is considered as a contagious social epidemic which is spread mainly by peer influences. A relation-based graph-CA (r-GCA) model consisting of 4 states namely, Nonusers (N), Experimental users (E), Recreational users (R) and Addicts (A), is formulated in order to represent the prevalence of the epidemic on a campus. The r-GCA model is set up by local transition rules which delineates the proliferation of marijuana use. Data available in [ 4 ] is opted to verify and validate the r-GCA. Simulations of the r-GCA system are presented and discussed. The numerical results agree quite accurately with the observed data. Using the model, the enactment of campaigns of prevention targeting N, E and R states respectively were conducted and analysed. The results indicate a significant decline in marijuana consumption on the campus when a campaign of prevention targeting the latter three states simultaneously, is enacted.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Game value for a pursuit-evasion differential game problem in a Hilbert space 希尔伯特空间中追逐-逃避微分对策问题的对策值

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2021019

A. J. Badakaya, A. S. Halliru, J. Adamu

引用次数: 3

Large deviations and Stochastic stability in Population Games 人口博弈中的大偏差和随机稳定性

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2021021

Mathias Staudigl, S. Arigapudi, W. Sandholm

{"title":"Large deviations and Stochastic stability in Population Games","authors":"Mathias Staudigl, S. Arigapudi, W. Sandholm","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2021021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021021","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we review a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. We survey the methods developed by the authors which allow for a quantitative analysis of these stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. We start with a compact survey of techniques designed to study the long run behavior in the small noise double limit (SNDL). In this regime we let the noise level in agents' decision rules to approach zero, and then the population size is formally taken to infinity. This iterated limit strategy yields a family of deterministic optimal control problems which admit an explicit analysis in many instances. We then move in by describing the main steps to analyze stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in the large population double limit (LPDL). This regime refers to the iterated limit in which first the population size is taken to infinity and then the noise level in agents' decisions vanishes. The mathematical analysis of LPDL relies on a sample-path large deviations principle for a family of Markov chains on compact polyhedra. In this setting we formulate a set of conjectures and open problems which give a clear direction for future research activities.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm 随机动力学与Edmonds算法

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2021029

Jonathan Newton, William H. Sandholm

引用次数: 2

Causal discovery in machine learning: Theories and applications 机器学习中的因果发现:理论与应用

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2021008

Ana Rita Nogueira, J. Gama, C. Ferreira

引用次数: 19

The sensitivity of commodity markets to exchange operations such as swing 大宗商品市场对波动等交易操作的敏感性