ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Democracy in Conflicting Ethnic Pluralism: Two Tales of Success and Failure in Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire","authors":"A. Bado","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2892738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2892738","url":null,"abstract":"While most of the literature on African politics has pointed out the flaws of democracies trapped by patent ethnicity, few studies have explored ways and conditions under which a pluralist democracy can contribute to the consolidation of peaceful political process in ethnically divided societies. Building on two case studies, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, this study argues that for democracy to be functional, it has seriously to take into account the fragmented structure of multi-national societies in which loyalties to ethnic communities are more deeply rooted than the newly planted loyalty to the state. The proactive integration of representatives of various ethnic communities in the executive committees of political parties and in the government turns the parties and the government into a framework of debate and pressure where the various ethno-national entities may present their grievances and demands for more equality. This reduces political violence. Instead of disqualifying ethnicity in political processes, one should therefore strive to understand and channel the influence of identity membership while upholding democratic principles.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121850642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Икономическата ефективност при аварийно спасителни работи (Economic Effectiveness in Emergency Rescue Work)","authors":"Venelin Terziev, Veronika Stefanova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3157971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157971","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Bulgarian Abstract: </b>Докладът разглежда икономическата ефективност при аварийно спасителни работи, като акцентира на очакваните социални ефекти и формулира основни изводи за връзката между икономическата и социалната активност и нуждата от приложение на интегрирани подходи за оценка на ефективността. Ефективността, като социален феномен, се явява във вида на качествено-количествената характеристика за максимално развитие на човешките ресурси, форми на социална жизнедеятелност и управление на обществото, при отчитане на минималните социални, политически, икономически и нравствени разходи. Този подход ни позволява да разглеждаме социалната ефективност като универсален подход за изразяване степента за резултативност на позитивното и негативното функциониране в развитието на социалните институти и процеси. При това, широко разбираният принцип за социална ефективност излиза извън пределите на даденото съотношение, доколкото отчита и интегрира още няколко най-важни измерения на ефективността от социалната дейност. Става дума за нейната ориентираност за достигане на обществено значими, нормативно зададени цели за развитие на обекта за социално управление, оценката за последователността и реалната степен за приближение до търсения обществен интерес в порядъка на „саморазвитие” на системата, ориентацията спрямо качеството на управленската дейност. Тези аспекти за измерване на социалната ефективност следва закономерно да намерят отражение в построяването на общия модел или принцип за икономическа и социална ефективност, анализиран в настоящия доклад. <b>English Abstract: </b>The paper examines the economic efficiency in emergency rescue operations, focusing on the expected social impact and formulating basic conclusions about the relationship between economic and social activity and the need for application of integrated approaches to assess the effectiveness. Effectiveness as a social phenomenon appears in the form of qualitative and quantitative characteristics for maximum development of human resources, forms of social activities and management of society, taking into account the minimum social, political, economic and moral costs. This approach allows to consider social performance as a universal approach to express the level of productivity of research on positive and negative functioning in the development of social institutions and processes. Moreover, the widely understood principle of social effectiveness goes beyond the given ratio as far as it takes into account and integrates some other important dimensions of the effectiveness of social activity. It's about its orientation to achieve socially significant, legally set targets for development of the object of social management, evaluation of consistency and the actual degree of approximation to the searched public interest in the order of the \"self-development\" of the system, and the orientation towards quality management activities. These aspects for measuring the social performance shoul","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125237949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule","authors":"Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786789","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the allocation problem of assigning heterogeneous objects to a group of agents and determining how much they should pay. Each agent receives at most one object. Agents have non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. Especially, we focus on the cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer a higher ranked object to a lower ranked one, and (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and as long as objects are equally priced, agents commonly prefer an object in the higher tier to an object in the lower tier. The minimum price rule assigns a minimum price (Walrasian) equilibrium to each preference profile. We establish: (i) on a common-object-ranking domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy, and (ii) on a common-tiered-object domain, the minimum price rule is the only rule satisfying these four axioms.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126898900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategy-Proof Location of Public Facilities","authors":"Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, M. Vorsatz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2690140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690140","url":null,"abstract":"Agents frequently have di fferent opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127724858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Maximal Manipulation of Envy-Free Solutions in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Money","authors":"Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2576028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2576028","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his “optimal” envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127930106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Framing and Cooperation: The Roles and Interaction of Preferences and Beliefs","authors":"Elizabeth Bernold, E. Gsottbauer, K. Ackermann, R. O. Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2557927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2557927","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence suggests that there are substantial and systematic dierences in cooperation rates under varying framing conditions in social dilemmas. Several explanations of these dierences","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122891775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimality and Distortionary Lobbying: Regulating Tobacco Consumption","authors":"L. Colombo, U. Galmarini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2579787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579787","url":null,"abstract":"We examine policies directed at regulating tobacco consumption through three types of instruments: (i) an excise tax hindering consumption by increasing the price of cigarettes, (ii) prevention programs helping consumers to make choices that are more time consistent when trading-off the current pleasure from smoking and its future health harms, and (iii) smoking bans directly restricting consumption. First, on normative grounds, we focus on the optimal design of public policies maximizing the economy’s surplus. Second, in a positive perspective, we investigate how the lobbying activities of the tobacco industry, of smokers, and of anti-tobacco organizations may distort government intervention.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126064395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Elección Colectiva y Bienestar Social (Collective Election and Social Welfare)","authors":"Eloy Ávalos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2959013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2959013","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: El presente documento aborda el estudio de la teoria de la eleccion social, exponiendo las propiedades necesarias que permitan construir una regla de eleccion colectiva en base a las preferencias de los individuos miembros de la sociedad. Asimismo, evalua los criterios de compensacion de bienestar. \u0000English Abstract: The present paper deals with the study of social choice theory, exposing the necessary properties that allow the construction of a rule of collective choice based on the preferences of individuals members of society. It also evaluates wellness compensation criteria.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123308136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Entrepreneurship - Igniting Young Minds in the Current Era","authors":"Sabiha Fazalbhoy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2937554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2937554","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relevance and need of social entrepreneurship - development in students and in educational institutions. Social entrepreneurship can be defined as a process by which people build or transform Institutions to advance solutions to social problems like poverty, illness, illiteracy, environmental destruction, human rights abuses and corruption in order to make life better for many. There is greater realization of the need for planning the induction of student members to social entrepreneurship bearing cognizance of their individual aspirations, ability and knowledge and the perceived impact on the business. Findings indicate that the students are aware of social entrepreneurship and realize its importance and need in today’s society. Social innovation is an effective tool of social entrepreneurship. The research design of this paper is an experimental study on the basis of primary data collected from five colleges in and around Pune city. In total 100 samples have been selected from five colleges and questionnaire method is used for collecting data from primary sources. The random sampling method was used to collect the samples. While earlier researchers have ventured to classify social entrepreneurship as a branch of business entrepreneurship, the contemporary ones are evaluating social entrepreneurship as a function of business entrepreneurship. The paper concludes to highlight the need of social entrepreneurship in today’s world and its impact on the society and business through the youth and educational institutions.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121733126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Designing Monetary Policy Committees","authors":"Volker Hahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2134983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2134983","url":null,"abstract":"We integrate monetary policy-making by committee into a New Keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee׳s institutional characteristics for inflation, output, and welfare. Our analysis delivers the following results. First, we demonstrate that transparency about the committee׳s future composition is typically harmful. Second, we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability. Third, larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization. Fourth, large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low. Fifth, we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121251258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}