{"title":"Regressive Mortgage Credit Redistribution in the Post-crisis Era","authors":"Francesco D’Acunto, Alberto G. Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2833961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2833961","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We document four secular trends about U.S. mortgage origination by traditional and FinTech lenders after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. First, since 2011, the overall number, size, and approval rate of small and medium-sized loans have been decreasing over time, relative to large loans. Second, the largest lenders redistribute their lending the most. Third, this loan-size redistribution of credit increases in the size of the lender. Fourth, the effects are stronger for mortgages further away from the conforming loan limit(s) in both directions. We argue that the supply of credit drives these secular trends, and we assess several potential economic mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127206648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Good Lies","authors":"Filippo Pavesi, Massimo Scotti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2962561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2962561","url":null,"abstract":"Decision makers often face uncertainty both about the ability and the integrity of their advisors. If an expert is sufficiently concerned about establishing a reputation for being skilled and unbiased, she may truthfully report her private information about the decision-relevant state. However, while in a truthtelling equilibrium the decision maker learns only about the ability of the expert, in an equilibrium with some misreporting the decision maker also learns about the expert’s bias. Although truthful behavior allows for more informed current decisions, it may lead to worst sorting. Therefore, if a decision maker places enough weight on future choices relative to present ones, lying may be welfare improving.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133673912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Goods and Public Bads","authors":"W. Buchholz, R. Cornes, D. Rübbelke","doi":"10.1111/JPET.12298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/JPET.12298","url":null,"abstract":"In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways: While for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes’ and Hartley’s (2007) Aggregative Game Approach, we analyze a general model, in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results w.r.t. redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition building and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto optimal solution highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129042274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards a New Economic Philosophy (The Value Added of Giving More than Receiving)","authors":"N. Gayed, N. Alber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2950863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2950863","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an economic philosophy derived from the main Philosophy of Humanism of all relationships among individuals (the philosophy of the science of human love), as a direct practical application of the philosophy of giving more than receiving. Can the producer achieve high profitability along with high competitive position while offering the consumer good quality product at a reasonable cost? Can the employees of such an enterprise have stable jobs and good income at the same time? The purpose of this paper is to look at how all these goals can be accomplished. \u0000The proposed economic philosophy depends on a main notion which is: if the strongest element in the equation or economic relationship, namely the producer or seller, starts to follows the philosophy of human love while dealing with the other party in the relationship, the weakest party, namely the consumer or buyer, then the same philosophy of giving more than receiving could be transmitted by extension to the weakest party. \u0000This philosophy may be supported by the growing of shadow banking, where the more the interest rate margin, the more the receiving more than giving and this is why we should rethink about using interest rate margin as a major source of banking profitability. Besides, statistical analysis indicates that corruption tends to be affected by poverty according to a quadratic function, where the minimum point represents the lowest level of corruption. Moreover, the lowest level of each of corruption and poverty may decrease through adopting the philosophy of giving more than receiving.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128707137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Exchange Rate Flexibility and the Effect of Remittances on Economic Growth","authors":"Emmanuel K. K. Lartey","doi":"10.1111/rode.12256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12256","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the question of whether exchange rate policy affects the impact of remittances on economic growth in recipient countries. The paper utilizes a comprehensive data set that comprises annual observations for 135 developing and transition countries, spanning 1970-2007. The data for exchange rate regimes is based on the Reinhart and Rogoff exchange rate regime classification, whereas the data for remittances and all other variables are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. The findings indicate that more flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with a greater increase in economic growth following an increase in remittances, but also that the impact of remittances on growth is positive under a fixed exchange rate regime. The estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in remittances increases per capita growth by about 0.79 percent under a fixed exchange rate regime, and that this effect increases by about 0.13 percent for a 1 point increase in the exchange rate flexibility index. The results further suggest that the effect of remittances under a fixed exchange rate regime is positive in less financially developed countries as well, but do not provide conclusive evidence that this effect varies inversely with exchange rate flexibility in such economies as theorized.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121807393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Eckerstorfer, Jan Halák, Jakob Kapeller, B. Schütz, Florian Springholz, Rafael Wildauer
{"title":"Correcting for the Missing Rich: An Application to Wealth Survey Data","authors":"P. Eckerstorfer, Jan Halák, Jakob Kapeller, B. Schütz, Florian Springholz, Rafael Wildauer","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12188","url":null,"abstract":"It is a well-known criticism that if the distribution of wealth is highly concentrated, survey data are hardly reliable when it comes to analyzing the richest parts of society. This paper addresses this criticism by providing a general rationale of the underlying methodological problem as well as by proposing a specific methodological approach tailored to correcting the arising bias. We illustrate the latter approach by using Austrian data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. Specifically, we identify suitable parameter combinations by using a series of maximum-likelihood estimates and appropriate goodness-of-fit tests to avoid arbitrariness with respect to the fitting of the Pareto distribution. Our results suggest that the alleged non-observation bias is considerable, accounting for about one quarter of total net wealth in the case of Austria. The method developed in this paper can easily be applied to other countries where survey data on wealth are available.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130778328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Probabilistic Lump-Sum Taxation","authors":"M. Dudek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2601764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2601764","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we describe an elementary, fully implementable, and revenue neutral randomizing mechanism that leads to a Pareto improvement over allocations induced by labor income tax functions. We illustrate, by providing a theoretical example, that our mechanism can be applied to optimal tax functions identified by Saez and Diamond. Furthermore, we provide an explicit numerical example, which confirms that our procedure can lead to a Pareto improvement over allocations induced by optimal tax functions of Mirrlees. Moreover, we show that our randomizing procedure is not only implementable, as it requires less than the standard informational demands, but can also lead to sizable welfare gains amounting to about 10% of the underlying distortion. Finally, we show that, unlike most of the traditional approaches involving randomness, the mechanism we describe can preserve horizontal equity.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130996791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assessing Recent Determinants of Borrowing Costs in Sub‐Saharan Africa","authors":"Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, I. Kvangraven","doi":"10.1111/rode.12195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12195","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores macroeconomic implications of the sovereign bond rush that has been taking place in sub‐Saharan Africa since 2006. The focus is on the sub‐Saharan sovereign bond yields as proxies for the region's ability to raise new funds on international markets. Despite the subcontinent's tour‐de‐force entrance to the international bond market, this paper reveals that recent (since early 2000s) borrowing in foreign currency is not without macroeconomic risk. Empirically this paper finds that sovereign bond yields are significantly influenced by global volatility, commodity prices and global liquidity - all factors that are out of the control of the sub‐Saharan economies in question. These findings suggest that portfolio repositioning by institutional investors prompted by improved growth prospects and implicit monetary policy tightening in the advanced economies or heightened risk perceptions, are likely to result in increased borrowing costs for the sub‐Saharan bond issuers and affect their ability to raise funds in international markets. Furthermore, a change in borrowing costs might lead to higher debt‐service costs and policy uncertainty, which in turn could lead to suboptimal investment levels and, ultimately, hinder economic development.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116458117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Informational Theory of Privacy","authors":"Ole Jann, Christoph Schottmüller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2853468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2853468","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Privacy of consumers or citizens is often seen as an inefficient information asymmetry. We challenge this view by showing that privacy can increase welfare in an informational sense. It can also improve information aggregation and prevent inefficient statistical discrimination. We show how and when the different informational effects of privacy line up to make privacy efficient or even Pareto-optimal. Our theory can be applied to decide who should have which information and how privacy and information disclosure should be regulated. We discuss applications to online privacy, credit decisions and transparency in government.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132855537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multi-Period Risk Sharing Under Financial Fairness","authors":"Hai-ming Bao, Eduard Ponds, Johannes Schumacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2690270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690270","url":null,"abstract":"We work with a multi-period system where a finite number of agents need to share multiple monetary risks. We look for the solutions that are both Pareto efficient utility-wise and financially fair value-wise. A buffer enables the inter-temporal capital transfer. Expected utility is used to evaluate the utility, and a risk-neutral measure is essential for determining the risk sharing rules. It can be shown that in the model setting there always exists a unique risk sharing rule that is both Pareto efficient and financially fair. An iterative algorithm is introduced to calculate this rule numerically.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115983705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}