ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)最新文献_第6页

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3348692

A. Ajorlou, A. Jadbabaie

{"title":"Sales-Based Rebate Design","authors":"A. Ajorlou, A. Jadbabaie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3348692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3348692","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study a family of sales-based rebate mechanisms as an effective tool to implement price discrimination across a population of buyers with correlated heterogeneous valuations on indivisible goods and services. In order to implement such sales-based rebate mechanisms, the seller charges each buyer a fixed price at the time of purchase contingent on a rebate that is a function of the ex post sales volume to be realized at the end of the sales period. The seller declares both a price and a menu of rebates as a function of sales. We show that, when there is a common component of uncertainty in consumers’ valuations (to which we refer as the quality of the product), such rebates enable a seller to effectively induce different expected net prices at different valuations. Importantly, this effective price discrimination over valuations is achieved keeping both the base price and the rebate uniform across all buyers. This uniformity of price and rebate across buyers is a key advantage of our proposed rebate mechanism, thereby providing a new mechanism for price discrimination in crowd-based markets. We use tools and techniques from game theory and variational optimization to provide insight into the economics of such mechanisms. In particular, we identify two mechanisms that are monotone functions of the sales volume that are easy to implement in practice and perform well when compared with the much more complex optimal mechanism. We provide a rigorous analysis of the optimal mechanism and discuss practical limitations in implementing the globally optimal design, further demonstrating the efficacy of our proposed monotone mechanisms. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This research was supported by a Vannevar Bush Fellowship from the Office of Secretary of State and Army Research Office [MURI Project W911NF-19-1-0217]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4691 .","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123143902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Feedback Stackelberg-Nash Equilibria in Mixed Leadership Games with an Application to Cooperative Advertising 混合领导博弈中的反馈Stackelberg-Nash均衡及其在合作广告中的应用

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3493916

A. Bensoussan, Shaokuan Chen, Anshuman Chutani, S. Sethi, Chi Chung Siu, S. Yam

引用次数: 13

Two Stage 2x2 Games with Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Heterogeneity 具有战略替代和战略异质性的两阶段2x2博弈

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-12-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3322176

Tarun Sabarwal, H. VuXuan

引用次数: 4

Analysing Group Contract Design Using a Lab and a Lab-in-The-Field Threshold Public Good Experiment 用实验室和现场阈值公共物品实验分析群体契约设计

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-11-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3289072

J. Bouma, T.T.B. Nguyen, Eline van der Heijden, J. Dijk

{"title":"Analysing Group Contract Design Using a Lab and a Lab-in-The-Field Threshold Public Good Experiment","authors":"J. Bouma, T.T.B. Nguyen, Eline van der Heijden, J. Dijk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289072","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (“the lab”) and a farm management training centre (“lab-in-the-field”). The treatments have two different distribution rules which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: average contributions and payoffs are higher in the lab under the ‘equal-payoff’ rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in the lab-in-the-field, possibly because contributions in the lab-in-the-field are much less efficient. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should not only consider farmer heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, but pay explicit attention to coordination problems as well.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133387887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring 不确定监测下声誉效应的鲁棒性

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-11-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3266235

Geyu Yang

引用次数: 1

Games With Coupled Populations: An Experiment in Continuous Time 具有耦合人口的游戏:连续时间实验

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-10-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3272936

V. Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Hans-Theo Normann

引用次数: 4

Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly: Multi-Market 伯特兰-埃奇沃斯双头垄断:多市场

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-10-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3304415

Jun Wang

{"title":"Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly: Multi-Market","authors":"Jun Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304415","url":null,"abstract":"Nowadays most firms compete for multiple separate markets as opposed to a single market. Extant IO works mainly focus on these firms' cooperative behavior, assuming away their capacity constraints and studying the effect of potential multi-market retaliation upon these firms' collusive incentive. With the assumption that the firms have a single capacity constraint, which applies to the multiple separate markets they compete for, this paper sheds light on the effects of the capacity constraint and demand linkages across different markets in the context of a non-cooperative duopoly model. Different from the classical single market capacity-constrained price competition theory, which has three regions divided by three different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints, two asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition has five regions divided by five different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints. An interesting result is that the firms do not always set higher price in the big or rich market than the small or poor market. When the capacities are endogenously determined, we find that the classical single market result (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) that the Cournot-Nash quantity is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot hold for the two asymmetric markets competition model. In sum, the results of the asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition may yield different implications on merger, price leadership, and collusive behavior.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130318085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Expected Utility Preferences versus Prospect Theory Preferences in Bargaining 讨价还价中的预期效用偏好与前景理论偏好

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3261837

Abhimanyu Khan

{"title":"Expected Utility Preferences versus Prospect Theory Preferences in Bargaining","authors":"Abhimanyu Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3261837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3261837","url":null,"abstract":"Are individuals always better off when their preferences can be represented by expected utility? I study this question in a bargaining game where individuals bargain over a pie of fixed size, and I contrast the share received in the long-run by expected utility maximisers with the share they would receive if their preferences were described by prospect theory preferences instead when, in either case, they bargain with expected utility maximisers. I present a necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to obtain a higher share of the pie if their preferences obey prospect theory rather than expected utility. I decompose the effect that the three features that characterise prospect theory preferences -- reference point dependence, loss-aversion and probability weighting -- have on the bargaining outcome, and show that loss-aversion does not have any effect on the outcome of the bargaining process, reference-point dependent preference confers an unambiguous advantage and probability weighting is unambiguously disadvantageous. \u0000This ties in with the main result outlined earlier: if the upward pull of reference point dependence is relatively stronger than the downward push of probability weighting, then individuals are better off with prospect theory preferences than with expected utility preferences, and vice-versa.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130596717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Multiplex Interdependent Durations Model 一个多重相互依赖的持续时间模型

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-09-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2923778

Zhongjian Lin, Ruixuan Liu

引用次数: 0

Contests with a Non-Convex Strategy Space 具有非凸策略空间的竞赛

ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-09-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3248730

Doron Klunover, J. Morgan

引用次数: 0