Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental最新文献

{"title":"Diagora di Melo e Teodoro di Cirene: due atei?","authors":"G. Casertano","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_33_03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_33_03","url":null,"abstract":"Diagora e Teodoro sono due degli atei ricordati in vari cataloghi sugli atei dell’antichità, il primo dei quali risalente al II sec. a.C., e da allora in poi ricordati, dagli antichi fino ai giorni nostri, immancabilmente con la qualifica di atei. In effetti l’ateismo condannato ad Atene affondava le sue radici nella cultura filosofica e scientifica presocratica, la cui impronta fondamentalmente “materialistica” è autorevolmente testimoniata da Aristotele (Metafisica I 983b5-10). Le filosofie di Anassimandro, Anassimene, Senofane, Eraclito, Anassagora, Diogene di Apollonia, e naturalmente degli atomisti e dei sofisti offrirono, sia pure in maniere diverse, non solo un supporto importante alla critica delle divinità tradizionali, ma anche le fondamenta filosofiche dell’ateismo. Con questa tradizione Diagora non ha nulla a che vedere; anche alcune vicende della sua vita possono al massimo meritargli l’accusa di empio, ma non di ateo. \u0000            Di altra tempra culturale appare Teodoro, vicino non solo alla cultura della scuola cirenaica, ma anche dei cinici e dei sofisti. Di lui abbiamo non solo dei riferimenti a dottrine filosofiche, ma anche chiare testimonianze del suo ateismo, essendosi dedicato a «eliminare radicalmente le comuni credenze negli dèi». In conclusione, mentre il nome di Diagora può tranquillamente cancellarsi dai cataloghi degli atei, quello di Teodoro a buon diritto vi fa parte.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85099187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wearing Virtue: Plato’s Republic V, 449a-457b and the Socratic Debate on Women’s Nature","authors":"Cinzia Arruzza","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_33_06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_33_06","url":null,"abstract":"In Plato’s Republic V, 449a-457b, Socrates argues that the guardian class of Kallipolis will comprise both men and women and that women with the appropriate nature ought to receive the same education and fulfill the same tasks as their male counterparts. In this article I argue, against competing interpretations of this claim as dependent either on the necessity of abolishing the oikos or on eugenic principles, that Socrates’ argument ought to be understood as a genuine argument about women’s natural capabilities and ought to be interpreted in light of the Socratic debate about women’s virtues. Moreover, I show that the legal language mobilized, combined with polemical references to Aristophanes, serves the purpose of evoking Socrates’ trial, thus alerting the reader to the seriousness of the proposal in question.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83057306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aporetic Discourse and Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis","authors":"Jan Szaif","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_37","url":null,"abstract":"In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysisfunctions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87171670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The akin vs. the good in Plato’s Lysis","authors":"Dave Jennings","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_39","url":null,"abstract":"The two most compelling accounts of the friend in Plato’s Lysis are that the neither good nor bad is friend of the good and that the akin is friend of the akin. In this paper I challenge a common interpretation that these accounts are the same, similar to, or compatible with one another. I argue instead that the two accounts are incompatible because they rely on opposing assumptions about the nature of desire and its relationship to need and about friendship and its orientation towards what benefits the one who loves. Although I do not offer a comprehensive interpretation of the dialogue, I argue that, given his main assumptions about the friendship, desire, and philosophy in the Lysis, Socrates could only endorse first of these accounts, that the neither good nor bad is a friend of the good, if indeed endorses any of them.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"30 Suppl 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78669395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Egoism, Utility, and Friendship in Plato’s Lysis","authors":"I. Deretic","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_41","url":null,"abstract":"Many scholars consider that Socrates in the Lysis holds that friendship and love are egoistic and utility-based. In this paper, I will argue against those readings of Plato’s Lysis. I will analyze how Socrates treats utility and egoism in the many different kinds of friendship he discusses in the dialogue, from parental love, like-to-like, and unlike-to-unlike relationships, to the accounts of friendship rooted in the human relation to the good and the ways in which we can belong with some other human beings. The upshot of my paper is twofold. I endeavor to prove that some of these relationships, as Plato’s Socrates discusses them, are not egoistic and that Plato represents and valorizes a particular type of friendship having to do with philosophy and philosophical way of life, which is for the sake of another.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80505425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“Cutting Them Down to Size”: Humbling and Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis","authors":"T. Anderson, Reid Comstock","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_38","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the role that humbling plays in Socratic practice. Specifically, we consider how Socrates humbles his interlocutors in order to turn them towards the pursuit of philosophical friendship. We argue against a standard interpretation of humbling in the Lysis, which holds that Socrates humbles Lysis by exposing his own ignorance to him at 210d. Instead, we argue that the humbling occurs not when Lysis is (allegedly) made aware of his own ignorance, but at 222d near the end of the dialogue, when Lysis is made to think that he is not as good a friend as he thought he was. On this reading, Socrates humbles Lysis not by exposing to him his ignorance about theoretical matters but by suggesting to him that he may be not the sort of person he thought he was.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84582440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Plato’s Lysis and the Erotics of Philia","authors":"D. Roochnik","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_42","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the account of friendship (philia) present in Plato's dialogue the Lysis is rife with the disruptive and maddening force of eros. By its end it is no longer clear whether the familiar sorts of personal relationships that we typically count as friendships, and which Aristotle discusses with great sensitivity and appreciation in the Nicomachean Ethics, can be meaningfully sustained. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes each of the seven, relatively self-contained arguments Socrates offers. In addition, it shows how the dramatic context in which these arguments are embedded foreshadows the dialogue's principal objective: to blur the distinction between philia and eros by allowing the latter to infect the former.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86457976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Philia as Fellowship in Plato’s Lysis","authors":"A. Payne","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_40","url":null,"abstract":"Socrates in the Lysis discusses philia and the conditions under which two or more people can be said to engage in this relationship. Many commentators take Socrates to be attempting to discover how human beings enter into the relationship of friendship, a relationship characterized by reciprocal affection, altruistic concern and personal intimacy. Other readers of the Lysis see in the dialogue’s investigation of philia a discussion of desire and attraction at the most general level. On this view, philia is one species of the general human desire for good. The present paper develops a third reading of philia. Philia is a type of partnership or fellowship where affection and intimacy are not central features of the relationship. The fellowship involves at least one party who possesses wisdom while other members of the fellowship seek to benefit from wisdom. Thus philia is a characteristically human response to the need for wisdom. The members of such a fellowship share a common desire for a good which gives purpose to their association, and because of their common desire to benefit from this good the members can be described as fellows or partners in the pursuit of this good.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"165 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86259675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction to Studies on Plato’s Lysis","authors":"Jan Szaif, D. Jennings","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_32_36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_32_36","url":null,"abstract":"Plato’s Lysis shows Socrates in conversation with two boys he has met at a wrestling school, Lysis and Menexenus. Their debate revolves around the notion of philia, seeking to pin down the nature of this relation, who or what takes part in it, and what causes it. The word philiahas usually been translated as “friendship” but has a wider application in this dialogue, as it encompasses a variety of friendly and loving attitudes toward both people and things. The kinds of interpersonal philia evoked include erotic attachments, kinship relations, utility-based relations, and playful companionship. Roughly two-thirds into the dialogue, the focus turns to a more general theory of desiderative attachments and the question of their ultimate telos and cause. The conversation ends, at least on the face of it, in an impasse, an aporia, when the interlocutors find themselves thrown back to the point from where they started, and no attempt to answer the question of what philia is or what motivates it has stuck. The Lysis nevertheless offers many incentives for further discussion and has elicited radically different responses from its interpreters as to what its real message is. For instance, does it promote a form of utilitarian egoism according to which human attachment can never, or should never, be altruistically motivated? Or does it hint at a very different concept of interpersonal love based on the idea that friendship, as it were, completes us since it connects us with those that share the same values? Does this dialogue stay within the familiar ambit of Socratic ethics, centered around the question of what it takes to achieve happiness (eudaimonia) in a human life, without a concern for metaphysical questions? Or, quite the contrary, does its discussion of the highest object of love (to proton philon) point forward to the metaphysical program of Plato’s so-called middle-period dialogues and especially to the notions of the form of the good or the form of the beautiful, notions which are at the center of the Republic and the Symposium? These questions and others will continue to be debated about this puzzling dialogue. The essays assembled in the present volume address many of these topics.","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80865790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Novas abordagens para o estudo da História das Mulheres: entre os gêneros, a igualdade e a liberdade; Resenha de Ancona, R.; Tsouvala, G. (eds.) New Directions in the Study of Women in the Greco-Roman World (2021)","authors":"Priscilla Gontijo Leite, Marina Pelluci Duarte Mortoza","doi":"10.14195/1984-249x_33_01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_33_01","url":null,"abstract":"Resenha de Ancona, R.; Tsouvala, G. (eds.) New Directions in the Study of Women in the Greco-Roman World (2021)","PeriodicalId":41249,"journal":{"name":"Archai-Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75222342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}