ElenchosPub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0017
Diego E. Machuca
{"title":"Can the Skeptic Search for Truth?","authors":"Diego E. Machuca","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Sextus Empiricus associates the Pyrrhonian stance with the activity of inquiry or investigation. In this paper, I propose to examine the skeptic’s involvement in that activity because getting an accurate understanding of the nature and purpose of skeptical inquiry will make it possible to delineate some of the distinctive traits of Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy. I defend the minority view among specialists according to which (i) Sextus describes both the prospective Pyrrhonist and the full-fledged Pyrrhonist as inquirers into truth, and (ii) the full-fledged Pyrrhonist can, without inconsistency, engage in truth-directed inquiry.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"321 - 349"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67253685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-11-29DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0018
M. Havrda
{"title":"Five Views of definienda in Alexander’s Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14","authors":"M. Havrda","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14, Alexander presents a distinctly realist or essentialist view of the objects of definition, distinguished, on the one hand, from two types of realism rejected by Aristotle (definienda as separate forms and as particulars), and, on the other, from two types of conceptualism (non-essentialist and essentialist abstractivism) that probably belong within the Peripatetic tradition. The difference between Alexander’s view and essentialist abstractivism lies in his understanding of definienda not as the common concepts of things existing in the particulars, but as the common things conceived of as existing in the particulars. This paper offers a close reading of Quaest. 1.3, whose aim is to flesh out Alexander’s position vis-à-vis the objects of definition against the backdrop of the four rejected alternatives. The distinction between Alexander’s essentialism and the essentialist abstractivist notion of definienda is further explained in light of Quaest. 2.14. The amended Greek text of Quaest. 1.3 is appended with an English translation.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"351 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48966690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0009
Julien Devinant
{"title":"Aux limites de l’explication : le rôle de la sympathie chez Galien","authors":"Julien Devinant","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper aims to assess the epistemological value of the notion of sympathy in Galen’s thought. It first shows that Galen makes use of two different concepts of sympathy: the ambient concept, according to which the human body manifests a harmonious part-whole relationship, and the technical concept, with which one connects two pathologies on the basis of the fact that the cause of the ailment is elsewhere than where it surfaces. Neither of these sympathies constitutes in itself a causal explanation of reality. The first merely acknowledges an obvious interrelationship, the second acts as an epistemic tool to shift the focus of diagnosis away from the place where the condition manifests itself. However, the two concepts are not absolutely unrelated; and they come together when the sympathetic paradigm is used to understand the unifying action of the psychic and natural faculties. Very significantly, Galen then provisionally defines the cause as a power or faculty (δύναμις) not out of theoretical necessity but for practical reasons.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"117 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43356341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0004
C. Viano
{"title":"Introduction. La technê et la connaissance des causes : Aristote et le modèle de la médecine","authors":"C. Viano","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The theme of the specificity of medical causes in the Greco-Roman world is part of a wider research project on the notion of causality, the starting point of which is Aristotle and his seminal theorisation of the four causes. It therefore seemed useful to introduce this collection with a synthetic presentation of the Aristotelian conception of medicine, which is characterised by the knowledge of causes and represents a paradigm for the other arts and practical knowledge.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"13 - 22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46841079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0006
Véronique Boudon-Millot
{"title":"Aition et prophasis chez Hippocrate et Galien : deux mots pour une même cause ?","authors":"Véronique Boudon-Millot","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper deals with the two notions of aition or aitia and prophasis in the Greek medical texts and asks the question of whether these words are synonymous or not. Therefore, it explores their different meanings in different contexts both in the Hippocratic and in the Galenic corpus. It also investigates how Galen understands these two notions when he reads them in the Hippocratic treatises and how he explains them in his commentaries to Hippocrates, and in particular, if he gives the same meaning to these words in his own treatises or if he uses them in a different way.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"47 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46625529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0001
C. Levy
{"title":"In memoriam Anna Maria Ioppolo","authors":"C. Levy","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"1 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46532630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0010
J. Jirsa
{"title":"The Structure of Courage in the Laches, Meno and Protagoras","authors":"J. Jirsa","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a normatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim that virtue is knowledge. I will show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in fact knowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic addresses some of the problems posed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"143 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48429652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ElenchosPub Date : 2021-08-01DOI: 10.1515/elen-2021-0007
Catherine Darbo-Peschanski
{"title":"Medical and Philosophical Causality of Nutrition. About some Hippocratic Issues","authors":"Catherine Darbo-Peschanski","doi":"10.1515/elen-2021-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After a quick overview on the specification of the causal role of the powers or faculties (δυνάμεις) in nutrition, from the Hippocratic physicians to Galen, via Aristotle, the article defines the set of questions about this process that the Hippocratic physicians leave open. It then examines how Aristotle provides some sort of indirect physical and ethical answers, while Galen openly takes the side of reappropriating the central Stoic concept of oikeiôsis in a Platonist way.","PeriodicalId":38726,"journal":{"name":"Elenchos","volume":"42 1","pages":"67 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43514911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}