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Grounds for the Development of Social Economy in Romania 罗马尼亚社会经济发展的基础
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-10-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2983253
Claudia Bacter (Oșvat), Florica Ștefănescu, Amalia Jurj
{"title":"Grounds for the Development of Social Economy in Romania","authors":"Claudia Bacter (Oșvat), Florica Ștefănescu, Amalia Jurj","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2983253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2983253","url":null,"abstract":"This paper sets out as an explanatory approach, supported with theories and statistical data, for the development of the social economy sector in Romania. Following a brief review of the literature, which informs the theoretical basis of this paper, We presented a series of economic and social data, expressing the needs of several social groups, potential actors in the social enterprise arena. The study has dealt with the issue of social economy by analysing two daily papers and a professional journal, as well as by interviewing 14 experts who work in the social field, in state institutions and NGOs. After analysing the articles published in the two papers and the journal, it can be stated that there is, in the context presented, a certain interest in the issue of social economy. The articles on this subject referred to different approaches in the field of social economy, the main idea being, particularly in the journal, that social economy represents a potential for creating jobs and for the social integration of the disadvantaged. As far as the results obtained after analysing the interviews are concerned, social economy is seen by experts as an opportunity to integrate disadvantaged groups into the labour market, to reduce social marginalization and to improve local communitiesÂ’ quality of life. The conclusions of the paper point to the need, but also to the possibility of developing social economy in Romania, the need to stimulate and sustain it, especially in regards to social entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123799233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Popular Committees 人民委员会
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-04-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2035363
Andreas Darmann
{"title":"Popular Committees","authors":"Andreas Darmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2035363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2035363","url":null,"abstract":"The computational complexity status for a problem of deciding on the quality of a committee is established. Starting with individual preferences over alternatives, we analyze when it can be determined efficiently if a given committee C satisfies a weak Condorcet criterion - i.e., if C is at least as good as every other committee in a pairwise majority comparison. Scoring functions used in classic voting rules are adapted for these comparisons. In particular, we draw the sharp separation line between computationally tractable and intractable instances with respect to different voting rules.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114753168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
지불거부응답의 판별 (Detecting Protest Responses) 拒付应答的判别(Detecting Protest Responses)
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-03-01 DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.135
Hyungna Oh
{"title":"지불거부응답의 판별 (Detecting Protest Responses)","authors":"Hyungna Oh","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.135","url":null,"abstract":"Korean Abstract: 조건부가치측정법(contingent valuation method)은 비시장재의 경제적 가치를 추정하는 방법의 하나로, 공공사업의 경제적 편익을 계산하는 데 이용되어 왔다. 지불거부응답(protest responses)은 본인의 선호와 상관없이 설문과정에서 공공사업에 대해 단1원도 지불할 의사가 없다고 응답하는 행동으로, 전체 CVM 응답의 25% 정도를 차지한다. 본 연구는 평가 대상이 된 공공재의 가치 추정에 있어 지불거부응답 행동에 의한 편의(bias)를 최소화하기 위해, 자신의 선호에 의해 지불의사액이 ‘0’이라고 답한 응답으로부터 지불거부응답을 판별해 내는 문항(protest response filtering items)과 그 미시적 근거를 제시한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 선호에 기반한 지불의사액을 ‘잠재적 지불의사액(implicit willingness-to-pay)’이라고 정의함으로써 설문과정에서 선호체계 이외에 다양한 요인이 작용하여 결정된 ‘구술된 지불의사액(stated willingness-to-pay)’과 구분하였다. 한편, 한국개발연구원(KDI)에서 주관한 20여 건의 CVM 데이터를 이용한 실증분석 결과에 의하면, 지불거부응답은 무작위가 아닌 응답자의 사회․경제적 특징에 의해 체계적으로 발생한다. 이는 지불거부응답을 공공재의 경제적 가치 추정에서 제외시킬 때 선택편의(selectivity bias)가 발생할 수 있음을 의미한다. English Abstract: This study analyzes ways to detect protest responses (hereafter, PR zero-bid) in the contingent valuation method (CVM). In order to distinguish PR zero-bids from true zero-bids (non-PR zero bids), this study adopts the concept of the implicit willingness to pay employing the Hicksian compensating surplus and the Taylor’s 1st order approximation. When a respondent proposes a zero-bid (i.e., WTP=0) and chooses a PR filtering item to indicate that her implicit WTP is not necessary zero, her response is identified as a PR zero bid. PR filtering items falling into the PR zero bids category include the uncertainty of information, distrust in the government and project achievement, disagreement to project plans, discontent with the fairness of public works and their payment method and animosity against the CVM itself. The empirical analysis shows that PR zero bids take place systematically in particular respondent groups: respondents who have never used similar facilities before nor plans to use the facility provided by the public project, the employed, and low income groups. In conclusion, the study suggests that a CVM questionnaire needs to be designed carefully to minimize problems associated with PR zero bids and the potential risks of having sample selection bias should be concerned.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134357819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Social Norms and Economic Performance: An Example of Business Loans by Islamic Banks 社会规范与经济绩效:伊斯兰银行商业贷款的一个例子
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1968702
S. Basov, Ishaq Bhatti
{"title":"Social Norms and Economic Performance: An Example of Business Loans by Islamic Banks","authors":"S. Basov, Ishaq Bhatti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1968702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1968702","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we consider how social norms affect economic performance, using example of an Islamic bank providing a business loan to an entrepreneur. We show that the ability to rely on social norms mitigates the moral hazard problem, but introduces rigidities that prevent optimal response to adverse economic consequences, thereby improving performance during the booms, but handicapping it during the recessions. In the case of an Islamic bank, another consequence of this rigidity is a greater reluctance to invest in daring new ideas, which may be highly profitable but include a significant risk of failure. Although we use Islamic banks as our main example, the conclusions have broader validity and are not limited to religious social norms.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123240885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Rural Demography, Public Services and Land Rights in Africa: a Village-Level Analysis in Burkina Faso 非洲农村人口、公共服务和土地权利:布基纳法索村庄层面的分析
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.3386/W17718
Margaret McMillan, William A. Masters, H. Kazianga
{"title":"Rural Demography, Public Services and Land Rights in Africa: a Village-Level Analysis in Burkina Faso","authors":"Margaret McMillan, William A. Masters, H. Kazianga","doi":"10.3386/W17718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W17718","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses historical census data from Burkina Faso to characterize local demographic pressures associated with internal migration into river valleys after Onchocerciasis eradication, combined with a new survey of village elders to document change over time and differences across villages in local public goods provision, market institutions and land use rights. We hypothesize that higher local population densities are associated with more public goods and a transition from open-access to regulated land use. Controlling for province or village fixed effects, we find that villages' variance in population associated with proximity to rivers is closely correlated with higher levels of infrastructure, markets and individual land rights, as opposed to familial or communal rights. Responding to population growth with both improved public services and private property rights is consistent with both scale effects in public good provision, and changes in the scarcity of land.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126658697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30
American Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality 美国人对经济不平等的态度
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-11-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1961432
T. Hayes
{"title":"American Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality","authors":"T. Hayes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1961432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961432","url":null,"abstract":"In a democratic society, changes in policy or outcomes are expected to be a product of the people’s preferences. To what extent do the American people support policies that reduce income inequality? This paper investigates whether Americans are supportive of large gaps in income, and finds that, contrary to popular perception, the American public is unsupportive of reducing income differences, a majority favor reductions in inequality. In examining the reasons for this support, I find that partisan and ideological attachments, along with economic self-interest are substantively and most consistently the strongest predictors of an individual’s support for reducing income inequality. These findings suggest that in light of increases in wealth inequality, elected officials’ failure to reduce this growth spurns the public will.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"28 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134344920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Toward a Critique of Mark Granovetter's Notion of Embeddedness 对马克·格兰诺维特嵌入性概念的批判
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1894033
J. Tittenbrun
{"title":"Toward a Critique of Mark Granovetter's Notion of Embeddedness","authors":"J. Tittenbrun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1894033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1894033","url":null,"abstract":"The paper critically analyses Mark Granovetter's popular concept of embeddedness. It is shown that this notion is based on a simplistic, overly narrow view of social relations and social structures. An alternative view overcoming those weaknesses is put forward.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127419227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining 联合议价中平稳均衡收益的唯一性
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-06-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1860085
Hülya Eraslan, A. McLennan
{"title":"Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining","authors":"Hülya Eraslan, A. McLennan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1860085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1860085","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposerʼs identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114328226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 73
Norms, Culture and Local Infrastructure: Evidence from a Decentralised Economy 规范、文化和地方基础设施:来自分散经济的证据
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1700450
S. Pal
{"title":"Norms, Culture and Local Infrastructure: Evidence from a Decentralised Economy","authors":"S. Pal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1700450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1700450","url":null,"abstract":"Culture as reflected in social and religious norms may be pivotal to social organization in a decentralised economy where local authorities are responsible for the provision of local public goods. We distinguish between individualist and collectivist cultures to argue that collectivist culture may promote rules to indulge in family, social and religious values at the cost of individual values promoting material objects and may thus result in inefficient choice of pubic goods. We use Indonesia as a case in point to classify communities strictly adhering to traditional adat laws and Islamic religion as promoting collectivist culture. Results using 1997 and 2007 Indonesian Family Life Survey community-level panel data highlight that, even after controlling for other variables, traditional collectivist communities strongly adhering to adat and Islam tend to have significantly greater access to social (rather than physical) infrastructural goods; similar pattern is reflected in the allocation of community spending to these goods.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123987861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Competition and Mergers Among Nonprofits 非营利组织之间的竞争与合并
ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-03-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1006762
Jens Prufer
{"title":"Competition and Mergers Among Nonprofits","authors":"Jens Prufer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1006762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006762","url":null,"abstract":"Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be regulated differently than mergers among for-profit firms? The relevant empirical literature is highly controversial, the theoretical literature is scarce. I analyze the question by modeling duopoly competition with quality-differentiated goods. I compare welfare effects of mergers between firms with the effects of mergers between nonprofits dominated by consumers, workers, suppliers, and pure donors respectively. I find that mergers both among firms and among most types of nonprofits do not increase welfare. Mergers among consumerdominated nonprofits, however, can improve welfare. These results imply for competition law and regulation that “nonprofit” might be too crude a label for organizations with varying goals. Consequently, mergers among certain nonprofit organizations should not necessarily be treated in the same way as mergers among for-profit firms – a notion that is absent in current merger guidelines both in the US and the EU.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132743605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
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