{"title":"Maximal Manipulation of Envy-Free Solutions in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Money","authors":"Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2576028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his “optimal” envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations.","PeriodicalId":409714,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations (Analysis) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2576028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Abstract
We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his “optimal” envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations.