{"title":"The Political Economy of Blockchain Governance","authors":"Barton E. Lee, Daniel J. Moroz, D. Parkes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3537314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537314","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a theory of blockchain governance using tools from formal political theory. The software underlying blockchain projects is frequently updated (forked) to implement new policies, and these forks are the subject of our inquiry. We investigate the ways in which the decentralized governance structure and preferences of users influence which policies are implemented, considering network effects as well as user preferences for different policies. We describe several types of forks and identify the strategic conditions necessary for each. We show that network-effects can motivate less moderate policy proposals, and highlight the role of market frictions created by cryptocurrency exchanges in promoting non-contentious forks that are adopted by all users. The model explains counter-intuitive phenomena that have been observed in the governance of blockchain systems.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130277419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Efficiency‐Adjusted Public Capital, Capital Grants, and Growth","authors":"Ernesto Crivelli","doi":"10.1111/rode.12638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12638","url":null,"abstract":"A debate on whether capital grants, and especially European Union (EU) funds, actually contribute to growth has gained prominence lately. This article empirically assesses the relationship between the quality of public investment, capital grants, and growth in a sample of 43 emerging and peripheral economies over 1991–2015. To this end, the contribution of public capital to growth is estimated using efficiency‐adjusted public capital stock series, which reflects the quality of public investment management institutions. In addition, the determinants of effective public investment are analyzed. The results suggest that capital grants contribute positively to effective public investment, and the latter is significant in explaining variations in economic growth. Finally, the article illustrates the impact of raising EU funds absorption on potential growth in emerging and peripheral EU countries.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127937399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Effect of Religious Priming in Prosocial and Destructive Behaviour","authors":"Jipeng Zhang, Elizabeth Brown, Huan Xie","doi":"10.1111/1468-0106.12293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12293","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the behavioural impact of religious priming by showing participants religious words in a scrambled sentence task before a dictator game and a joy-of-destruction game. We also elicited data on individual religiosity and religious affiliation using a questionnaire. Priming religious words significantly increased pro-social behaviour in the dictator game, and the effect was especially striking among those reporting no religion, atheists and agnostics. The religious prime has no significant effect in mitigating destructive behaviour or own expectations of the other's destruction choice, but both destructive behaviour and expectations correlate positively with the multi-dimensional religiosity measure.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127284814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Capital Account Liberalization Affect Income Inequality?","authors":"Xiang Li, Dan Su","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3404691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3404691","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the relationship between capital account liberalisation and income inequality. Adopting a novel identification strategy, namely a difference-in-difference estimation combined with propensity score matching between the liberalised and closed countries, we provide robust evidence that opening the capital account is associated with an adverse impact on income inequality in developing countries. The main findings are threefold. First, fully liberalising the capital account is associated with a small rise of 0.07-0.30 standard deviations in the Gini coefficient in the short-run and a rise as large as 0.32-0.62 standard deviations in the ten years after liberalisation, on average. Second, widening income inequality is the outcome of the growing income share of the rich at the cost of the poor. The long-term effect of capital account liberalisation includes a reduction in the income share of the poorest half by 2.66-3.79 percentage points and an increase in the income share of the richest 10% by 5.19-8.76 percentage points. Third, the directions and categories of capital account liberalisation matter. Inward capital account liberalisation is more detrimental to income equality than outward capital account liberalisation, and free access to the international equity market exacerbates income inequality the most, while foreign direct investment has an insignificant impact on inequality.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126828177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Crawler: Two Equivalence Results for Object (Re)Allocation Problems When Preferences are Single-Peaked","authors":"Y. Tamura, Hadi Hosseini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3503893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503893","url":null,"abstract":"For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the \"crawler\", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined \"dual\" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the \"random priority rule\" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the \"core from random endowments\".","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134371513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Ali, Jeff Luckstead, Alvaro Durand‐Morat, E. Wailes
{"title":"The Impacts of Trade and Self‐Sufficiency Policies on Heterogeneous Rice Farms in Malaysia","authors":"R. Ali, Jeff Luckstead, Alvaro Durand‐Morat, E. Wailes","doi":"10.1111/rode.12618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12618","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a farm household model of heterogeneous Malaysian rice farmers. The model determines the domestic price of milled rice in equilibrium. The model is simulated to analyze the effects of free trade, self‐sufficiency achieved through trade policy, and the impact of free trade and self‐sufficiency when rice productivity expands. The ex ante results for free trade predict that total rice supply rises as the increase in imports offsets the decrease in domestic production, causing the domestic price of milled rice to fall by 15.8 percent. While this price decrease generates negative income effects for rice farmers, it leads to an expansion of consumption of milled rice by both the farm and urban populations. The results for self‐sufficiency through heightened tariffs predict that production for domestic rice farmers increases. However, with fewer imports, total rice supply falls, causing the domestic price of rice to increase by 41.5 percent. Because free trade is politically unfeasible and trade‐driven self‐sufficiency policies contract total rice consumption, boosting rice production through research and development is an effective way for Malaysia to increase the total supply of rice while limiting its dependence on imports.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115018924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Social Responsibility to Social Impact: A Framework and Research Agenda","authors":"A. Kaul, Jiao Luo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3575027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3575027","url":null,"abstract":"While corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received increasing attention in the management literature, the focus of most prior work has been on the financial implications of CSR activities for firms, rather than on their consequences for social welfare. We contend that this relative neglect stems from the lack of a conceptual framework to evaluate social impact, and offer such a framework in this study. Specifically, we identify four criteria that an activity must meet in order to have an unambiguously positive effect on social welfare: it must be substantive, meaning that it delivers meaningful benefits to those it claims to serve; it must be unequivocal, meaning that these benefits must not be offset by harmful actions by the firm elsewhere; it must be inclusive, meaning that those that do not benefit from the firm’s actions are not left worse off; and it must be comparatively efficient, meaning that the same activity could not be carried out more effectively or efficiently under a different organizational form. By developing a coherent and rigorous framework to assess social impact systematically, our study offers both a research agenda for future scholars, and a useful tool for managers seeking to design more effective CSR initiatives.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123091509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Debunking Rumors in Networks","authors":"L. Merlino, Nicole Tabasso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3469490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469490","url":null,"abstract":"We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals’ incentives to verify. (JEL D83, D85, L82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130580263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transitions Across Labor Market States Including Formal/Informal Division in Egypt","authors":"A. Tansel, Zeynel Abidin Ozdemir","doi":"10.1111/rode.12620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12620","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the worker transitions across labor market states including formal/informal division using panel data of 2006 to 2012 from Egypt. We generate a broad set of facts about labor market dynamics in Egypt. We first develop transition probabilities by gender across different labor market states including formal/informal sectors utilizing Markov transition processes. Government employment is the most persistent labor market state for both men and women and the out of labor force is the second most persistent labor market state for women. Unemployment is the most mobile labor market state. Informal private wage work and self‐employed–agriculture are also relatively mobile labor market states. We next identify the effects of individual, household and job characteristics on different mobility patterns by estimating multinomial logit models. We find that gender, age, education, experience, and several sectors of economic activity are associated with the transition probabilities between the labor market states considered such as formal wage, informal wage, self‐employment, unemployment, government employment, and out of labor market. Education, in particular, university degree or above is noted to play a vital role in the probability of transitions across several labor market states.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"237 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113996883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies","authors":"E. Algaba, R. van den Brink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449949","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we focus on restrictions arising from the players belonging to some hierarchical structure that is represented by a digraph. Two of these models are the games with a permission structure and games under precedence constraints. In both cases, the hierarchy can be represented by a directed graph which restricts the possibilities of coalition formation. These two approaches led to two different type of solutions in the literature. The precedence power solutions for games under precedence constraints, are axiomatized with an axiom that applies a network power measure to the precedence constraint. We will show that something similar can be done for games with a permission structure, and obtain a class of permission power solutions. This class contains the (conjunctive) permission value. With this we have two classes of solutions for games with a hierarchy, one based on permission structures and another based on precedence constraints, that are characterized by similar axioms. Moreover, the solutions are linked with network power measures.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"193 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132623866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}