Microeconomics: Information最新文献_第3页

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2011-11-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1360658

E. Antoniadou, Leonard J. Mirman, Richard Ruble

引用次数: 1

Leveraging of Reputation Through Umbrella Branding with and Without Market Power 通过有和没有市场支配力的保护伞品牌来撬动声誉

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2011-11-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1989066

E. Rasmusen

引用次数: 2

Unsure What the Future Will Bring? You May Overindulge: Uncertainty Increases the Appeal of Wants over Shoulds 不确定未来会发生什么?你可能会过度放纵:不确定性增加了欲望的吸引力

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2011-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1393535

Katherine L. Milkman

引用次数: 68

General Equilibrium Analysis of Hold‐Up Problem and Non‐Exclusive Franchise Contract 滞留问题与非排他性特许经营合同的一般均衡分析

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2010.00523.x

Chihning Chu, Wai-Man Liu

引用次数: 3

A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions 赞助搜索拍卖中的“位置悖论”

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-10-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1464545

Kinshuk Jerath, Liye Ma, Young-Hoon Park, K. Srinivasan

{"title":"A 'Position Paradox' in Sponsored Search Auctions","authors":"Kinshuk Jerath, Liye Ma, Young-Hoon Park, K. Srinivasan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1464545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1464545","url":null,"abstract":"We study the bidding strategies of vertically differentiated firms that bid for sponsored search advertisement positions for a keyword at a search engine. We explicitly model how consumers navigate and click on sponsored links based on their knowledge and beliefs about firm qualities. Our model yields several interesting insights and a main counter-intuitive result we focus on is the position paradox.\" The paradox is that a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position below it, yet still obtain more clicks than the inferior firm. Under a pay-per- impression mechanism, the inferior firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, while the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position as it pays a smaller advertising fee but some consumers will still reach it in the search of a higher-quality firm. Under a pay-per-click mechanism, the inferior firm has an even stronger incentive to be at the top since now it only has to pay for the consumers who do not know the firms' reputations and, therefore, can bid more aggressively. Interestingly, as the quality premium for the superior firm increases, and/or if more consumers know the identity of the superior firm, the incentive for the inferior firm to be at the top may increase. Contrary to conventional belief, we find that the search engine may have the incentive to over-weight the inferior firm's bid and strategically create the position paradox to increase overall clicks by consumers. To validate our model, we analyze a dataset from a popular Korean search engine firm and find that: (i) a large proportion of auction outcomes in the data show the position paradox, and (ii) sharp predictions from our model are validated in the data.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128937701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

How Does the Variance of Product Ratings Matter? 产品评级差异有何影响?

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-09-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1400173

Monic Sun

引用次数: 569

The Demand for Information 对信息的需求

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-06-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1630244

G. Sims

{"title":"The Demand for Information","authors":"G. Sims","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1630244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1630244","url":null,"abstract":"I use a new measure of investor attention and measure its affect on the returns of winner and loser portfolios over a holding period of up to 52 weeks. Whilst I do not find any relationship between Stock Information Demand and price momentum, I do find that increases in investor attention affect the demand for stocks, which for ‘winner stocks’ in turn pushes prices up. I find evidence of this effect in a small sample of large, highly traded, and closely followed firms, i.e. the S&P500.My measure of attention is derived from the Google Insights for Search webpage, which allows access to the relative volumes of search criteria submitted to Google each week, since 2004. This measure of attention, which I call the Stock Information Demand (SID) is a more direct measure of market participants’ behaviour than previous studies have used.I evaluate the returns to the S&P500 constituents over five years, and find that stocks with high degrees of Stock Information Demand(SID) that have increased in price over the previous 4 weeks tend to continue to increase in price for a further 4 weeks. Stocks with low levels of SID do not show the same continued price appreciation. Further to this, I also find less robust evidence that stocks which have declined in price over the previous 4 weeks, and have not been subject to high levels of SID show a continued longer term price decline, out to 52 weeks in some cases.I am not able to measure any significant degrees of price reversal, and hence over reaction, or of robust under reaction, so am not able to add further evidence to the two behaviour models provided by K. Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam (1998) or Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998). My results support the previous findings of Hong, Lim, & Stein (2000) and of Chan (2003), in that stocks react quickly to good news, and slowly to bad news. My results also support previous studies of attention, such as Barber & Odean (2008), and the related work Barber, Odean, & Zhu (2006), showing that stocks subject to investor’s attention do change in price, and that noise traders are capable of moving market prices.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131723270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bank Bailout Menus 银行救助菜单

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1625641

S. Bhattacharya, Kjell G. Nyborg

{"title":"Bank Bailout Menus","authors":"S. Bhattacharya, Kjell G. Nyborg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1625641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1625641","url":null,"abstract":"Bailing out banks requires overcoming debt overhang as well as dealing with adverse selection with respect to the quality of banks' balance sheets, in terms of heterogeneity in both the likelihood and extent of their potential shortfalls, of future asset values vis-a-vis contractual debt obligations. We examine bailouts that eliminate debt overhang, while attempting to minimize subsidies to banks' equityholders. When banks do not di ffr with respect to the extent of debt overhang, it can be fully overcome with the minimal amount of subsidies, providing each bank's equity holders no more than their pre-bailout values, with a partial new equity injection, or an asset buyout. When levels of debt overhang co-vary with underlying probabilities of default, we characterize the conditions for attaining a similar minimal subsidy outcome, with a Menu of either equity injection or asset buyout plans, satisfying suitable self-selection constraints among bank types. These involve global rather than local conditions, with multiple intersections of indi fffrence curves among types, and imply strictly greater funds injections than those needed to make existing debt default-free. We also explore the role of coupling asset purchases with providing the bailout agency Options to buy bank equity, to enhance its capture of rents arising from new investments by banks. We compare its performance with equity injections on this dimension, as well as others such as post-bailout stakes held by prior inside equity holders of banks.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129398446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 51

The Value of Online Trust Seals: Evidence from Online Retailing 网络信任印章的价值:来自网络零售的证据

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-04-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1592480

Koray Özpolat, G. Gao, Wolfgang Jank, S. Viswanathan

引用次数: 0

Active Risk Budgeting: Volatility is Not Standard Deviation 主动风险预算:波动性不是标准差

Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2010-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1407584

M. Leblanc

引用次数: 1