ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)最新文献

Tradable mobility permits in a monocentric city with pre-existing labor taxation: a general equilibrium perspective 具有劳动税收的单中心城市的可交易流动性:一般均衡视角

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3914773

Diego Candia, E. Verhoef

引用次数: 1

Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets 固定预算下的集体行动与群内冲突

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3909789

Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath

引用次数: 3

Expected Neediness and the Formation of Mutual Support Arrangements: Evidence from the Philippines 预期需求与相互支持安排的形成:来自菲律宾的证据

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-08-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3899806

Friederike Lenel

引用次数: 1

Consumer Status Signaling, Wealth Inequality and Non-deceptive Counterfeits 消费者地位信号、财富不平等与非欺骗性假货

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-07-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3889503

Li Chen, Zhen Lian, S. Yao

{"title":"Consumer Status Signaling, Wealth Inequality and Non-deceptive Counterfeits","authors":"Li Chen, Zhen Lian, S. Yao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889503","url":null,"abstract":"Consumers often enjoy displaying luxury consumption to signal their private wealth status. The emergence of social media has fueled such desire for status signaling. Meanwhile, the rising of e-commerce has made it easy for consumers to search and purchase cheap non-deceptive counterfeits to send a ``fake'' status signal, posing a serious problem to the luxury (status product) industry. Motivated by these industry dynamics, we consider a market entry deterrence game between an incumbent status product firm (the firm) and a non-deceptive counterfeiter (the counterfeiter) who attempts to enter the market. A unique feature of our model is that the market demand is endogenously determined by a consumer status signaling subgame. We investigate the interaction among consumer status signaling, wealth inequality, and equilibrium market outcomes, as well as the implications of anti-counterfeit measures aimed at increasing the counterfeiter market entry cost. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, we show that without counterfeits, the firm is strictly better off from the heightened motive of consumer status signaling; however, such benefit would be neutralized by the potential counterfeiter entry. Second, we find that the presence of counterfeits lowers the firm's profit, but may induce the firm to raise its price. It may also increase social welfare, despite enabling a fake status signal. Third, we demonstrate that increasing the counterfeiter market entry cost may not completely eliminate counterfeiting insofar as the consumer status signaling motive and wealth inequality are high, in which case the firm would settle for strategic coexistence with the counterfeiter.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126508742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Welfare Measurement and Poverty Targeting Based on Participatory Wealth Rankings 基于参与式财富排名的福利衡量与贫困定位

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-12-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3756257

Martin Wiegand

{"title":"Welfare Measurement and Poverty Targeting Based on Participatory Wealth Rankings","authors":"Martin Wiegand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3756257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3756257","url":null,"abstract":"Participatory wealth rankings (PWRs) present an inclusive and inexpensive targeting method to identify poor households. They tend to be well received by participants but point to a systematically different understanding of welfare than implied by consumption-based rankings. This suggests that PWRs could be used as the basis for alternative welfare measures that aim to reflect local perceptions of poverty. This paper demonstrates how such a measure can be constructed, using data from a field experiment on poverty targeting in Indonesia. It then explores the potential impact of using this welfare measure as targeting goal on participants’ and village leaders’ satisfaction. I find that higher targeting accuracy—using the PWR-based measure as benchmark—increases satisfaction with the program. However, after controlling for targeting accuracy, the PWR does not lead to discernibly higher satisfaction than a proxy means targeting mechanism. The PWRs thus seem to be appreciated for their resulting allocations rather than valued intrinsically. I also find that targeting accuracy explains satisfaction outcomes better when it is measured against PWR-based welfare rather than predicted consumption. This holds true even for communities where no actual PWRs had been conducted. The results suggest that the information contained in PWRs can be used as a meaningful basis for targeting and poverty measurement.<br>","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115935231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Elinor Ostrom as Behavioral Economist 行为经济学家埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-11-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3739912

Vlad Tarko

{"title":"Elinor Ostrom as Behavioral Economist","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3739912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739912","url":null,"abstract":"Similar to fellow Nobelists Vernon Smith and Richard Thaler, Elinor Ostrom has emphasized not just our cognitive limits, but also the institutions that people create to overcome them. But, while Vernon Smith or Thaler still focus primarily on private choices, and the institutions within which such choices happen, e.g. private financial or health choices, Elinor Ostrom has expanded the realm of inquiry by exploring how bounded rationality also enters the picture in collective action problems. The fact that Elinor Ostrom is primarily interested in collective action, rather than private individual action, has also led her to a different perspective on the limits of rational choice models. For Ostrom, the simplistic rational choice collective action model, as developed in Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, leads to wrong predictions about the conditions under which collective action happens (or doesn’t happen), and, furthermore, biases the analysis in favor of paternalistic solutions for solving collective action problem, as illustrated in Hardin’s analysis of the tragedy of the commons. The result of Ostrom’s analysis is a richer concept of rational choice, which simultaneously (a) accepts that individuals will act opportunistically, possibly undermining collective action, and (b) acknowledges the capacities of groups to take advantage of richer behavioral features, like altruistic punishment, fairness, group loyalty, and intrinsic preferences, in order to enable self-governing collective action. This richer concept of human behavior also raises additional concerns about the problems of hierarchical paternalistic proposals, showing that tyranny and oppression can be even more robust than accounted for by the simple rational choice model, particularly when we consider group loyalty.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124550861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Strong Consistency of Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules 中性单调二元社会决策规则的强一致性

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3718621

S. Jain

引用次数: 0

Compromising between the Proportional and Equal Division Values: Axiomatization, Consistency and Implementation 比例与等分值之间的妥协:公理化、一致性与实现

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3684658

Zhengxing Zou, R. van den Brink, Yukihiko Funaki

引用次数: 0

Electoral Maldistricting 选举Maldistricting

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3579221

Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma

引用次数: 8

The Last Will Be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies With Relative Payoff Concerns 后来者优先，后来者最后:考虑到相对收益的社会中的隔离

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3564235

P. Herings, Riccardo D. Saulle, C. Seel

引用次数: 1