{"title":"行为经济学家埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆","authors":"Vlad Tarko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3739912","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Similar to fellow Nobelists Vernon Smith and Richard Thaler, Elinor Ostrom has emphasized not just our cognitive limits, but also the institutions that people create to overcome them. But, while Vernon Smith or Thaler still focus primarily on private choices, and the institutions within which such choices happen, e.g. private financial or health choices, Elinor Ostrom has expanded the realm of inquiry by exploring how bounded rationality also enters the picture in collective action problems. The fact that Elinor Ostrom is primarily interested in collective action, rather than private individual action, has also led her to a different perspective on the limits of rational choice models. For Ostrom, the simplistic rational choice collective action model, as developed in Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, leads to wrong predictions about the conditions under which collective action happens (or doesn’t happen), and, furthermore, biases the analysis in favor of paternalistic solutions for solving collective action problem, as illustrated in Hardin’s analysis of the tragedy of the commons. The result of Ostrom’s analysis is a richer concept of rational choice, which simultaneously (a) accepts that individuals will act opportunistically, possibly undermining collective action, and (b) acknowledges the capacities of groups to take advantage of richer behavioral features, like altruistic punishment, fairness, group loyalty, and intrinsic preferences, in order to enable self-governing collective action. This richer concept of human behavior also raises additional concerns about the problems of hierarchical paternalistic proposals, showing that tyranny and oppression can be even more robust than accounted for by the simple rational choice model, particularly when we consider group loyalty.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"181 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Elinor Ostrom as Behavioral Economist\",\"authors\":\"Vlad Tarko\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3739912\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Similar to fellow Nobelists Vernon Smith and Richard Thaler, Elinor Ostrom has emphasized not just our cognitive limits, but also the institutions that people create to overcome them. But, while Vernon Smith or Thaler still focus primarily on private choices, and the institutions within which such choices happen, e.g. private financial or health choices, Elinor Ostrom has expanded the realm of inquiry by exploring how bounded rationality also enters the picture in collective action problems. The fact that Elinor Ostrom is primarily interested in collective action, rather than private individual action, has also led her to a different perspective on the limits of rational choice models. For Ostrom, the simplistic rational choice collective action model, as developed in Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, leads to wrong predictions about the conditions under which collective action happens (or doesn’t happen), and, furthermore, biases the analysis in favor of paternalistic solutions for solving collective action problem, as illustrated in Hardin’s analysis of the tragedy of the commons. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
与同为诺贝尔奖得主的弗农·史密斯(Vernon Smith)和理查德·塞勒(Richard Thaler)类似,埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆(Elinor Ostrom)不仅强调了我们的认知极限,还强调了人们为克服这些极限而建立的制度。但是,虽然弗农·史密斯和塞勒仍然主要关注私人选择,以及这些选择发生的机构,例如私人金融或健康选择,但埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆通过探索有限理性如何在集体行动问题中发挥作用,扩大了研究领域。埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆(Elinor Ostrom)主要对集体行动感兴趣,而不是个人的私人行动,这一事实也使她对理性选择模型的局限性有了不同的看法。在奥斯特罗姆看来,曼瑟尔·奥尔森(Mancur Olson)的《集体行动逻辑》(Logic of collective action)中提出的过分简单化的理性选择集体行动模型,对集体行动发生(或不发生)的条件做出了错误的预测,而且,正如哈丁(Hardin)对公地悲剧的分析所表明的那样,这种分析倾向于采用家长式的解决方案来解决集体行动问题。奥斯特罗姆分析的结果是一个更丰富的理性选择概念,它同时(a)承认个人会机会主义地行动,可能会破坏集体行动,(b)承认群体有能力利用更丰富的行为特征,如利他惩罚、公平、群体忠诚和内在偏好,以实现自治的集体行动。这种更丰富的人类行为概念也引发了对等级家长式建议问题的额外关注,表明暴政和压迫可能比简单的理性选择模型更强大,特别是当我们考虑到群体忠诚时。
Similar to fellow Nobelists Vernon Smith and Richard Thaler, Elinor Ostrom has emphasized not just our cognitive limits, but also the institutions that people create to overcome them. But, while Vernon Smith or Thaler still focus primarily on private choices, and the institutions within which such choices happen, e.g. private financial or health choices, Elinor Ostrom has expanded the realm of inquiry by exploring how bounded rationality also enters the picture in collective action problems. The fact that Elinor Ostrom is primarily interested in collective action, rather than private individual action, has also led her to a different perspective on the limits of rational choice models. For Ostrom, the simplistic rational choice collective action model, as developed in Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, leads to wrong predictions about the conditions under which collective action happens (or doesn’t happen), and, furthermore, biases the analysis in favor of paternalistic solutions for solving collective action problem, as illustrated in Hardin’s analysis of the tragedy of the commons. The result of Ostrom’s analysis is a richer concept of rational choice, which simultaneously (a) accepts that individuals will act opportunistically, possibly undermining collective action, and (b) acknowledges the capacities of groups to take advantage of richer behavioral features, like altruistic punishment, fairness, group loyalty, and intrinsic preferences, in order to enable self-governing collective action. This richer concept of human behavior also raises additional concerns about the problems of hierarchical paternalistic proposals, showing that tyranny and oppression can be even more robust than accounted for by the simple rational choice model, particularly when we consider group loyalty.