Neuropsychoanalysis最新文献

{"title":"The difference between neuroscience and psychoanalysis: Irreducibility of absence to brain states","authors":"Cadell Last","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1926312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1926312","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is a difference between neuroscience and psychoanalysis in terms of their primary correlate for subjectivity. Neuroscience defines its discourse in relationship to the materiality of the brain – something that is present – whereas one of the defining features of psychoanalysis is its relationship to problematic forms of absence, namely, unconscious mental processes. One central concern in this regard is the proposition of unconscious mental processes as a wish-fulfillment. In this paper, the logic of the unconscious as a wish-fulfillment is mobilized as a type of knowledge having significant value for understanding neuroscience as a social and historical community. From this perspective, one of the central problems of neuroscience, the “hard problem of consciousness,” is framed not as a problem of neurological correlation but of problematic experience itself. This reframing of the hard problem of consciousness suggests that in order to bring neuroscience and psychoanalysis together, theorists need to think principles of absence. This can be explored with the metaphysics of absence, where indeterminacy and incompleteness become central, and also in the psychoanalytic formulation of the death drive, where we reach the limit of conscious mastery and control. From this foundation, neuroscience and psychoanalysis may find productive dialogue in constructing an “absential science” which would allow a space for new theory of the human relationship to sex (libido) and death (mortality). This paper argues that such new theory is necessary because the future development of neuroscientific technologies could transform fundamental experiences of absence which structure subjective discourse.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"27 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1926312","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43251472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The structure of neuropsychoanalytic explanations","authors":"Ståle Gundersen","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1929419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1929419","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The “mechanism approach” to scientific explanation is to explain a phenomenon by showing how it is generated through the interactions among its constituents; that is, the explanation elucidates the internal causal structures of what is to be explained. The paper argues that the mechanism approach to explanation may function as a framework for constructing neuropsychoanalytic explanations. One important virtue of the mechanism approach is that it helps us see how different levels, such as the neuroscientific and psychoanalytic levels, are integrated with each other. It is argued that the mechanism approach does not entail reductionism or do away with meaning and understanding. Based on the preceding discussion, the paper touches briefly upon some challenges facing neuropsychoanalysis, such as its supposed clinical irrelevance, the relation between neuropsychoanalysis and psychology, and the future of psychoanalysis in view of the continuously growing knowledge about mind–brain processes.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"15 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1929419","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47592036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bulletin 39 of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society","authors":"Maria Sonia Goergen","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1929031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1929031","url":null,"abstract":"In the strange pandemic time of 2020, we were not able to include the group reports from our dynamic correspondents around the world. To make up for it, we now present a rich array of reports covering the entire year of 2020, through the spring of 2021. Our Regional Group coordinators report a truly remarkable set of interdisciplinary activities – reading groups, research projects, publications of all sorts, and a heartening level of inter-group collaboration. After more than a year of Zoom meetings and seminars, we look forward to greeting new colleagues as old friends when we are finally able to meet in person (as we intend to do in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in the summer of 2021)! In the meantime, enjoy the news of our colleagues from all around the world – from Japan, Turkey, a variety of Russian-speaking countries, Sweden, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and Mexico. For more information on regional groups (and submitting information on a new group, if you form one), visit https://npsa-association.org/who-we-are/the-international-neuropsychoanalysis-society/. We look forward to hearing from you, and seeing you soon! (Maria Sonia Goergen, M.D., and Maggie Zellner, Ph.D., L.P., Editor)","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"39 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1929031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43465121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Center and margin in mainstream psychoanalysis: The case of neuropsychoanalysis","authors":"Aner Govrin","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1934722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934722","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores the intricate relations between neuropsychoanalysis and mainstream psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic communities tend to be suspicious of non-psychoanalytic bodies of knowledge and to dismiss their relevance for the clinical encounter. This dismissive attitude is regarded by many as part of psychoanalysts’ indoctrination, arrogance, and over-fascination with their own theories. The paper offers an alternative explanation of psychoanalysts’ reluctance to be influenced by other non-psychoanalytic sciences, in particular neuropsychoanalysis. By demonstrating that resistance to change and a commitment to entrenched theoretical positions are ubiquitous within science, the paper indicates that the reluctance of mainstream psychoanalysts to use findings from neuropsychoanalysis is not irrational but normal. It does not stem from arrogance, but from two inherent qualities within psychoanalytic knowledge: (a) difficulties in relying on extra-clinical sources, and (b) full reliance on an all-encompassing psychoanalytic narrative. The paper discusses ways by which neuropsychoanalysis can evolve by becoming more relevant to the daily practice of psychoanalysts.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"3 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45551274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring the very nature of neuropsychoanalysis","authors":"I. Biran, Richard Kessler, D. Olds, M. Zellner","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","url":null,"abstract":"The three Original Articles in the current issue represent widely divergent theoretical explorations. At the same time, they all concern themselves with the very nature of the disciplines of neuropsychoanalysis and psychoanalysis. It’s an unintentional special issue of sorts! Readers may discover some of their “unknown knowns” articulated in these papers: explicit statements of the underlying assumptions many of us have had, by ourselves, about the neuropsychoanalytic dialogue, which can now be placed on a more solid epistemological footing. You will also find some articulations of the philosophical or scientific perspectives agreed upon amongst ourselves. Most importantly, each paper brings up some new insights and questions about our rich interdisciplinary project. In “The Difference Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience,” Cadell Last provides a fresh, if somewhat mind-bending, discussion of a central problem in the integration of neuroscience findings into psychoanalysis. This problem, identified through a Lacanian lens, is that “neuroscience defines its discourse in relationship to the materiality of the brain – something that is present – whereas one of the defining features of psychoanalysis is its relationship to problematic forms of absence, namely, unconscious mental processes” (p. 27). On the other hand, Ståle Gundersen, in “The Structure of Neuropsychoanalytic Explanation,” offers a “mechanism approach” to help integrate neuroscience into psychoanalysis. He views the goal of neuropsychoanalysis as the establishing of an “updated and empirically based metapsychology founded on neuroscience” as it provides a methodological framework for testing psychoanalytic hypotheses (p. 16). The “mechanism approach,” applicable to all scientific enterprises, provides for psychoanalysis a method of integrating different levels of observation and explanation, including the personal, the psychological, and the neuroscientific. Gundersen asserts that the mechanism approach in neuropsychoanalysis will help to undo the isolation of psychoanalysis from other disciplines. This isolation is the specific focus of Aner Govrin’s “Center and Margin in Psychoanalysis: The Case of Neuropsychoanalysis,” i.e., “the dismissive attitude” of psychoanalytic communities towards non-psychoanalytic bodies of knowledge, in particular neuroscience, ignoring any implications for the clinical situation. Rather than locate the problem as one of arrogance, Govrin sees the issue largely as residing within the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, i.e., the image of its knowledge and reliance on “all-encompassing narratives.” Ultimately, he offers a pathway for neuropsychoanalytic evolution into a discipline more relevant to psychoanalytic practice. That these articles have happily arrived together, all addressing neuropsychoanalytic epistemology, reflects the vitality of discussions within psychoanalysis that have been generated by neuropsychoanalytic explorations. As is, in thems","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"23 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1934867","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41697459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Standing on the shoulders of giants: Integrating affective and computational neuroscience with psychoanalytic theory","authors":"I. Biran, R. Kessler, D. Olds, M. Zellner","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","url":null,"abstract":"This blockbuster issue of Neuropsychoanalysis is packed with examples of the theoretical generativity of neuropsychoanalysis, which may have far-reaching clinical consequences. A series of pieces in this issue provide stimulating food for thought, and fertile ground for new work. Our journal has a tradition of publishing Target Articles that stimulate the kind of interdisciplinary dialogue that is necessary for developing neuropsychoanalysis. Typically, an experienced researcher, clinician, or theoretician addresses a body of work, or specific clinical or research question, with great depth and breadth. The Target Article is then responded to by a group of expert commentators, followed by a response from the author. See, for example, the masterful Target Articles on the social origins of interoceptive inference by Katerina Fotopoulou and Manos Tsakiris (2017), an integrative model of autism spectrum disorder by William Singletary (2015), and evolutionary and developmental biology by Myron Hofer (2014), to name but a few examples. In this issue, we have a variation on the typical format, in the Target Article by Mark Solms entitled “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme.” In this piece, Solms produces something new by revising, on a line-by-line basis, Sigmund Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” (1895), which Solms calls the “ur-text” of neuropsychoanalysis. In Freud’s original piece, which remained unpublished during his lifetime, Freud began to sketch an over-arching model of the brain and mind, but could not pursue it to completion, due to the nascent or nonexistent technologies in neuroscience. Solms takes developments in affective and computation neuroscience – especially ideas from Jaak Panksepp and Karl Friston – to flesh out and update Freud’s model, producing a landmark work that we believe will be a major contribution to psychoanalytic theory and history. To provide some social and scientific context, our co-editor Richard Kessler offers a short review of the extraordinary and complex history of Freud’s original seminal work, which appears in a separate section in this editorial, below. We also invite readers to see the actual deletions and additions that Solms made in Freud’s original, found in the Supplemental Material in the online version (visit https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ suppl/10.1080/15294145.2020.1833361). Not surprisingly, fourteen commentators found in Solms’ remarkable revision a variety of jumping-off points for their Commentaries. Their expertise ranges from computational neuroscience and physics, neurobiology, art and literature, philosophy, psychology, and psychoanalysis. From these points, they provide a rich array of confirmations, disagreements, elaborations, and critiques. We highly recommend these commentaries from Cristina Alberini, Simon Boag, Erkki Brändas and Roman Poznanski, Daniel Dennett, George Ellis, Karl Friston, Robert GalatzerLevy, Siri Hustvedt, Luba Kessle","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1855938","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46362231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Response to the commentaries on the “New Project”","authors":"M. Solms","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1843215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1843215","url":null,"abstract":"This banquet of commentaries by some of the world’s leading physicists, philosophers, psychoanalysts, neuroscientists, literary theorists, novelists, and more, is testimony to the ongoing vitality of Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” the Ur-text of psychoanalysis. I would like to thank them very sincerely for the time and effort they have expended on this very difficult paper, and for the refreshingly positive spirit in which they have done so. To say the obvious, in the space available, I can respond only to a selection of the many issues they have raised, which I regret; but I will try to focus on the main ones, and especially on those that pose challenges and raise disagreements. I will do so in alphabetical order, starting with Alberini. She asks (1) whether we should build a new metaneuropsychology upon Freud’s basic concepts, or start afresh, and (2) whether we should limit ourselves to the scientific disciplines that were extant in Freud’s day, or draw upon the cutting-edge sciences of our own times, like molecular neurobiology (Alberini, 2020). She also asks an even more basic question: (3) what is “the mind” anyway? Regarding this third question, Alberini is wrong to cast Freud as a dualist; he, like Panksepp and me, was a dual-aspect monist. This means that he viewed the mind as a functional system which can be studied from two observational perspectives: objective brain and subjective being. When it comes to the former perspective, of course we must use every “unbiased” method and technology that we have, without exception. That answers Alberini’s second question. When it comes to the subjective perspective, psychoanalysis stands pretty much alone among the mental sciences in recognizing that felt experience provides the primary empirical data of psychology. As Alberini’s opening quotation from Freud (1950 [1895]) reminds us: “the nature of the subject” demands that we take this perspective; but still, almost all academic psychologists today do not. That is why Alberini’s mentor Eric Kandel asserted that “psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind” (1999, p. 505); it remains more-or-less the only conception we have of the subject of the brain. That answers Alberini’s first question. But ultimately, as monists, we are seeking an understanding of the underlying functional system itself; the abstracted entity which unites mind and brain. This abstracted system is what Freud called the “mental apparatus,” something that is neither physiological nor psychological but rather inferred from the observational data of both fields. When it comes to this level of analysis, the level that I call metaneuropsychological, I think the language of statistical physics is the most serviceable, since it transcends both physiological and psychological phenomenologies. Ontologically, on the dualaspect monist view, the mind is not composed of neurons or their molecular genetics and epigenetics","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"97 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1843215","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46994531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rethinking the framework of the project for a scientific psychology","authors":"C. Alberini","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","url":null,"abstract":"I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to apply local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. Breuer and Freud (1895). Studies on hysteria. S.E.2","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"37 - 41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878604","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46455101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Time and the dream","authors":"Jason W. Brown","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper is a contribution to a theory of duration and subjective time in dream and waking consciousness. According to microgenetic theory, an act of thought begins, Wittgenstein wrote, and psychoanalysts would agree, as would I, with instinct as the animal inheritance traverses the evolutionary core of the brain, the drives arousing acquired experience and knowledge. These strands of the inherited and acquired constitute the core self, the “me,” which is bound up with bodily function, immediacy and the largely innate determinants of behavior. This construct passes a liminal threshold leading to a conscious self in relation to desire for objects or conditions in the future. Thus, the self appears early in the mental state prior to thought and the endpoint of object-perception. A mental state enfolds a transition from instinct to thought to perception in a fraction of a second. The partial overlap of early segments in a series of mental states arouses preliminary phases out of which thoughts and perceptions actualize. Long-term or experiential memories, revised but not erased by the oncoming state, serve as a foundation for thought and perception, while segments at the surface or endpoint of the state that transition to an object, which are not enfolded in the overlap, are receptive to new perceptions. In dreaming, the specious or illusory present arises in the overlap of mental states and the incomplete revival of their predecessors. Incompleteness of revival is the key to recall as fading states lapse to successive planes of iconic, short- and long-term memory. The present arises in the forgetting of perceptions, or the passage of perceptual to memorial content, as the disparity between the floor of the mental state – the endpoint of withdrawal beneath recall – and conscious revival – the ceiling of the mental state – in the final actuality. This disparity is converted to a longitudinal epoch of duration. The degree to which each state is revived – the forgetting of each state, in dream and waking – accounts for the rapid decay in dream recall on waking, as well as the predominance of imagery.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"11 3","pages":"129 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2020.1835527","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41247180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The importance of being precise: Commentary on “New Project for a Scientific Psychology: General Scheme” by Mark Solms","authors":"Karl J. Friston","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","url":null,"abstract":"It is a great pleasure to comment on Solms’ Rosetta Stone. This commentary focuses on the New Project as a natural science. As such, the New Project has to conform to natural laws. In the physical sciences, there is only one principle we have to worry about, namely, Hamilton’s principle of stationary action. From this principle, one has to elaborate a physics of sentience. I think that Solms meets this challenge, casting Freud’s Project in a light – and language – that physicists and neurobiologists would be comfortable with. This is a remarkable achievement but not entirely unanticipated. I refer here to a line of thinking that inherits from the students of Plato, through Kant and Helmholtz, to modern day treatments of the Bayesian brain (Helmholtz 1878/1971). Given that Freud built upon the foundations laid by Helmholtz, the [re]union of Freudian and Helmholtzian thinking – on offer in the New Project – should be of no surprise. Although the mathematical details may take a few years to tie down with precision (sic) and grace, I think all the heavy lifting has been accomplished with this [re]visionary monograph. This commentary focuses on what the Solms’ [re]vision brings to the table, in terms of the functional architectures that underwrite a physics of sentience. There are some beautifully phrased sentences in it that speak to the fundaments of the free energy principle – and some that take us into new territory. I will frame my critique around these key observations and unpack them from the perspective of active inference.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"57 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878610","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49442799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}