{"title":"Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability","authors":"Jonas-Sébastien Beaudry","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.3","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of disability is used across a variety of contexts to describe different phenomena and prescribe distinct behaviors or norms. The definitional challenge is not only that the category of “disabled people” is heterogenous, but also that what “disability” should denote, primarily or exclusively, is controversial among both theorists and practitioners. This conceptual breadth is far from innocuous: disability models have the potential to influence public policies, culture, and interactions by suggesting what rights, duties, and social expectations disability entails. Instead of examining those various definitions and arguing in favor of one, this chapter considers the unavoidable cultural polysemy of disability and contrasts the appeal and limitations of the main theoretical strategies to manage it. Some disability models deny that competing understandings of disability are valid, others seek to determine procedures through which disabilities will be defined and assessed, and still others conceptualize disability in a more culturally malleable way.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122022320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect","authors":"T. Hill","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.46","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes and illustrates ideals of appreciation and positive expressions of respect in personal relationships and then argues that these are distinct from beneficence, that they are aspects of a full recognition of human dignity, and that they have important general and special implications for relationships involving persons with disabilities. The chapter emphasizes that especially among family, friends, and caregivers, proper respect for persons calls for positive affirmations and being open to appreciate the good in others and their lives and that appreciating them is more than respecting them and caring for their comfort and happiness. Respect and appreciation for and by us, as persons with disabilities, requires confronting and changing cultural stigmas that undermine these morally important attitudes.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129756248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dignitarian Approach to Disability","authors":"L. Barclay","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.25","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that dignity is a useless concept that adds nothing to existing moral vocabulary: it is just a slogan. In this chapter, it is argued that only a concept of dignity can adequately explain a serious moral wrong inflicted on people with disabilities, namely their relegation to inferior social status. Far from being useless, it uniquely explains why fundamental changes to social relations are needed to secure justice. Moreover, dignity matters just as much for people with cognitive impairments as it does for everyone else. As such, fraught debates about the moral standing of people with severe cognitive impairment are largely irrelevant to explaining why they, too, should be treated as social equals.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128069590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment","authors":"J. Vorhaus","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.23","url":null,"abstract":"It is a familiar idea that showing respect for someone requires an effort to take account of how she sees the world. There is more than one way we might do this. Williams suggests that each person is owed an effort at identification, whereas Rawls remarks that “mutual respect is shown … in our willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view.” The author explores these ideas as they apply to people with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities (PMLD), whose condition raises special difficulties in the way of complying with the conduct described here. The author examines the ideas of having a point of view and identifying with the person whose point of view it is, and shows how much—and also how little—these views can contribute to a principle of respect that includes people with PMLD.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114148265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities","authors":"M. Crossley","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.43","url":null,"abstract":"Ordinarily, parents have broad authority to make medical decisions for their children. This chapter explores whether a child’s disability may sometimes provide a basis for deviating from the legal presumption of parental authority. Drawing on the concept of “horizontal identities” and highlighting the potential roles of disability bias and conflicts of interest, the chapter examines how several concerns may undermine justifications for parental authority to pursue elective medical interventions for their disabled children. After arguing that the presence of several of these concerns in a particular case justifies skepticism regarding the parents’ unfettered discretion to pursue elective interventions, the chapter suggests some ways that parental authority might be constrained or guided in such cases.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131335324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disability, Health, and Difference","authors":"J. Bickenbach","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.4","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins by distinguishing two political and philosophical understandings of disability: disability as a marker of a discrete and insular disadvantaged minority group and as a universal human experience, grounded in health and determined by environmental factors. Although approaches argue for the same social response to disability in the name of justice, they are incompatible on the issue of the conceptual relationship with health and the normative force of impairments. The chapter reviews current arguments for both positions—that one can be disabled and perfectly healthy and that impairments are “mere” differences—and find the argumentation both faulty and offering unstable and empirically unsupportable foundations for disability law and policy grounded in social justice.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121299013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Visible and the Invisible","authors":"Coreen Mcguire, H. Carel","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.14","url":null,"abstract":"The interplay between assistive technology and disability has received scant attention within disability studies, in part because of the assumption that any consideration of prosthetic technology must represent support of the medical model of disability. In this chapter, the authors challenge that assumption by demonstrating that an understanding of the lived experience of prosthetic use or nonuse can reveal crucial social influences that affect modification or rejection of prescribed technology. Invisible disabilities that are revealed primarily through the addition of body technology provide poignant examples of the crucial role of stigma in the decision to reject or modify technology to “pass” as “normal.” This chapter explores historical failures of assistive technology as failures to understand the subjective experiences of the disabled. By prioritizing a phenomenological understanding of nonuse, the authors explain the lack of fit between prosthetic designs and user experiences and advocate greater user involvement in healthcare design.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134026179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities","authors":"Lorella Terzi","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.28","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that a capability perspective on justice in education provides a normative framework that is sensitive to the educational interests of students with intellectual disabilities. It argues that a “threshold” approach, specified in terms of a threshold of capabilities for equal participation in society, is an appropriate principle for educational justice, when equal participation is a condition for the well-being of the child, both as a child and future adult. It also offers a rich and pluralistic account of citizenship, which, linked to a capability notion of well-being and flourishing, includes children with intellectual disabilities.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"230 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121979878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cognitive Disability and Moral Status","authors":"Alice Crary","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.40","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides a roadmap of ongoing conversations about cognitive disability and moral status. Its aim is to highlight the political stakes of these conversations for advocates for the cognitively disabled while at the same time bringing out how a fundamental point of divergence within the conversations has to do with what count as appropriate methods of ethics. The main divide is between thinkers who take ethical neutrality to be a regulative ideal for doing empirical justice to the lives of people with cognitive disabilities and those who reject this methodological precept as unduly restrictive. What results is a debate between, on the one hand, fans of various familiar forms of moral individualism and Kantian approaches in ethics and, on the other, a range of disability scholars and activists who implicitly or explicitly make use of philosophically more radical methods.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"357 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132931677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability","authors":"J. Scully","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the ways in which disabled people are subject to epistemic injustice. It starts by introducing how social epistemology models the creation of shared knowledge and then uses feminist epistemology to highlight the role of social and political power in producing epistemic privilege, exclusion, and oppression. The well-known concepts of testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustice are discussed in relation to disability, showing how these forms of injustice are frequently experienced within the lives of disabled people. In particular, disabled experience has features that distinguish it from the experiences of sexism and racism most commonly used as illustrations of epistemic injustice. The chapter ends by arguing that the potential for epistemic injustice poses unprecedented risks for disabled people in the current context, which could be minimized by recognizing that ignorance about disabled lives is not inevitable, but something that can and should be challenged.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114785401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}