{"title":"爬虫:偏好为单峰时对象(再)分配问题的两个等价结果","authors":"Y. Tamura, Hadi Hosseini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3503893","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the \"crawler\", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined \"dual\" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the \"random priority rule\" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\\\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the \"core from random endowments\".","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Crawler: Two Equivalence Results for Object (Re)Allocation Problems When Preferences are Single-Peaked\",\"authors\":\"Y. Tamura, Hadi Hosseini\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3503893\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the \\\"crawler\\\", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined \\\"dual\\\" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the \\\"random priority rule\\\" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\\\\\\\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the \\\"core from random endowments\\\".\",\"PeriodicalId\":410371,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"74 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503893\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503893","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Crawler: Two Equivalence Results for Object (Re)Allocation Problems When Preferences are Single-Peaked
For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycle rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, the endowment lower bound, and strategy-proofness; moreover, TTC coincides with the core. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019a) defines a new rule, the "crawler", which also satisfies the first three properties. Our first theorem states that the crawler and a naturally defined "dual" rule are actually the same. Next, for object allocation problems, we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our second theorem states that this rule is the same as the "random priority rule" which, as proved by Knuth (1996) and Abdulkadiroglu and S\"onmez (1998), is equivalent to the "core from random endowments".