{"title":"马克·索尔姆斯“科学心理学新计划”述评","authors":"Fritz Lackinger","doi":"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Mark Solms’ revision and reformulation of Freud’s famous “Project for a Scientific Psychology” seems to be a heroic effort to bring recent progress in neuropsychoanalysis closer to some sectors of today’s psychoanalysts. His text makes clear the extent to which not only can Freud’s intentions of 1895 be maintained after a thorough and twenty-first-century neuroscientific updating of his Project but that even whole chapters are preserved in much of their original wording. Although important ideas of Freud, like his famous Qη or his “principle of neuronal inertia,” are replaced by more timely concepts, today’s Freudians can see how much of the thinking of their intellectual founder has stood the test of time. Simultaneously, the question arises in how far Solms’ revision has managed to update Freud not only neuroscientifically but also psychoanalytically, as psychoanalysis as well has neither stood still in the decades after Freud’s Project nor since Freud’s death. My endeavor in this short commentary is to relate some of the basic innovations of Solms with important ideas from psychoanalytic object relations theory, a trend within the psychoanalytic community that is associated with names like Fairbairn, Klein, Jacobson and Kernberg. Object relations theory has placed great emphasis on the idea that human beings live objectively and subjectively in relationships from the beginning of life, thus putting into question Freud’s idea of primary narcissism as a developmental stage before that of object relations. As I am no neuroscientist but a psychoanalyst, my reasoning will focus on some of the implications of Solms’ paper for psychoanalytic theory and not so much on the computational neuroscientific details. I want to make four separate but connected points which hopefully add up to a constructive suggestion and supplement to Solms’ approach.","PeriodicalId":39493,"journal":{"name":"Neuropsychoanalysis","volume":"22 1","pages":"77 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Commentary on Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology”\",\"authors\":\"Fritz Lackinger\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Mark Solms’ revision and reformulation of Freud’s famous “Project for a Scientific Psychology” seems to be a heroic effort to bring recent progress in neuropsychoanalysis closer to some sectors of today’s psychoanalysts. His text makes clear the extent to which not only can Freud’s intentions of 1895 be maintained after a thorough and twenty-first-century neuroscientific updating of his Project but that even whole chapters are preserved in much of their original wording. Although important ideas of Freud, like his famous Qη or his “principle of neuronal inertia,” are replaced by more timely concepts, today’s Freudians can see how much of the thinking of their intellectual founder has stood the test of time. Simultaneously, the question arises in how far Solms’ revision has managed to update Freud not only neuroscientifically but also psychoanalytically, as psychoanalysis as well has neither stood still in the decades after Freud’s Project nor since Freud’s death. My endeavor in this short commentary is to relate some of the basic innovations of Solms with important ideas from psychoanalytic object relations theory, a trend within the psychoanalytic community that is associated with names like Fairbairn, Klein, Jacobson and Kernberg. Object relations theory has placed great emphasis on the idea that human beings live objectively and subjectively in relationships from the beginning of life, thus putting into question Freud’s idea of primary narcissism as a developmental stage before that of object relations. As I am no neuroscientist but a psychoanalyst, my reasoning will focus on some of the implications of Solms’ paper for psychoanalytic theory and not so much on the computational neuroscientific details. I want to make four separate but connected points which hopefully add up to a constructive suggestion and supplement to Solms’ approach.\",\"PeriodicalId\":39493,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Neuropsychoanalysis\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"77 - 80\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Neuropsychoanalysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Psychology\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Neuropsychoanalysis","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2021.1878614","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Psychology","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
马克·索姆斯(Mark Solms)对弗洛伊德著名的“科学心理学计划”(Project for a Scientific Psychology)的修订和重新表述,似乎是一项英勇的努力,它使神经精神分析的最新进展更接近今天精神分析学的某些领域。他的文章清楚地表明,在对他的计划进行了彻底的、21世纪的神经科学更新之后,弗洛伊德1895年的意图在多大程度上得以维持,而且甚至整个章节都保留了大部分原始措辞。尽管弗洛伊德的重要思想,比如他著名的Qη或“神经元惯性原理”,已经被更及时的概念所取代,但今天的弗洛伊德信徒可以看到,他们的智力奠基人的思想有多少经受住了时间的考验。与此同时,问题出现了,索姆斯的修正在多大程度上不仅在神经科学上,而且在精神分析上更新了弗洛伊德,因为精神分析在弗洛伊德的计划之后的几十年里,无论是弗洛伊德死后,都没有停滞不前。在这篇简短的评论中,我的努力是将索姆斯的一些基本创新与精神分析对象关系理论的重要思想联系起来,这是精神分析界的一种趋势,与费尔贝恩、克莱因、雅各布森和克恩伯格等人有关。客体关系理论非常强调人类从一开始就客观和主观地生活在人际关系中,从而对弗洛伊德的初级自恋作为客体关系之前的发展阶段的观点提出了质疑。由于我不是神经科学家,而是一名精神分析学家,我的推理将集中在索姆斯的论文对精神分析理论的一些影响上,而不是在计算神经科学的细节上。我想提出四个独立但相互关联的观点,希望它们能形成建设性的建议,并对Solms的方法进行补充。
Commentary on Mark Solms’ “New Project for a Scientific Psychology”
Mark Solms’ revision and reformulation of Freud’s famous “Project for a Scientific Psychology” seems to be a heroic effort to bring recent progress in neuropsychoanalysis closer to some sectors of today’s psychoanalysts. His text makes clear the extent to which not only can Freud’s intentions of 1895 be maintained after a thorough and twenty-first-century neuroscientific updating of his Project but that even whole chapters are preserved in much of their original wording. Although important ideas of Freud, like his famous Qη or his “principle of neuronal inertia,” are replaced by more timely concepts, today’s Freudians can see how much of the thinking of their intellectual founder has stood the test of time. Simultaneously, the question arises in how far Solms’ revision has managed to update Freud not only neuroscientifically but also psychoanalytically, as psychoanalysis as well has neither stood still in the decades after Freud’s Project nor since Freud’s death. My endeavor in this short commentary is to relate some of the basic innovations of Solms with important ideas from psychoanalytic object relations theory, a trend within the psychoanalytic community that is associated with names like Fairbairn, Klein, Jacobson and Kernberg. Object relations theory has placed great emphasis on the idea that human beings live objectively and subjectively in relationships from the beginning of life, thus putting into question Freud’s idea of primary narcissism as a developmental stage before that of object relations. As I am no neuroscientist but a psychoanalyst, my reasoning will focus on some of the implications of Solms’ paper for psychoanalytic theory and not so much on the computational neuroscientific details. I want to make four separate but connected points which hopefully add up to a constructive suggestion and supplement to Solms’ approach.