{"title":"A Survey of the Hold-Up Problem in the Experimental Economics Literature","authors":"Yadi Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3203629","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews experimental studies on the so-called \\hold-up problem\". Common features in the experimental design and results are summarized. Most experimental studies show evidence of the hold-up problem, but to an extent less severe than what standard theory predicts. Hold-up occurs at the individual level, but exhibits a less severe pattern than theoretical predictions at the aggregate level. A positive correlation is found between the investment stage decisions and subsequent bargaining behaviors. Social preferences largely influence the results in hold-up games. Remedies that enhance the effect of social preferences can effectively alleviate the hold-up problem. These fi ndings in the laboratory setting are also relevant in a real life hold-up situation e.g. in the standard-setting context, but differences in the specifi c institution and environment may require more variations in the experimental design.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3203629","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This paper reviews experimental studies on the so-called \hold-up problem". Common features in the experimental design and results are summarized. Most experimental studies show evidence of the hold-up problem, but to an extent less severe than what standard theory predicts. Hold-up occurs at the individual level, but exhibits a less severe pattern than theoretical predictions at the aggregate level. A positive correlation is found between the investment stage decisions and subsequent bargaining behaviors. Social preferences largely influence the results in hold-up games. Remedies that enhance the effect of social preferences can effectively alleviate the hold-up problem. These fi ndings in the laboratory setting are also relevant in a real life hold-up situation e.g. in the standard-setting context, but differences in the specifi c institution and environment may require more variations in the experimental design.