Neuropsychoanalysis最新文献

{"title":"Exploring the very nature of neuropsychoanalysis","authors":"I. Biran, Richard Kessler, D. Olds, M. Zellner","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","url":null,"abstract":"The three Original Articles in the current issue represent widely divergent theoretical explorations. At the same time, they all concern themselves with the very nature of the disciplines of neuropsychoanalysis and psychoanalysis. It’s an unintentional special issue of sorts! Readers may discover some of their “unknown knowns” articulated in these papers: explicit statements of the underlying assumptions many of us have had, by ourselves, about the neuropsychoanalytic dialogue, which can now be placed on a more solid epistemological footing. You will also find some articulations of the philosophical or scientific perspectives agreed upon amongst ourselves. Most importantly, each paper brings up some new insights and questions about our rich interdisciplinary project. In “The Difference Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience,” Cadell Last provides a fresh, if somewhat mind-bending, discussion of a central problem in the integration of neuroscience findings into psychoanalysis. This problem, identified through a Lacanian lens, is that “neuroscience defines its discourse in relationship to the materiality of the brain – something that is present – whereas one of the defining features of psychoanalysis is its relationship to problematic forms of absence, namely, unconscious mental processes” (p. 27). On the other hand, Ståle Gundersen, in “The Structure of Neuropsychoanalytic Explanation,” offers a “mechanism approach” to help integrate neuroscience into psychoanalysis. He views the goal of neuropsychoanalysis as the establishing of an “updated and empirically based metapsychology founded on neuroscience” as it provides a methodological framework for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses (p. 16). The “mechanism approach,” applicable to all scientific enterprises, provides for psychoanalysis a method of integrating different levels of observation and explanation, including the personal, the psychological, and the neuroscientific. Gundersen asserts that the mechanism approach in neuropsychoanalysis will help to undo the isolation of psychoanalysis from other disciplines. This isolation is the specific focus of Aner Govrin’s “Center and Margin in Psychoanalysis: The Case of Neuropsychoanalysis,” i.e., “the dismissive attitude” of psychoanalytic communities towards non-psychoanalytic bodies of knowledge, in particular neuroscience, ignoring any implications for the clinical situation. Rather than locate the problem as one of arrogance, Govrin sees the issue largely as residing within the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, i.e., the image of its knowledge and reliance on “all-encompassing narratives.” Ultimately, he offers a pathway for neuropsychoanalytic evolution into a discipline more relevant to psychoanalytic practice. That these articles have happily arrived together, all addressing neuropsychoanalytic epistemology, reflects the vitality of discussions within psychoanalysis that have been generated by neuropsychoanalytic explorations. As is, in thems","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41697459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Standing on the shoulders of giants: Integrating affective and computational neuroscience with psychoanalytic theory","authors":"I. Biran, R. Kessler, D. Olds, M. Zellner","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","url":null,"abstract":"This blockbuster issue of Neuropsychoanalysis is packed with examples of the theoretical generativity of neuropsychoanalysis, which may have far-reaching clinical consequences. A series of pieces in this issue provide stimulating food for thought, and fertile ground for new work. Our journal has a tradition of publishing Target Articles that stimulate the kind of interdisciplinary dialogue that is necessary for developing neuropsychoanalysis. Typically, an experienced researcher, clinician, or theoretician addresses a body of work, or specific clinical or research question, with great depth and breadth. The Target Article is then responded to by a group of expert commentators, followed by a response from the author. See, for example, the masterful Target Articles on the social origins of interoceptive inference by Katerina Fotopoulou and Manos Tsakiris (2017), an integrative model of autism spectrum disorder by William Singletary (2015), and evolutionary and developmental biology by Myron Hofer (2014), to name but a few examples. In this issue, we have a variation on the typical format, in the Target Article by Mark Solms entitled “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme.” In this piece, Solms produces something new by revising, on a line-by-line basis, Sigmund Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” (1895), which Solms calls the “ur-text” of neuropsychoanalysis. In Freud’s original piece, which remained unpublished during his lifetime, Freud began to sketch an over-arching model of the brain and mind, but could not pursue it to completion, due to the nascent or nonexistent technologies in neuroscience. Solms takes developments in affective and computation neuroscience – especially ideas from Jaak Panksepp and Karl Friston – to flesh out and update Freud’s model, producing a landmark work that we believe will be a major contribution to psychoanalytic theory and history. To provide some social and scientific context, our co-editor Richard Kessler offers a short review of the extraordinary and complex history of Freud’s original seminal work, which appears in a separate section in this editorial, below. We also invite readers to see the actual deletions and additions that Solms made in Freud’s original, found in the Supplemental Material in the online version (visit https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ suppl/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361). Not surprisingly, fourteen commentators found in Solms’ remarkable revision a variety of jumping-off points for their Commentaries. Their expertise ranges from computational neuroscience and physics, neurobiology, art and literature, philosophy, psychology, and psychoanalysis. From these points, they provide a rich array of confirmations, disagreements, elaborations, and critiques. We highly recommend these commentaries from Cristina Alberini, Simon Boag, Erkki Brändas and Roman Poznanski, Daniel Dennett, George Ellis, Karl Friston, Robert GalatzerLevy, Siri Hustvedt, Luba Kessle","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46362231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rethinking the framework of the project for a scientific psychology","authors":"C. Alberini","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","url":null,"abstract":"I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to apply local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. Breuer and Freud (1895). Studies on hysteria. S.E.2","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"37 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46455101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time and the dream","authors":"Jason W. Brown","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is a contribution to a theory of duration and subjective time in dream and waking consciousness. According to microgenetic theory, an act of thought begins, Wittgenstein wrote, and psychoanalysts would agree, as would I, with instinct as the animal inheritance traverses the evolutionary core of the brain, the drives arousing acquired experience and knowledge. These strands of the inherited and acquired constitute the core self, the “me,” which is bound up with bodily function, immediacy and the largely innate determinants of behavior. This construct passes a liminal threshold leading to a conscious self in relation to desire for objects or conditions in the future. Thus, the self appears early in the mental state prior to thought and the endpoint of object-perception. A mental state enfolds a transition from instinct to thought to perception in a fraction of a second. The partial overlap of early segments in a series of mental states arouses preliminary phases out of which thoughts and perceptions actualize. Long-term or experiential memories, revised but not erased by the oncoming state, serve as a foundation for thought and perception, while segments at the surface or endpoint of the state that transition to an object, which are not enfolded in the overlap, are receptive to new perceptions. In dreaming, the specious or illusory present arises in the overlap of mental states and the incomplete revival of their predecessors. Incompleteness of revival is the key to recall as fading states lapse to successive planes of iconic, short- and long-term memory. The present arises in the forgetting of perceptions, or the passage of perceptual to memorial content, as the disparity between the floor of the mental state – the endpoint of withdrawal beneath recall – and conscious revival – the ceiling of the mental state – in the final actuality. This disparity is converted to a longitudinal epoch of duration. The degree to which each state is revived – the forgetting of each state, in dream and waking – accounts for the rapid decay in dream recall on waking, as well as the predominance of imagery.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"11 3","pages":"129 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41247180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The importance of being precise: Commentary on “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” by Mark Solms","authors":"Karl J. Friston","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","url":null,"abstract":"It is a great pleasure to comment on Solms’ Rosetta Stone. This commentary focuses on the New Project as a natural science. As such, the New Project has to conform to natural laws. In the physical sciences, there is only one principle we have to worry about, namely, Hamilton’s principle of stationary action. From this principle, one has to elaborate a physics of sentience. I think that Solms meets this challenge, casting Freud’s Project in a light – and language – that physicists and neurobiologists would be comfortable with. This is a remarkable achievement but not entirely unanticipated. I refer here to a line of thinking that inherits from the students of Plato, through Kant and Helmholtz, to modern day treatments of the Bayesian brain (Helmholtz 1878/1971). Given that Freud built upon the foundations laid by Helmholtz, the [re]union of Freudian and Helmholtzian thinking – on offer in the New Project – should be of no surprise. Although the mathematical details may take a few years to tie down with precision (sic) and grace, I think all the heavy lifting has been accomplished with this [re]visionary monograph. This commentary focuses on what the Solms’ [re]vision brings to the table, in terms of the functional architectures that underwrite a physics of sentience. There are some beautifully phrased sentences in it that speak to the fundaments of the free energy principle – and some that take us into new territory. I will frame my critique around these key observations and unpack them from the perspective of active inference.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"57 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49442799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” by Mark Solms","authors":"G. Ellis","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","url":null,"abstract":"[P1]: Intention The intention is to attempt, once more, to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science; that is, to represent mental processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable physical elements, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. Two principle ideas are involved: (1) What distinguishes activity from rest is to be regarded as F, an information exchange between a system and its environment, subject to the general laws of information. (2) Neurons are to be taken as the physical elements.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"53 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43203086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Review of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Special Issue 39:8 (2019), “The influence of neuroscience on psychoanalysts: a contemporary perspective”","authors":"C. P. Fisher","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The special issue of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Volume 39, No. 8 (2019), entitled “The Influence of Neuroscience on Psychoanalysts: A Contemporary Perspective,” edited by Fredric N. Busch, M.D., presents a contemporary view of developments that began more than 100 years ago with Sigmund Freud’s monograph On Aphasia (1891). The fact that the title of the issue refers to “psychoanalysts,” rather than the abstract discipline of psychoanalysis, alerts the reader to the volume’s collection of personal views of a complex topic. In this review, I will also be personal, considering how the volume engages me as a psychoanalyst, while commenting on the representativeness of the selections, and some of the issues raised by the authors. Fredric Busch has undertaken a massive task, handling it with elegance and grace. I’ll come back to the scientific questions he raises in his Prologue to the issue, and merely mention here that I feel challenged by the complexity and volume of the material. I imagine it is similarly challenging for every reader who seeks to grasp the influence of neuroscience on psychoanalysts.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"151 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45465562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New project for a scientific psychology: General scheme","authors":"M. Solms","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is a revision of Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme.” It updates the original, sentence for sentence where possible, in light of contemporary neuroscientific knowledge. The principle revisions are as follows. (1) Freud’s conception of “quantity” (the precursor of “drive energy”) is replaced by the concept of “free energy.” This is the energy within a system that is not currently performing useful work. (2) Shannon’s conception of “information” is introduced, where information is equivalent to unpredictability, and is formally equivalent to “entropy” in physics. (3) In biology, the fundamental purpose of “homeostasis” is to resist entropy – i.e., to increase predictability. Homeostasis turns out to be the underlying mechanism of what Freud called the “principle of neuronal inertia.” (4) Freud’s conception of “contact barriers” (the physical vehicles of memory) is linked with the modern concepts of consolidation/reconsolidation, whereby more deeply consolidated predictions are less plastic (more resistant to change) than freshly consolidated ones. (5) Freud’s notion of sensory “excitation” is replaced with the concept of “prediction error,” where only that portion of sensory input which is not explained by outgoing predictions is propagated inwards for cognitive processing. (6) Freud’s conception of “bound” (inhibited) cathexis, the main vehicle of his “secondary process” and voluntary action is equated with the buffering function of “working memory”; and “freely mobile” cathexis (the vehicle of Freud’s “primary process”) is equated with the automatized response modes of the nondeclarative memory systems. (7) Freud’s notion of ω (the system “consciousness”) is replaced by the concept of “precision” modulation, also known as “arousal” and “postsynaptic gain.”","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"5 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49610813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Solms’ “New Project”","authors":"Jean-Pierre de la Porte","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Solms has kindly invited me to comment on his newest manuscript. More than this he has generously, perhaps over generously, credited me with playing some part in sparking his initial intention to take Freud’s Project seriously as a result of some of my observations long ago. Like the State, the University insists on asking who you are before you are permitted to speak. In that case who you read is who you are and, in keeping with this belief, I may be permitted a few comments about who I was reading and otherwise occupied with in 1984 when a reserved young neuropsychologist audited some of my seminars. I found myself then in a strange position of offering something of my own interests and concerns in a segregated university standing on the brink of either the last civil war of the Cold War era or at the dawn of the first Mitterrand-Blair style neoliberal utopia in Africa. Many of my listeners were preparing for immigration and took a lively interest in the style of thought and topics they felt were relevant elsewhere. There was an expectation on me to provide introductions to what was then called Continental thought. I was trying to avoid making a salad of thinkers who I knew were very different to one another. Since I was due to teach under the rubric of comparative literature I decided to use the then-underexposed comparative work of Michel Serres to underpin a curriculum. It is at this moment that Mark Solms found me. My interest then was not really in psychoanalysis, although like most of my peers I had read and profited from Freud: at first Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, The Interpretation of Dreams and Moses and Monotheism but beyond this assortment I had read Meltzer on transference, was intrigued by a Kleinian art writer Anton Ehrenzweig, and read whatever I could find in print by Adrian Stokes, but more for his vocabulary of the Renaissance than for his allusive treks through object relations. A chance discovery of Frank Sulloway’s large book opened a way to merge Freud with my abiding interest in scientific epistemology. Sulloway’s thesis that Freud was a crypto sociobiologist seemed a generous concession to Edward Wilson, but many great books had been written under the guidance of errors. I profited from Sulloway’s contention that two forms of explanation existed side-by-side in Freud, the distal and the proximal. This led to Sulloway’s emphasis on Freud’s unfinished “Project for a Scientific Psychology” as the outcome of his academic research career in neurology. In standard accounts, starting with Jones, this phase of Freud’s writing was retroactively packaged into a psychoanalytic sociology of ideas. In such accounts the Project came into existence but remained a torso as a consequence of its role in a relationship to a colleague and confidante Wilhelm Fliess. The potency of this view was maintained by the need to explain Freud’s self-analysis as a transferential construction, pursued in the guise of an unfi","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"91 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45343117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Solms: On the mechanisms of repression and defence","authors":"S. Boag","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mark Solms provides a sophisticated extension and clarification of Freud's Project in light of current neuropsychoanalytic thinking and Friston's free-energy principle. This commentary focuses upon Solms' view of repression and defence in his updated Project, whereby Solms extends his recent work on the topic. After noting similarities and differences between Freud's and Solms' views on repression and defense, the commentary addresses the proposed mechanism of repression in Solms' revised Project. An analysis of Solms' account indicates there is not as yet a coherent mechanism of repression in his revised Project, although some type of plausible neural mechanism may nevertheless still be theoretically possible. Consequently, although there is likely merit in Solms' position on repression and defence, there are still outstanding questions that need addressing before this merit can be fully recognised.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"43 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47219145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}