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General Equilibrium vs. General Nash Equilibrium 一般均衡和一般纳什均衡
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3261286
Susheng Wang
{"title":"General Equilibrium vs. General Nash Equilibrium","authors":"Susheng Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3261286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3261286","url":null,"abstract":"We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to the concept of general Nash equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to more general games. We also generalize the concept of general equilibrium in general equilibrium theory to a more general concept of general equilibrium such that it becomes applicable to any game. To illustrate the usefulness of these generalized concepts, we apply them to industrial organizations and general equilibrium theory.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132603489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Investment and Learning with Private Information 利用私人信息进行战略投资和学习
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3302677
Peter A. Wagner, N. Klein
{"title":"Strategic Investment and Learning with Private Information","authors":"Peter A. Wagner, N. Klein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3302677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302677","url":null,"abstract":"We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation in which agents choose the timing of investments which yield uncertain returns over time. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others’ investment decisions and from public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and we relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay when the most optimistic intermediate belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in investments induces a negative learning feed-back which may either escalate or dampen beliefs and investment choices. We highlight how private information in strategic experimentation can increase ex ante welfare because of strategic uncertainty and due to an «encouragement effect of private information»","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126250662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
The Family of Lattice Structure Values for Games with Externalities 外部性博弈的晶格结构值族
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3244403
J. M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, A. Jiménez-Losada
{"title":"The Family of Lattice Structure Values for Games with Externalities","authors":"J. M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, A. Jiménez-Losada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3244403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244403","url":null,"abstract":"We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities. To define it we generalize the concept of marginal contribution by using a lattice structure on the set of embedded coalitions. The family of lattice structure values is characterized by extensions of Shapley's axioms: efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and the null player property. The first three axioms have widely accepted generalizations to the framework of games with externalities. However, different concepts of null players have been proposed in the literature and we contribute to this debate with a new one. The null player property that we use is weaker than the others. Finally, we present one particular value of the family, new in the literature, which delivers balanced payoffs and characterize it by two additional properties.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115851294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria 纳什均衡中的承诺量化
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2512882
Thomas A. Weber
{"title":"Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria","authors":"Thomas A. Weber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2512882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512882","url":null,"abstract":"To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117185221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ordinally Symmetric Games 序对称对策
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-07-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3206379
Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang
{"title":"Ordinally Symmetric Games","authors":"Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3206379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3206379","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We extend the notion of an ordinally symmetric game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) from two to n players. We prove that each ordinally symmetric game with two strategies is an ordinal potential game and thus possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, generalizing a result of Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) on symmetric games.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124996047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Survey of the Hold-Up Problem in the Experimental Economics Literature 实验经济学文献中的拖延问题述评
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-06-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3203629
Yadi Yang
{"title":"A Survey of the Hold-Up Problem in the Experimental Economics Literature","authors":"Yadi Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203629","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews experimental studies on the so-called hold-up problem\". Common features in the experimental design and results are summarized. Most experimental studies show evidence of the hold-up problem, but to an extent less severe than what standard theory predicts. Hold-up occurs at the individual level, but exhibits a less severe pattern than theoretical predictions at the aggregate level. A positive correlation is found between the investment stage decisions and subsequent bargaining behaviors. Social preferences largely influence the results in hold-up games. Remedies that enhance the effect of social preferences can effectively alleviate the hold-up problem. These fi ndings in the laboratory setting are also relevant in a real life hold-up situation e.g. in the standard-setting context, but differences in the specifi c institution and environment may require more variations in the experimental design.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126793449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Robust Pricing With Refunds 有退款的稳健定价
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3165146
Toomas Hinnosaar, Keiichi Kawai
{"title":"Robust Pricing With Refunds","authors":"Toomas Hinnosaar, Keiichi Kawai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165146","url":null,"abstract":"Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to best take advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed. JEL: D82, C79, D42","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127472627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Институциональная Инициатива Функционирования Фирм в Условиях Двусторонней Монополии (Institutional Initiative of Functioning of Firms in Conditions of a Bilateral Monopoly) ИнституциональнаяИнициативаФункционированияФирмвУсловияхДвустороннейМонополии(机构计划运作公司的双边垄断的条件)
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3166044
A. Meleshkina, A. Shastitko
{"title":"Институциональная Инициатива Функционирования Фирм в Условиях Двусторонней Монополии (Institutional Initiative of Functioning of Firms in Conditions of a Bilateral Monopoly)","authors":"A. Meleshkina, A. Shastitko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3166044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166044","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Работа основана на методологии комплексного экономического анализа проблем разрешения конфликтов интересов на рынках промежуточных товаров с высокими издержками переключения как на стороне спроса, так и на стороне предложения. Исследование основывается на разработках в области теории организации рынков, теории игр и институциональной экономической теории. В работе проводится анализ круга вопросов, связанных с процессом ведения переговоров в ходе определения цены промежуточного товара, а также с разработкой условий контрактов, снижающих риск возникновения антимонопольных споров в условиях двусторонней монополии. <b>English Abstract:</b> The work is based on the methodology of a comprehensive economic analysis of the problems of resolving conflicts of interest in intermediate goods markets with high switching costs, both on the demand side and on the supply side. The research is based on developments in the field of theory of market organization, game theory and institutional economic theory. The work analyzes the range of issues related to the negotiation process in determining the price of the intermediate goods, as well as the development of contract terms that reduce the risk of antimonopoly disputes arising in the conditions of a bilateral monopoly.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121747145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Alliances in Coalitional Bargaining 联盟议价中的战略联盟
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3160062
Joosung J. Lee
{"title":"Strategic Alliances in Coalitional Bargaining","authors":"Joosung J. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3160062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160062","url":null,"abstract":"To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in which each player can buy out other players with upfront transfers. We uncover the role of an essential player in a transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in preventing efficient outcomes and we show that delay in bargaining generically occurs. In an application to legislative bargaining with vote buying, if a veto player and a non-veto player coexist, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily minimal. In three-player simple games, we fully characterize the set of the equilibrium outcomes, which is equivalent to the convex hull of the core and the egalitarian solution. As the set of equilibrium outcomes includes well-known cooperative power indices, players' strategic alliance can be viewed as a noncooperative foundation of the cooperative solutions.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123654118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Role of Theory in an Age of Design and Big Data 理论在设计和大数据时代的作用
ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_72
M. Jackson
{"title":"The Role of Theory in an Age of Design and Big Data","authors":"M. Jackson","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_72","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_72","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124269845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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