{"title":"A new event-driven Dynamic Vision Sensor based Physical Unclonable Function for camera authentication in reactive monitoring system","authors":"Yue Zheng, Yuan Cao, Chip-Hong Chang","doi":"10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835551","url":null,"abstract":"Surveillance footage has become an integral part of law enforcement as video cameras become ubiquitous, affordable and more reliable. Dynamic vision sensor (DVS) emerges as a new sensing technology that outsmarts existing static CMOS image sensors in vision-enabled traffic monitoring, assisted living and high-speed target tracking for its low latency, high temporal resolution and wide dynamic range under uncontrolled illumination. Instead of recording a steady stream of snapshots taken at a fixed rate, DVS responds only to temporal contrast and records only sparse asynchronous address-events with precise timing information. However, the accountability of the footage captured is incomplete if the cue is triggered by an unidentified device. One effective way to eliminate the anonymity is to build a random oracle out of the DVS sensor and use its authenticity as a root of trust to protect the integrity of the footage. In this paper, we present the first ever event-based physical unclonable function (PUF) for DVS camera identification and secret key generation in reactive monitoring system. A non-intrusive PUF response readout scheme is proposed by exploiting the two unique reset switches, one continuous-timed and one self-timed, of DVS pixel to enable simultaneous generation of PUF response with non-disruptive output of asynchronous address-events. Only three transistors are added to each pixel to isolate the PUF response readout and to prevent the spontaneously detected DVS events from interfering with the PUF operation, which is also triggered by the reflectance change in the scene. Our simulation results based on 1.8V 180nm CMOS technology show that the raw response generated by the proposed event-driven DVS-based PUF has near ideal uniqueness of 49.96%, and worst-case reliability of 96.3% and 99.2% for variations of temperature from −35∼115°C and supply voltage from 1.6∼2.0V, respectively. Its randomness has also been attested by the NIST tests.","PeriodicalId":394462,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126602960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inner collisions in ECC: Vulnerabilities of complete addition formulas for NIST curves","authors":"Poulami Das, Debapriya Basu Roy, Harishma Boyapally, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay","doi":"10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835562","url":null,"abstract":"Elliptic curve cryptosystems are built on an underlying additive group, with an addition operation defined as the group operation. The aim of the elliptic curve addition operation is to render an elliptic curve point on the underlying elliptic curve when two ECC points are taken as inputs. However ECC addition formula may not be complete in nature, and may contain exceptional points, for which the addition formula may fail to produce a valid third point. The addition formula for prime order NIST curves were in fact not complete, till Renes et. al. proposed a complete addition formula for the class of prime order NIST curves in their Eurocrypt 2016 paper. The property of completeness ensures a valid third ECC point for any two chosen input points, and thus provides the advantage of using the same formula for both addition and doubling operations. Consequently it is assumed to be inherently side-channel secure, however any practical validation against side-channel protection is not yet present in the literature. In this work we analyse the side-channel protection for this newly constructed unified formula against two horizontal attacks. We show although this new construction is resistant against HCCA, it may be vulnerable to the ROSETTA attack, which exploits inner collisions within field multiplication operations.","PeriodicalId":394462,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130489420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Echeloned IJTAG data protection","authors":"Senwen Kan, Jennifer Dworak, J. Dunham","doi":"10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835558","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a novel IJTAG-based data protection method that utilizes stream ciphers and IJTAG topology. The method protects IJTAG data with encryption. It further imposes access restriction on user control sequencing. In particular, it complements IJTAG encryption-based data access with IJTAG topology, and it augments IJTAG-based authorization checks to defend against unauthorized and unintended access. It also allows the device owner to implement use case isolation for better compartmentalization of the supply chain.","PeriodicalId":394462,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122549886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upper bounds on the min-entropy of RO Sum, Arbiter, Feed-Forward Arbiter, and S-ArbRO PUFs","authors":"Jeroen Delvaux, Dawu Gu, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835572","url":null,"abstract":"The focus and novelty of this work is the derivation of tight upper bounds on the min-entropy of several physically unclonable funcions (PUFs), i.e., Ring Oscillator Sum, Arbiter, Feed-Forward Arbiter, and S-ArbRO PUFs. This constrains their usability for the fuzzy extraction of a secret key, as an alternative to storing keys in non-volatile memory. For example, it is shown that an ideal Arbiter PUF with 64 stages cannot provide more than 197 bits of min-entropy. At Financial Cryptography 2012, Van Herrewege et al. assume that 1785 bits of min-entropy can be extracted, which renders their 128-bit key generator instantly insecure. We also derive upper bounds that comply with non-ideal PUFs, attributed to, e.g., manufacturing in silicon. As a side contribution hereby, we refute the claim that S-ArbRO PUFs are highly resistant against machine learning.","PeriodicalId":394462,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122537545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}