{"title":"不确定监测下声誉效应的鲁棒性","authors":"Geyu Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3266235","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals and the long-run player's strategy. Thus the long-run player may not have the ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed.","PeriodicalId":393761,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring\",\"authors\":\"Geyu Yang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3266235\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals and the long-run player's strategy. Thus the long-run player may not have the ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":393761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266235\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Game Theory & Bargaining Theory (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266235","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring
I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the short-run player is unsure about the monitoring structure. The uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct relationship between the distribution of signals and the long-run player's strategy. Thus the long-run player may not have the ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish commitment action from a bad action, the standard reputation results break down. I also provide sufficient conditions under which reputation effects on long-run player’s payoffs can be extended to the current framework. When the commitment payoff is the highest payoff he can get, the conditions can be relaxed.