Neuropsychoanalysis最新文献

{"title":"Commentary on “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” by Mark Solms","authors":"G. Ellis","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","url":null,"abstract":"[P1]: Intention The intention is to attempt, once more, to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science; that is, to represent mental processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable physical elements, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. Two principle ideas are involved: (1) What distinguishes activity from rest is to be regarded as F, an information exchange between a system and its environment, subject to the general laws of information. (2) Neurons are to be taken as the physical elements.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"53 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878609","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43203086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Review of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Special Issue 39:8 (2019), “The influence of neuroscience on psychoanalysts: a contemporary perspective”","authors":"C. P. Fisher","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The special issue of Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Volume 39, No. 8 (2019), entitled “The Influence of Neuroscience on Psychoanalysts: A Contemporary Perspective,” edited by Fredric N. Busch, M.D., presents a contemporary view of developments that began more than 100 years ago with Sigmund Freud’s monograph On Aphasia (1891). The fact that the title of the issue refers to “psychoanalysts,” rather than the abstract discipline of psychoanalysis, alerts the reader to the volume’s collection of personal views of a complex topic. In this review, I will also be personal, considering how the volume engages me as a psychoanalyst, while commenting on the representativeness of the selections, and some of the issues raised by the authors. Fredric Busch has undertaken a massive task, handling it with elegance and grace. I’ll come back to the scientific questions he raises in his Prologue to the issue, and merely mention here that I feel challenged by the complexity and volume of the material. I imagine it is similarly challenging for every reader who seeks to grasp the influence of neuroscience on psychoanalysts.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"151 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1852102","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45465562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New project for a scientific psychology: General scheme","authors":"M. Solms","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This is a revision of Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme.” It updates the original, sentence for sentence where possible, in light of contemporary neuroscientific knowledge. The principle revisions are as follows. (1) Freud’s conception of “quantity” (the precursor of “drive energy”) is replaced by the concept of “free energy.” This is the energy within a system that is not currently performing useful work. (2) Shannon’s conception of “information” is introduced, where information is equivalent to unpredictability, and is formally equivalent to “entropy” in physics. (3) In biology, the fundamental purpose of “homeostasis” is to resist entropy – i.e., to increase predictability. Homeostasis turns out to be the underlying mechanism of what Freud called the “principle of neuronal inertia.” (4) Freud’s conception of “contact barriers” (the physical vehicles of memory) is linked with the modern concepts of consolidation/reconsolidation, whereby more deeply consolidated predictions are less plastic (more resistant to change) than freshly consolidated ones. (5) Freud’s notion of sensory “excitation” is replaced with the concept of “prediction error,” where only that portion of sensory input which is not explained by outgoing predictions is propagated inwards for cognitive processing. (6) Freud’s conception of “bound” (inhibited) cathexis, the main vehicle of his “secondary process” and voluntary action is equated with the buffering function of “working memory”; and “freely mobile” cathexis (the vehicle of Freud’s “primary process”) is equated with the automatized response modes of the nondeclarative memory systems. (7) Freud’s notion of ω (the system “consciousness”) is replaced by the concept of “precision” modulation, also known as “arousal” and “postsynaptic gain.”","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"5 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49610813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Report on “Neuropsychoanalysis around the world,” an online meeting hosted by the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society, July 2020","authors":"Daniela Flores Mosri","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1848612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1848612","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The 21st Congress of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society was scheduled to happen on July 9th to 11th in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The coronavirus pandemic led to postponing the event for 2021 and left the Society without its annual meeting. As the world quickly moved on to online communications, the organizing committee decided to have an event in lieu of the Congress on July 11th and 12th. It was titled “Neuropsychoanalysis around the world” and it saw a large audience (approximately 357 people) from all over the world, including Lithuania, Brazil, Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, Colombia, Canada, Australia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Uruguay, Turkey, Sweden, Puerto Rico, Spain, Japan, South Africa, Belgium, Chile, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Peru, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Ukraine and Mexico. Updates in research, clinical advances, and theory were presented to be followed by comments and discussions from attendees.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"139 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1848612","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49400995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Animal minds: The case for emotion, based on neuroscience","authors":"O. Turnbull, Anna-Lorena Bär","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1848611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1848611","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Do non-human animals have minds? This scientific question, with important ethical implications, can be answered differently depending on the criteria used: in particular, whether we conceptualise animal minds through the lens of intelligence, or of feelings. This paper surveys the animal minds literature, and related philosophical issues. We review four core components of mind (consciousness, affective valence, agency, and intelligence), and their neurobiology. We survey current scientific evidence for language, tool use, problem-solving, theory of mind, self-awareness, and the behavioural and neuroscientific aspects of emotion. In overview: some animal species have fairly impressive intellectual abilities, but these are found only in a few species, often only in some species members, and only after substantial practice. Therefore, if mind is defined strictly by intelligence, then most non-human animals might be argued not to have minds. However, this paper argues that intelligence is a poor proxy for mind, and that we are better placed to debate the case for mind based on emotion. Viewed this way, there is evidence from a vast array of vertebrate species, where emotion is universal within those species, with none of the practice needed for intelligence. Jeremy Bentham was indeed correct when he pointed out that the critical issue is not merely the evidence, but the question of how we frame our thinking about non-human animals: are we to decide about animals based on their rationality, or on their capacity for feeling?","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"109 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1848611","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45608927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Solms’ “New Project”","authors":"Jean-Pierre de la Porte","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Solms has kindly invited me to comment on his newest manuscript. More than this he has generously, perhaps over generously, credited me with playing some part in sparking his initial intention to take Freud’s Project seriously as a result of some of my observations long ago. Like the State, the University insists on asking who you are before you are permitted to speak. In that case who you read is who you are and, in keeping with this belief, I may be permitted a few comments about who I was reading and otherwise occupied with in 1984 when a reserved young neuropsychologist audited some of my seminars. I found myself then in a strange position of offering something of my own interests and concerns in a segregated university standing on the brink of either the last civil war of the Cold War era or at the dawn of the first Mitterrand-Blair style neoliberal utopia in Africa. Many of my listeners were preparing for immigration and took a lively interest in the style of thought and topics they felt were relevant elsewhere. There was an expectation on me to provide introductions to what was then called Continental thought. I was trying to avoid making a salad of thinkers who I knew were very different to one another. Since I was due to teach under the rubric of comparative literature I decided to use the then-underexposed comparative work of Michel Serres to underpin a curriculum. It is at this moment that Mark Solms found me. My interest then was not really in psychoanalysis, although like most of my peers I had read and profited from Freud: at first Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, The Interpretation of Dreams and Moses and Monotheism but beyond this assortment I had read Meltzer on transference, was intrigued by a Kleinian art writer Anton Ehrenzweig, and read whatever I could find in print by Adrian Stokes, but more for his vocabulary of the Renaissance than for his allusive treks through object relations. A chance discovery of Frank Sulloway’s large book opened a way to merge Freud with my abiding interest in scientific epistemology. Sulloway’s thesis that Freud was a crypto sociobiologist seemed a generous concession to Edward Wilson, but many great books had been written under the guidance of errors. I profited from Sulloway’s contention that two forms of explanation existed side-by-side in Freud, the distal and the proximal. This led to Sulloway’s emphasis on Freud’s unfinished “Project for a Scientific Psychology” as the outcome of his academic research career in neurology. In standard accounts, starting with Jones, this phase of Freud’s writing was retroactively packaged into a psychoanalytic sociology of ideas. In such accounts the Project came into existence but remained a torso as a consequence of its role in a relationship to a colleague and confidante Wilhelm Fliess. The potency of this view was maintained by the need to explain Freud’s self-analysis as a transferential construction, pursued in the guise of an unfi","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"91 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878608","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45343117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Solms: On the mechanisms of repression and defence","authors":"S. Boag","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Mark Solms provides a sophisticated extension and clarification of Freud's Project in light of current neuropsychoanalytic thinking and Friston's free-energy principle. This commentary focuses upon Solms' view of repression and defence in his updated Project, whereby Solms extends his recent work on the topic. After noting similarities and differences between Freud's and Solms' views on repression and defense, the commentary addresses the proposed mechanism of repression in Solms' revised Project. An analysis of Solms' account indicates there is not as yet a coherent mechanism of repression in his revised Project, although some type of plausible neural mechanism may nevertheless still be theoretically possible. Consequently, although there is likely merit in Solms' position on repression and defence, there are still outstanding questions that need addressing before this merit can be fully recognised.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"43 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878605","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47219145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comments on “New Project for Scientific Psychology” by Mark Solms","authors":"E. Brändas, R. Poznanski","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878606","url":null,"abstract":"In his impressive “New Project for a Scientific Psychology,” Mark Solms presents us with a revision of Freud’s original “Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme.”While doing so, he conveys a neuropsychoanalytic perspective on Chalmers’ “hard problem” of consciousness. In Solms’ update, he mentions a few key notions and theories that were not available to Freud and his students, viz. (i) Shannon’s concept of information, (ii) surprisal, (iii) predictive coding, (iii) Friston’s free energy, and (iv) Panksepp’s affective neuroscience. Although the intention is not foremost to solve the hard problem, Solms states that he wants to investigate why and how consciousness arises, i.e. why and how there is something it is like to be for an organism. In other words, how and why do neurophysiological activities produce the “experience of consciousness.” The new project (Solms, 2017) implicates the hard problem, the view of dual-aspect monism, consciousness as a noncognitive, but affective function with the latter being homeostatic deviations that cognition suppresses surprise, all formulated within the free energy principle (FEP) (Friston, 2010). To achieve this program, Solms bases his theory on Friston’s model of FEP, shown to minimize surprisal as a unifying principle of brain functioning. The theoretical project sets down that prior hypotheses are supplanted by posterior ones implicating that the central organ of the human nervous system operates as a “Bayesian brain.” Yet, Solms’ dualistic view entails that the material brain does not produce the mind and therefore creates a “ghost in the machine” (Koestler, 1967; Koestler & Smythies, 1969). The use of hard-core scientific terms such as free energy, surprisal, negentropy, information, dualism, self-organization, Markov blanket, etc., prompts useful strategies and subtle and interesting interpretations. Nevertheless, their utility might lead to a confusing mix of equivocal terminology. For instance, is not minimizing the free energy and entropy a contradiction? First, let us briefly review some standard definitions from chemistry. The notion of free energy, H = U− TS, where U, T , S are the internal energy, absolute temperature, and entropy, respectively, reveals details of the direction of a chemical reaction. H is minimum and S maximum at equilibrium. However, in the present context, it is evident that FEP is a minimum principle for the surprise, which shifts the focus to S. Now surprisal is an information-theoretic concept, useful in many areas, which here assumes a somewhat ambiguous role. For instance, it was employed in chemistry by Bernstein and Levine (1972) to improve the understanding of non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems. The surprisal analysis is a way to identify and characterize systems that deviate from the state of maximum entropy due to physical constraints that prevent a situation of balancing equilibrium. Quantifying the probability of a particular event in relation to i","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"47 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878606","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43360875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Commentary on Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology”","authors":"Fritz Lackinger","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","url":null,"abstract":"Mark Solms’ revision and reformulation of Freud’s famous “Project for a Scientific Psychology” seems to be a heroic effort to bring recent progress in neuropsychoanalysis closer to some sectors of today’s psychoanalysts. His text makes clear the extent to which not only can Freud’s intentions of 1895 be maintained after a thorough and twenty-first-century neuroscientific updating of his Project but that even whole chapters are preserved in much of their original wording. Although important ideas of Freud, like his famous Qη or his “principle of neuronal inertia,” are replaced by more timely concepts, today’s Freudians can see how much of the thinking of their intellectual founder has stood the test of time. Simultaneously, the question arises in how far Solms’ revision has managed to update Freud not only neuroscientifically but also psychoanalytically, as psychoanalysis as well has neither stood still in the decades after Freud’s Project nor since Freud’s death. My endeavor in this short commentary is to relate some of the basic innovations of Solms with important ideas from psychoanalytic object relations theory, a trend within the psychoanalytic community that is associated with names like Fairbairn, Klein, Jacobson and Kernberg. Object relations theory has placed great emphasis on the idea that human beings live objectively and subjectively in relationships from the beginning of life, thus putting into question Freud’s idea of primary narcissism as a developmental stage before that of object relations. As I am no neuroscientist but a psychoanalyst, my reasoning will focus on some of the implications of Solms’ paper for psychoanalytic theory and not so much on the computational neuroscientific details. I want to make four separate but connected points which hopefully add up to a constructive suggestion and supplement to Solms’ approach.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"77 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48700008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A project for a scientific psychoanalysis","authors":"Luba Kessler, R. Kessler","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878613","url":null,"abstract":"In the “New Project for a Scientific Psychology,” Solms (2020) reclaims the long-forsaken biological anchor of psychoanalysis. Equipped with the insights of Jaak Panksepp’s affective neuroscience and Karl Friston’s computational neuroscience, he repurposes Freud’s original Project by expanding its pioneering metapsychological ideas. In the process, we rediscover the foundations of the essential nature of psychoanalysis. While Freud reportedly abandoned the Project in his turn towards psychoanalysis, the New Project documents anew its relevant metapsychology as the scaffolding for psychoanalytic theory and practice. The paper is daunting. But we believe that what awaits as a result of the effort to extract some of its essential content will actually yield profound psychoanalytic recognition. This commentary is our personal effort to make the case for it – the best we can. It may not meet all criteria for a full grasp of the paper, but it is guided by a discernible vision we see in it. What follows is an outline of that vision. The updated version takes up Freud’s modeling of the dynamic mental processes which underpin the organization of the “mental apparatus” in terms of energy transformations into affective qualia in neuronal functioning. The life of an organism requires the proper energy management necessary for the preservation of homeostatic balance. Human life is marked additionally by “feeling” the way of doing that while interacting with the (object) world – i.e. regulating it by means of mentation. The functionality of this model is underscored further by highlighting two powerful vectors characterizing these processes: (1) the concentric levels of graded complexity of their central neuronal organization, and (2) the centrifugal/centripetal ebb and flow from the neuronal to proto-mental to mental functioning. This provides cohesion to the entire model: if internal organismic energy requirements lead to transformations in mental organization through affective qualia expressions, it is because these transformations take place along the inside/ outside axis of the human organism. In the mental apparatus, this axis connects the received signals of imperative biological demands for the maintenance of homeostasis in the body’s interior with the resources in the outside (object) world needed to secure it. Why does this articulation matter? After prolonged arguments about the theoretical and clinical relevance of metapsychology, psychoanalysis largely discarded it. Even when Rapaport and Gill (1959) affirmed the five tenets of psychoanalytic metapsychology (topographic, dynamic, economic, genetic, and adaptive), they were already treating it as a psychological system untethered from its biological roots. Rootless, psychoanalysis was set adrift into hermeneutic debates of competing schools of thought. While believing passionately in psychoanalytic propositions and their clinical mettle, a shared foundational matrix, needed to give them common grou","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"73 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878613","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43963932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}