{"title":"Discussion of a new project for a scientific psychology","authors":"R. Galatzer‐Levy","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878611","url":null,"abstract":"When Wilhelm Fliess received the amazing document from Sigmund Freud that has come down to us as the “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” he must have read it with a combination of thrill at his friend’s brilliance, frustration with its difficult and incomprehensible passages, and an impulse to advise his friend that Freud should, at minimum, include Fleiss’s nasal theories as a centerpiece of the discussion. Reading Solms’ wonderful attempt to update Freud’s Project, I find myself in a similar, though hopefully less extreme, frame of mind. While the New Project contains many points worthy of commentary and elaboration, and others points that call for clarification, I find myself coming at the entire manuscript with something like Fliess’ preoccupation with the nose, namely my own hobby horse, a central focus on nonlinear dynamic systems theory as a way of thinking about mental life. While I believe that this viewpoint is not as far off the mark as Fliess’ ideas, and while I will try to show its specific relevance to a critique of Solms’ approach, I do think it is important for myself and for the reader to keep in mind that, while the critique comes from a far better established framework than Fliess’ nasal theories, it is itself not without problems and limitations and should not be taken as gospel. The New Project is far too rich for brief discussion as a whole, so I will focus on its general approach to theory and its two foundational elements, leaving aside a vast amount of important material. Regardless of their merit as pure theory, the two projects organize vast amounts of data in a meaningful, comprehensible way. The resulting presentation of brain function could not be achieved without such an organizing conceptualization, whether or not that conceptualization is, in some sense, ultimately accurate. Both the original Project and the New Project bring together phenomena that could easily be lost among a myriad of seemingly unrelated facts and data needed to fill in the pictures they suggest. But these virtues are insufficient to make a good theory. Solms and Freud use a method that has proven fabulously successful in science – reductionism – in which complex phenomena are understood as manifestations of a small number of simple principles. Chemistry explains the properties of materials and reactions in terms of elements joined by chemical bonds; physics explains light in terms photons and their dual wave-particle nature; evolution explains the diversity of species through the mechanism of natural selection. Shouldn’t psychology be explainable in similar terms? Some history: Freud’s scientific lineage traces to Johannes Müller (1801–1858), among the last great proponents of Naturphilosophie, a tradition that included the idea that living and inanimate matter differ fundamentally. Observing that each sense organ responds to stimuli in its own particular way, Müller posited that each sense had its own specific energy. In 1826 he argued tha","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"63 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878611","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48931101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Solms","authors":"D. Dennett","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878607","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Solms' unusual project of translating Freud's “Project for a Scientific Psychology” into contemporary cognitive science terms is hard to assess. The most important theme, to my way of thinking, is Solms' support, in present-day terms, of Freud's insistence that emotion lies at the heart of all cognition. Taking this one idea seriously will require significant alterations to the working assumptions of many in cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"51 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878607","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45714823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In conversation: Commentary on Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology”","authors":"T. Nolte","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878616","url":null,"abstract":"Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology” (2020) is both a coup de maître and also dizzingly impenetrable (something it, unintentionally I believe, shares with Freud’s original). Despite its length, is to be seen in a wider context of Solms’ unique efforts to forge an interdisciplinary dialogue between psychoanalysis and neighbouring disciplines, mainly, but not restricted to, the neurosciences. It is therefore not surprising that, like this broader endeavour, one can view his contribution as enormously stimulating and enriching, controversial and contradictory or even irrelevant. In other words, it is likely the New Project will provoke similar responses to the many varied ones that neuropsychoanalysis itself elicits: enthusiasm, disagreement, and indifference being the main ones. Taking these three different reactions, one must be content with the fact that none of them is entirely right nor wrong, all potentially legitimate depending on the reader’s vantage point and preference and even co-existing in one person’s mind (perhaps representing the commentator’s attempt to reduce his own free energy when unable to approximate to the hidden causes that lie behind the writing in full – so much circularity must be allowed as, in keeping with the free energy principle (FEP) (Friston, Kilner & Harrison, 2006), one is now confronted with a new “posterior” presented by Solms’ reconceptualisations that call for mental “work”). Pleasure and unpleasure are in dialogue while reading. Solms updates Freud’s project elegantly and he revises it where he sees need and fit. I understand it as work in progress, with sufficient converging empirical evidence and conceptual advances allowing not only for an overdue stocktaking of isolated findings from experimental psychology, neurophysiology, neuroimaging, and modelling approaches but also for the possibility to put pen to paper and to systematize and integrate these new insights under the rubric of Friston’s FEP. It may be important to remember that what has been put forward is a model and what models do is to simplify and thereby inevitably reduce. But they also provide clarity, precision of argument, and a basis for hypothesis-testing and further reworking. They cannot be the last word on the matter although ensuing debates often fall for that and then hinder proper dialogue. The future conversational partner concerned here is perhaps not so much the experimental scientist but the psychoanalyst speaking from the different position of and imbued with their valid evidence from the laboratory of the consulting room. It is in this echo chamber, where Solms’ updating turns, in part, into a substantial revision of Freud’s ideas and where further debate and disagreement may be engendered (e.g. Bell, 2019). From 1895, Freud kept developing his metapsychology and understanding of the mental apparatus. New clinical observations and phenomena found entry into his metapsychological edifice and he chose to depart f","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"83 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878616","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43989120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Commentary on Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology”","authors":"L. Oppenheim","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878617","url":null,"abstract":"As we know from the introduction to Solms’ target article (2020), an editor of this journal articulated in a private communication to him the value of his revision of Freud’s Project (along with the fuller exposition offered in a forthcoming book), the value “for theoreticians, clinicians, and researchers” who seek “to account for the complex interactions between cognition and emotion; impulse and regulation; consciousness and unconscious processes; genetics and experience; etc.” The impact of this undertaking, however, has an even greater reach, extending much beyond the research lab or the consulting room to the broader domains of curiosity, the interrelation of how and why we know what we know, and the imaginary. Indeed, Solms’ New Project is Freud’s psychology revisioned as a natural science, but it is not for nothing that terms like “autopoiesis” and “intentionality,” to name but two, figure prominently not only in biology but in philosophy, both in phenomenology and aesthetics. And it is perhaps also not for nothing that it was by way of a lecturer in comparative literature, as he makes known in the introduction as well, that Solms first came upon Freud’s text. The point I would make is that “the articulation of an infrastructure of a truly neuropsychoanalytic model of the mind and brain,” to again cite Maggie Zellner, adds significantly to our understanding of, on the one hand, the need to know and modes of reflection, and, on the other, the origin of communication and modes of expression. Solms goes so far, in fact, as to ask in The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness, his soon-to-be-published book, “Where do observers come from?” And “How and why, in physical terms, does question-asking arise?,” an inquiry relevant not only to cognition, but to perceptual and affective activity as well, and to the capacity of the individual to imagine. Imagination is the means by which the writer, painter, and composer observe, the tool which allows their question-asking to occur. So, too, it is that of the reader, viewer, and listener. For what underlies that intentionalizing (à la Husserl) projection of the mind, its expressivity and resulting autopoietic construction of agency, is the seeking of knowledge, curiosity itself. What Solms makes eminently clear in the New Project is that the pursuit of knowledge emanates from a curiosity that takes an infinite number of forms. Drawing upon the achievements of Karl Friston and Jaak Panksepp as well as his own, he demonstrates with his modifications of Freud’s conceptualizations how homeostasis is served by the strategic design of the nervous system, a design at once economic (in its dynamic opposition to entropy), generative (in its “unfolding over a concentric predictive hierarchy”), and self-organizing (in its embeddedness within the psychophysiology of all life experience). Learning – which emerges from the feedback by sensory states of “the external consequences of prior active state","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"87 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878617","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46492305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Playing with free energy","authors":"C. Mathys","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878615","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mark Solms's “New Project for a Scientific Psychology” represents an invaluable step in the direction of a generative model of the mental apparatus. In particular, the idea of drawing a connection between conscious processing and variations in the precision of predictions, is an idea worth pursuing. However, the imperative always to minimize free energy is far too limiting. There is no stronger sign of evolutionary fitness than not needing to minimize it and instead playing with it. We may therefore assume that the mental apparatus, and conscious processing especially, have evolved also in order to display their skill at allowing for and handling an abundance of free energy.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"81 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878615","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47264544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mark Solms’ Project","authors":"S. Hustvedt","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878612","url":null,"abstract":"Mark Solms’ revision of Freud’s (1895) Project re-represents a dynamic, biologically plausible, mathematically tractable model of mind. “The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction” (Freud, 1895, p. 295). In Solms’ version, psychical has become mental and material particles have become physical elements. In the next sentence, Freud’s Q (quantity) of energy “subject to the laws of motion” becomes Solms’ F (Friston free energy) “subject to the laws of information.” The two documents may be read as a palimpsest. Solms’ superimposed text is intended to fortify the underlying text as prescient precursor to newer science. Both Projects are written in dense prose. Language is not superfluous to my discussion. Scientific terms often carry multiple and labile meanings (information, representation,mechanism, entropy). Metaphors have and continue to shape understanding in science in both productive and blinding ways (Keller, 1995; Pigliucci & Boudry, 2011). Freud’s frequently quoted words that the cases in Studies on Hysteria read “like short stories” and “lack the serious stamp of science” (Breuer & Freud, 1895, p. 160) have an apologetic tone I suspect he hoped to rectify in the Project. A hope for that “stamp” has animated the discipline of neuropsychoanalysis. My own apologies: I suffer from formula blindness and could not perform a Bayesian calculation if someone tied me to a tree and threatened me with a gun. Despite these glaring deficits, what I have to offer in few words is historical context for and philosophical observations on the intellectual foundations of the Projects. I have questions, not answers. Solms’ changes to Freud’s opening paragraph afford ample room for thoughts on the complexities involved. Thedreamofquantifying intangible qualities in theWest is as old as the Pythagoreans, and methods for measuring the mind have a long and sometimes ugly history. Galton’s eugenics was fueled by precisely the same desire (Kevles, 1985). For modern science, quantity begins with Galileo – “science is measure.” Questions of “soul” or “psyche” fell outside the picture (see Goff, 2019). Freud hoped to bring subjective consciousness and felt meaning to “quantitative psychology” (1895, p. 311), but uniting quantity and quality remains an unsolved chasm of the mind/body problem. This is Solms’ “Rubicon,” the fateful crossing from the objective and numerical to lived experience – the phenomenological. The old and the new Project are linked by analogous formulas for entropy. Freud’s concept of neuronal energy is derived from the first two laws of thermodynamics clarified in the nineteenth century, first by Clausius, then Boltzmann: the first, the conservation of force (energy); and the second, in isolated systems entropy (disorder, randomness) tends ","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"69 - 72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878612","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42049820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From hatch to egg grading: monitoring of Salmonella shedding in free-range egg production systems.","authors":"Andrea R McWhorter, Kapil K Chousalkar","doi":"10.1186/s13567-019-0677-4","DOIUrl":"10.1186/s13567-019-0677-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Human cases of salmonellosis are frequently liked with the consumption of contaminated table eggs. Recently, there has been an increase in consumer demand for cage-free eggs precipitating the need for a greater understanding of Salmonella dynamics in free-range production systems. A longitudinal study was conducted to determine the points in production where birds are most likely to be exposed to Salmonella and where the risk of egg contamination is highest. In this study, two free-range flocks were sampled from hatch to the end of production. At hatch, all chicks were Salmonella negative and remained negative during rearing. During production, the proportion of positive samples was low on both farms. Salmonella positive samples were detected intermittently for Flock A. Dust, nest box, and egg belt swabs had the highest proportion of positive samples and highest overall loads of Salmonella. The egg grading floor was swabbed at different points following the processing of eggs from Flock A. Only the suction cups that handle eggs prior to egg washing tested positive for Salmonella. Swabs collected from machinery handling eggs after washing were Salmonella negative. During production, positive samples from Flock B were observed at only single time point. Dust has been implicated as a source of Salmonella that can lead to flock to flock contamination. Bulk dust samples were collected and tested for Salmonella. The proportion of positive dust samples was low and is likely due to physical parameters which are not likely to support the survival of Salmonella in the environment.</p>","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"7 1","pages":"58"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2019-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6668057/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81959735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taphophobia and resurrection mania following left parietal stroke","authors":"I. Biran","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2019.1698314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1698314","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The paper describes a patient with psychotic depression following left inferior parietal stroke. He had a dominant delusion: a belief that he was buried alive and had died thereafter. This delusion was an amalgamation of taphophobia (fear of being buried alive) and Cotard’s nihilistic delusion. This taphophobia-Cotard complex was accompanied by a resurrection delusional belief that his son would resuscitate him by pressing his chest through the gravestone, during which the son’s hands would be detached from his body. This uncanny presentation is analyzed on various levels: Psychiatric level with an attempt to understand this presentation as reactivation of post-traumatic stress disorder; classical neurological level based on the function of the left parietal cortex and its role in body representations as in Gerstmann’s syndrome; Coltheart’s neuropsychological “Two-Factors Model” of delusional beliefs suggesting that the nihilistic-like delusion stems from false interpretation secondary to impaired mental activity that follows similar brain lesions and that this interpretation is not rejected due to lack of censorship activity; psychodynamic level – looking at the switch to primary thinking processes and at the accompanying uncanniness, anxiety and manic defenses. The paper suggests that what seems like diverse and haphazard presentation can be a multifaceted expression of the crucial function of the left inferior parietal cortex as a heteromodal cortex sited in an intersection between concrete perceptions and symbolic constructs and between primary and secondary thinking processes.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"21 1","pages":"79 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2019.1698314","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49621330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Keynote, Research, and Symposia Abstracts from the 2019 Congress of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society","authors":"A. Fotopoulou, M. Tsakiris","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2019.1696536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1696536","url":null,"abstract":"We take a novel interpersonal and multimodal approach to characterize the self-reported intensity and distribution of erogenous zones, mapped both on one’s own body and on an imagined partner’s body in response to being touched but also being looked at. Here we show the presence of a multimodal erogenous mirror between sexual partners, as we observed clear correspondences between individuals’ topographic distributions of erogenous zones on their own and their partners’ bodies, as well as between those elicited by touch and vision. The erogenous body is therefore organized and represented in an interpersonal and multisensory way. The implications of this organization are discussed in relation to current neuropsychoanalytic models of body-awareness.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"21 1","pages":"161 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2019.1696536","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43833253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bulletin of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society","authors":"Maria Sonia Goergen","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2019.1697561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1697561","url":null,"abstract":"As the oldest member of the South Brazil Group, and a founding member of the International Society of Neuropsychoanalysis, I invited the members of our group to introduce themselves to you, the reader, as you may be from the region and not know how to get in touch or to dive into the field! My name is Maria Sonia Goergen, MD, and you can read about me at another section. As we come from various regions in the South, we will start with a few here and continue in the next bulletin.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"21 1","pages":"133 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2019.1697561","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42137767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}