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Income and Fiscal Incidence by Age and Gender: Some Evidence from New Zealand 按年龄和性别划分的收入和财政发生率:来自新西兰的一些证据
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12165
O. Aziz, N. Gemmell, A. Laws
{"title":"Income and Fiscal Incidence by Age and Gender: Some Evidence from New Zealand","authors":"O. Aziz, N. Gemmell, A. Laws","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12165","url":null,"abstract":"With many fiscal policies likely to have quite different age/gender incidences, this paper examines age and gender dimensions of income distribution and fiscal incidence in New Zealand using Household Economic Survey data for 2010. Applying, and testing, an intra‐household income sharing rule, our evidence suggests strong life‐cycle and gender aspects to fiscal incidence. Net tax liabilities are found to be low and negative, at younger and older ages but positive during much of the “working age.” Notwithstanding considerable within‐gender heterogeneity, women are found on average to have systematically and persistently lower net fiscal liabilities than men, especially at older ages.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129242755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence Over Nine Decades 收入不平等与政治两极分化:90年来的时间序列证据
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12162
John V. Duca, Jason L. Saving
{"title":"Income Inequality and Political Polarization: Time Series Evidence Over Nine Decades","authors":"John V. Duca, Jason L. Saving","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12162","url":null,"abstract":"Rising income inequality and political polarization have led some to hypothesize that the two are causally linked. Properly interpreting such correlations is complicated by the multiple factors that drive each of these phenomena, potential feedbacks between inequality and polarization, measurement issues, and statistical challenges for modeling non-stationary variables. We find that a more precise measure of inequality (the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient) is statistically related to polarization while a less precise one (top 1% income share) is not, and that there are bi-directional feedbacks between polarization and inequality. Findings support a nuanced view of the links between polarization and inequality.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122044941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 40
Accounting for Needs in Cost Sharing 成本分摊中需求的核算
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2698697
Etienne Billette de Villemeur, J. Leroux
{"title":"Accounting for Needs in Cost Sharing","authors":"Etienne Billette de Villemeur, J. Leroux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2698697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698697","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We introduce basic needs in cost-sharing problems so that agents with higher needs are not penalized, all the while holding them responsible for their consumption. We characterize axiomatically two families of cost-sharing rules, each favoring one aspect—compensation or responsibility—over the other. We also identify specific variants of those rules that protect small users from the cost externality imposed by larger users. Lastly, we show how one can implement these schemes with realistic informational assumptions; i.e., without making explicit interpersonal comparisons of needs and consumption.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121889651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments 双淘汰赛的奖品和奖励
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3011715
Lingbo Huang
{"title":"Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments","authors":"Lingbo Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3011715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3011715","url":null,"abstract":"I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129406512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Income Inequality in Latin America: A Factor Component Analysis 拉丁美洲的收入不平等:一个因素成分分析
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-01 DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12236
Verónica Amarante
{"title":"Income Inequality in Latin America: A Factor Component Analysis","authors":"Verónica Amarante","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12236","url":null,"abstract":"The decline in inequality observed in most Latin American countries after 2002 was surprisingly good news, particularly given that most developed countries were experiencing a rise in inequality at that time. Various arguments have been put forward to explain this decline, but there is still no consensus on the most plausible explanation. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion by performing inequality decompositions by factor components. We estimate the importance of each source of income in explaining the observed decline in income inequality between 2002 and 2011 in five Latin American countries. Specifically, we explore the role of the process of formalization that has taken place in regional labor markets, separating formal and informal wages and considering self‐employment incomes. In the five countries studied here informal wages and self‐employment income contributed to decreasing inequality. Formal sector wages, on the other hand, fostered inequality in all countries except Bolivia.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117302129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Growth in Illyria: The Role of Meritocracy in the Accumulation of Human Capital 伊利里亚的增长:精英政治在人力资本积累中的作用
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2745327
Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón
{"title":"Growth in Illyria: The Role of Meritocracy in the Accumulation of Human Capital","authors":"Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2745327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2745327","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present a dynamic model of cooperative production with human capital accumulation. We assume CES preferences on consumption and leisure in each period. When agents do not care about future generations, sustained growth occurs iff the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is larger or equal than one. Meritocracy always has a positive effect on output, but when the elasticity of substitution is less than one, is only a level effect. When agents care about future generations, under Cobb–Douglas preferences in each period and some extra conditions, there is constant growth at a rate that is larger than the one when future generations do not count. For any discount rate between generations, there is a unique level of meritocracy for which efficiency is achieved.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116962745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Constrained Multi-Issue Rationing Problems 约束多议题配给问题
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2841642
J. Izquierdo, Pere Timoner
{"title":"Constrained Multi-Issue Rationing Problems","authors":"J. Izquierdo, Pere Timoner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2841642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841642","url":null,"abstract":"We study a variant of the multi-issue rationing model, where agents claim for several issues. In this variant, the available amount of resource intended for each issue is constrained to an amount fixed a priori according to exogenous criteria. The aim is to distribute the amount corresponding to each issue taking into account the allocation for the rest of issues (issue-allocation interdependence). We name these problems constrained multi-issue allocation situations (CMIA). In order to tackle the solution to these problems, we first reinterpret some single-issue egalitarian rationing rules as a minimization program based on the idea of finding the feasible allocation as close as possible to a specific reference point. We extend this family of egalitarian rules to the CMIA framework. In particular, we extend the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule and the reverse Talmud rule to the multi-issue rationing setting, which turn out to be particular cases of a family of rules, namely the extended α-egalitarian family. This family is analysed and characterized by using consistency principles (over agents and over issues) and a property based on the Lorenz dominance criterion.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115696132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Findings on Relative Deprivation from the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking 家庭经济与决策调查的相对剥夺结果
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2802719
Samuel Dodini
{"title":"Findings on Relative Deprivation from the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking","authors":"Samuel Dodini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2802719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802719","url":null,"abstract":"The Federal Reserve's Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) contains questions designed to ascertain overall economic well-being and fragility, which can be used to gauge both the perceptions individuals have about their own economic status and an approximation of their actual financial health.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124365389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Give and Take between Households and the State: Development and Application of a Benefaction – Contribution Ratio 家庭与国家之间的付出与接受:一种施助比的发展与应用
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12169
G. Lee, G. Rees
{"title":"Give and Take between Households and the State: Development and Application of a Benefaction – Contribution Ratio","authors":"G. Lee, G. Rees","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12169","url":null,"abstract":"This study defines a “Benefaction–Contribution Ratio” (BCR), describing the extent to which households are net beneficiaries of or contributors to the economy in relation to income and consumption. Such issues are central to assessment and targeting of policies such as social welfare and taxation. We apply the ratio to 21,144 South African households. South Africa employs various taxation‐funded social grants and subsidized services. A central question is how such transfers affect real household income and consumption. We find that the constitution of social transfers as a function of tax adjusted earned income significantly augments household buying power. Furthermore, we hypothesize and find a negative curvilinear shape which has implications for design of taxation and welfare. This constitution and distribution of this ratio may be useful for international benchmarking and household planning, and as an economic predictor of outcomes such as job seeking, entrepreneurial behavior, family planning, migration, and tax evasion.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125167311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Non-Manipulability of Walrasian Mechanisms in Economies with a Large Number of Objects 具有大量对象的经济体中瓦尔拉斯机制的不可操纵性
ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2786814
Tomoya Tajika, Tomoya Kazumura
{"title":"Non-Manipulability of Walrasian Mechanisms in Economies with a Large Number of Objects","authors":"Tomoya Tajika, Tomoya Kazumura","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786814","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linear preferences with a submodular valuation function. It is known that Walrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference profile, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at sufficiently many objects, i's incremental valuation is higher than j's incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are sufficiently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy. We also consider replica economies, and show that for each economy, if it is replicated sufficiently many times, the minimum price Walrasian mechanisms are non-manipulable at the replica economy.","PeriodicalId":410371,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114634383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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