{"title":"Can Investors Profit from Information Diveristy? The Wisdom of Crowds in Security Analyst Recommendations","authors":"Ilona Mostipan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3076118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3076118","url":null,"abstract":"There is heterogeneity in individual forecasts of any variable — inflation, corporate earnings, etc. The standard consensus estimate takes a simple average of individual forecasts, implicitly treating each forecast as a common signal plus noise. If some individuals know more than others, then a consensus estimate is not necessarily the optimal way to combine forecasts. I show how a recently developed statistical technique can infer overlap in information across agents and I apply it to stock recommendations of sell-side analysts. I find a trading strategy that delivers an alpha of 2-3% on an annualized basis, net of transaction costs, suggesting that information diversity is prevalent, economically significant, and tradable.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126453883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Upgrades Matter? Evidence from Trading Volume","authors":"Jonathan Brogaard, Jennifer L. Koski, A. Siegel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2619522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2619522","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research examines the information content of credit rating changes using returns in stock, bond or credit default swap markets. Results are mixed, generally showing a significant reaction to downgrades with much weaker results for upgrades. We extend prior research using abnormal trading volume. Because trading volume is highly non-normally distributed (especially in the bond market), we derive a new nonparametric test statistic that can be used to test abnormal volume in other applications. Our results show significant abnormal volume in both stock and bond markets around upgrades and downgrades, consistent with the hypothesis that credit rating changes are informative.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126031159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rewarding Mediocrity? Optimal Regulation of R&D Markets with Reputation Concerns","authors":"Chia-Hui Chen, J. Ishida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940014","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social value and further that it is indeed superior to rewarding major innovations directly, even when those minor innovations are intrinsically valueless in themselves. When only major innovations are rewarded, the R&D market eventually shuts down due to a version of the lemons problem. Rewarding minor innovations is actually conducive to major innovations as it induces self-sorting among researchers, which is essential in providing time and resources necessary for more productive ones to take riskier but more ambitious approaches. This result draws clear contrast to the static counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view in academia that “no publications are better than a few mediocre publications” at an early stage of one's career.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132049978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Market for Conflicted Advice","authors":"Briana Chang, M. Szydlowski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2843050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2843050","url":null,"abstract":"We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for heterogeneous customers through information provision. The competitive equilibrium features information dispersion and partial disclosure. Although conflicted fees lead to distorted information, they are irrelevant for customers' welfare: banning conflicted fees improves only the information quality, not customers' welfare. Instead, financial literacy education for the least informed customers can improve all customers' welfare because of a spillover effect. Furthermore, customers who trade through advisers realize lower average returns, which rationalizes empirical findings.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122219784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credit Derivatives and Analyst Behavior","authors":"George E. Batta, Jiaping Qiu, F. Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2019807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019807","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the role of credit default swaps (CDS) in information production surrounding earnings announcements. First, we demonstrate that the strength of CDS price discovery prior to earnings announcements is related to the presence of private information and the illiquidity of the underlying corporate bonds, consistent with the CDS market being a preferred venue for informed trading. Next, we ask how the information revealed through CDS trading influences the output of equity and credit rating analysts. We find that post-CDS trading, the dispersion and error of earnings per share forecasts are generally reduced, and downgrades by both types of analysts become more frequent and more timely before large negative earnings surprises, suggesting that the CDS market conveys information valuable to financial analysts.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134367365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fitness as Informational Fit: An Information Theoretic Approach to Multilevel Requisite Variety","authors":"Martin Hilbert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2619965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2619965","url":null,"abstract":"The article starts with the familiar notion that evolution can be thought of as handling uncertainty with regard to variety in population structures. The resolution of uncertainty communicates information through negative entropy, which increases fitness. This setup can be generalized. Information turns out to be the link between diversity of types in populations and unfolding environmental patterns in time. Conditioning of information over multiple levels reduces uncertainty, which increases fitness. While previous research has applied this logic to temporal patterns through Kelly’s bet-hedging criteria (stochastic switching), this article shows how the same logic can also be applied to multilevel population structures. Examples include taxonomies and geographic distributions. The result is a reformulation of fitness as a multilevel communication process between the evolving population and its environment. The multilevel recursion provides a single setup to investigate diversity relations between any population hierarchy and environmental patterns. Information theoretic optimization through bet-hedging reveals that fitness can be optimized for the case in which there is one specialized type per environmental state. This is reminiscent of the notion of requisite variety, and shows how fitness optimization can be understood in terms of a multilevel informational fit between the evolving population and environmental patterns.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122354615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"NBA Chemistry: Positive and Negative Synergies in Basketball","authors":"Allan Z. Maymin, Philip Z. Maymin, Eugene Shen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1935972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1935972","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a novel Skills Plus Minus (“SPM”) framework to measure on-court chemistry in basketball. First, we evaluate each player’s offense and defense in the SPM framework based on three basic categories of skills: scoring, rebounding, and ball-handling. We then simulate games using the skill ratings of the ten players on the court. The results of the simulations measure the effectiveness of individual players as well as the 5-player lineup, so we can then calculate the synergies of each NBA team by comparing their 5-player lineup’s effectiveness to the “sum-of-the-parts.” We find that these synergies can be large and meaningful. Because skills have different synergies with other skills, our framework predicts that a player’s value is dependent on the other nine players on the court. Therefore, the desirability of a free agent depends on the players currently on the roster. Indeed, our framework is able to generate mutually beneficial trades between teams. Other ratings systems cannot generate mutually beneficial trades since one player is always rated above another. We find more than two hundred mutually beneficial trades between NBA teams, situations where the skills of the traded players fit better on their trading partner’s team.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115583372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Step-by-Step Explanation of Hendricks and Kovenock (1989)'s Model of Social Learning","authors":"Marc Santugini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1393288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1393288","url":null,"abstract":"We explain the Hendricks and Kovenock (1989)'s framework by studying the behavior of two strategic firms under an informational externality. The informational externality arises when each firm of a social network is endowed with private information regarding the profitability of the investment. In such situations, the past decisions of the firms are informative and, thus, are used as partially revealing signals of private information. Asymmetric information and the observability of actions render the firm's problem dynamic and strategic because the investment decision of one firm affects the other firms' future payoffs through the learning process. We describe the model and we show that there exists a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The informational externality increases the likelihood for a firm to refrain from investing immediately in order to make a more informed decision in the future.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123338979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization","authors":"Maher Said","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1296455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1296455","url":null,"abstract":"A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient allocation using a sequence of ascending auctions. The buyers use memoryless strategies to reveal all private information in every period, inducing symmetric behavior across different cohorts. We extend our results to revenue maximization, showing that a sequence of ascending auctions with asynchronous price clocks is an optimal mechanism.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129988255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ties that Bind: The Kin System as a Mechanism of Income-Hiding between Spouses in Rural Ghana","authors":"C. Castilla","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1996882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1996882","url":null,"abstract":"I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. From the model, a test to identify income hiding empirically is derived. For the empirical application, a household survey conducted in Southern Ghana is used. I exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband’s own reporting of farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the allocation of resources is consistent with hiding. For identification, the wife’s clan and the husband’s bride-wealth payments upon marriage are used as instruments for asymmetric information. My findings indicate that allocations are suggestive of men hiding farm sales income in the form of gifts to extended family members, which are not closely monitored. It is unclear whether hiding has negative consequences in the long run because hiding occurs in the form of gifts, instead of expenditure in alcohol or tobacco. If the gifts represent a form of risk-sharing, then these gifts will return to the household in the future, and hiding is not necessarily inefficient. However, if these gifts are motivated by social pressure then hiding can result on poverty traps caused by kin system. The wife’s response is also suggestive of hiding. As information asymmetries increase, she reduces her expenditure in non-essential items, such as prepared foods and oil, but increases personal spending. Expenditure in oil is one of the main sources of calories among poor households in the region.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129065864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}