{"title":"Upper bounds on the min-entropy of RO Sum, Arbiter, Feed-Forward Arbiter, and S-ArbRO PUFs","authors":"Jeroen Delvaux, Dawu Gu, I. Verbauwhede","doi":"10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835572","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The focus and novelty of this work is the derivation of tight upper bounds on the min-entropy of several physically unclonable funcions (PUFs), i.e., Ring Oscillator Sum, Arbiter, Feed-Forward Arbiter, and S-ArbRO PUFs. This constrains their usability for the fuzzy extraction of a secret key, as an alternative to storing keys in non-volatile memory. For example, it is shown that an ideal Arbiter PUF with 64 stages cannot provide more than 197 bits of min-entropy. At Financial Cryptography 2012, Van Herrewege et al. assume that 1785 bits of min-entropy can be extracted, which renders their 128-bit key generator instantly insecure. We also derive upper bounds that comply with non-ideal PUFs, attributed to, e.g., manufacturing in silicon. As a side contribution hereby, we refute the claim that S-ArbRO PUFs are highly resistant against machine learning.","PeriodicalId":394462,"journal":{"name":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2016 IEEE Asian Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (AsianHOST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/AsianHOST.2016.7835572","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Abstract
The focus and novelty of this work is the derivation of tight upper bounds on the min-entropy of several physically unclonable funcions (PUFs), i.e., Ring Oscillator Sum, Arbiter, Feed-Forward Arbiter, and S-ArbRO PUFs. This constrains their usability for the fuzzy extraction of a secret key, as an alternative to storing keys in non-volatile memory. For example, it is shown that an ideal Arbiter PUF with 64 stages cannot provide more than 197 bits of min-entropy. At Financial Cryptography 2012, Van Herrewege et al. assume that 1785 bits of min-entropy can be extracted, which renders their 128-bit key generator instantly insecure. We also derive upper bounds that comply with non-ideal PUFs, attributed to, e.g., manufacturing in silicon. As a side contribution hereby, we refute the claim that S-ArbRO PUFs are highly resistant against machine learning.