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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability最新文献

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Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability 对增强和残疾的再思考
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190622879.013.34
M. Hall
{"title":"Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability","authors":"M. Hall","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190622879.013.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190622879.013.34","url":null,"abstract":"Transhumanist arguments in support of radical human enhancement are inimical to disability justice projects. Transhumanist thinkers, the strongest promoters of human enhancement, and fellow travelers who claim enhancement is a moral obligation, make arguments that rely on the denigration of disabled embodiment and lives. These arguments link disability with risk. The promotion of human enhancement is therefore open to significant disability critique despite transhumanism’s claims to allyship with disability justice activism. This chapter lays out such a disability critique of enhancement and further supports its claims by describing bioethics, and therefore transhumanism, as biopolitical in the sense Michel Foucault uses the term. Finally, this chapter develops an alternative vision of enhancement. This alternative vision poses a disability-inclusive future, accepts the risks of embodiment, and lays groundwork for a counterdiscourse of enhancement.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116709825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Interactions with Delusional Others 与妄想症患者的互动
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.9
J. Dohmen
{"title":"Interactions with Delusional Others","authors":"J. Dohmen","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers some epistemic aspects of interactions with those who are believed to be delusional. The chapter makes five main claims: first, for the day-to-day purposes of most individuals, it is helpful to understand delusions as extreme epistemic failures, failures that all are guilty of to some degree. Second, one should be cautious when attributing delusions to others because to call someone delusional can act to discredit them, and this can be especially dangerous when applied to members of oppressed groups. Third, delusional individuals can indeed be wronged by epistemic injustice. Fourth, epistemic responsibility for delusions needs to be extended beyond the individual holding delusional beliefs to the conditions that shape those beliefs. Finally, the virtue of epistemic humility offers several important epistemic benefits in interactions with delusional others.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130786077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Limiting Role of Respect 尊重的限制作用
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.22
A. Cureton
{"title":"The Limiting Role of Respect","authors":"A. Cureton","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.22","url":null,"abstract":"People with disabilities sometimes feel disrespected by some of the ways that well-meaning people regard and treat them. Respect for something is often thought to involve understanding and acknowledging it, holding it in high regard and engaging with it. But there is another aspect of our ordinary idea of respect, one that involves resistance, reluctance, and limitation. Negative respect presumptively requires us to recognize and acknowledge respectful limits on how we treat others. Other aspects of human dignity, such as benevolence, appreciation, and positive respect, can provide competing presumptions about how to affirm the dignity of persons. We should nonetheless take seriously a general theme that underlies many kinds of legitimate complaints that disabled and non-disabled people have, which is that even well-meaning people sometimes overstep bounds of respect in the otherwise good and virtuous ways that they regard and treat those with disabilities.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"219 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120854573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination 成本效益分析与残疾歧视
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.35
G. Bognar
{"title":"Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination","authors":"G. Bognar","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.35","url":null,"abstract":"Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is an analytical tool in health economics. One of the most important objections to it is that its use can lead to unjust discrimination against people with disabilities. This chapter evaluates this objection. It begins by clarifying its nature, then it examines some alleged forms of discrimination. It argues that they are either not cases of unjust discrimination, or they are based on misunderstandings of CEA. However, the chapter does point out that there is one case in which the use of CEA may disadvantage people with disabilities. It goes on to consider several proposals for explaining the wrongness of discrimination but argues that none of them accommodates this case. It concludes that the case should not be thought as a matter of unjust discrimination; rather, it should be thought of as raising an issue for justice in the allocation of health-care resources.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126420805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People 残疾人的神经技术与司法
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.33
S. Goering, E. Klein
{"title":"Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People","authors":"S. Goering, E. Klein","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.33","url":null,"abstract":"Neurotechnologies under development are often explicitly justified in terms of the advantages they will provide to disabled people. Thus, it would seem important to know what disabled people want from current and future iterations of these technologies and how they experience the functional barriers the technologies are meant to address. Ensuring that disabled people want what is designed requires attention to “end user” needs and values. The paradigmatic form of end user input in device design focuses on device acceptability, usually happens late in the development process, and is oriented to economic viability. But seeking out and taking seriously the perspectives of disabled people (potential end users) should be grounded at least in part by considerations of justice, including both distribution and recognition.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123009945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability 论道德地位与智力残疾
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.39
L. Carlson
{"title":"On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability","authors":"L. Carlson","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.39","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines conceptual, methodological, and epistemological questions in debates about the moral status of people with intellectual disabilities. It begins with a call for conceptual clarity and specificity when philosophizing about intellectual disability. The chapter then goes on to address the many references to nonhuman animals in discussions of intellectual disability and moral status. It considers what is at stake in drawing such comparisons and whether such arguments contribute to the dehumanization of people with intellectual disabilities. It concludes with an exploration of how critical, reparative, and generative philosophies of intellectual disability can move beyond current approaches to moral status.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134048204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Disabilities and Well-Being 残疾与福祉
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.11
Joshua Shepherd
{"title":"Disabilities and Well-Being","authors":"Joshua Shepherd","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues for a normative distinction between disabilities that are inherently negative with respect to well-being and disabilities that are inherently neutral. After clarifying terms, the author discusses recent arguments according to which possession of a disability is inherently neutral with respect to well-being. He notes that although these arguments are compelling, they are only intended to cover certain disabilities and, in fact, that there exists a broad class regarding which they do not apply. He then discusses two problem cases: locked-in syndrome and the minimally conscious state, and explains why these are cases in which possession of these disabilities makes one worse off overall. He argues that disabilities that significantly impair control over one’s situation tend to be inherently negative with respect to well-being; other disabilities do not. The upshot is that we must draw an important normative distinction between disabilities that undermine this kind of control and disabilities that do not.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121221166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reproductive Choice, in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency? 背景下的生殖选择:避免过量和不足?
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.21
R. Hull, T. Shakespeare
{"title":"Reproductive Choice, in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?","authors":"R. Hull, T. Shakespeare","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.21","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter on prenatal diagnosis explores the obligations on prospective parents to act morally. Specifically, the chapter explores the highly contextual and variable nature of reproductive decision making when looking at (and criticizing) parental choice with respect to prenatal testing and selective termination. The chapter engages both with those critics who argue that disability should not be grounds for selective termination of pregnancy, and those critics who argue that not only testing for significant medical conditions but also wider testing for non-medical traits might be permissible or useful. It is argued that decisions around prenatal diagnosis are private, difficult, and entail the balancing of different concerns around abortion, disability, and the good life. The chapter then explores the usefulness of the Aristotelian concepts of excess and deficiency, as a guide to navigating our way through these difficult decisions. The idea is considered that too much selection and too little selection might both potentially represent a failure to act as a virtuous prospective parent. The chapter concludes by exploring the value of seeking the Aristotelian “mean” between those concerns.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133340281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but . . . ” Reasoning? “你说你很快乐，但是……”“推理?
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.7
Jason Marsh
{"title":"What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but . . . ” Reasoning?","authors":"Jason Marsh","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.7","url":null,"abstract":"Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are happy are worrisome because they threaten everyone’s well-being and are further challenged by an argument from moral risk.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"12 36","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132846210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds 认知障碍和具体化的扩展思维
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.10
Zoe Drayson, Andrew R. Clark
{"title":"Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds","authors":"Zoe Drayson, Andrew R. Clark","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190622879.013.10","url":null,"abstract":"Many models of cognitive ability and disability rely on the idea of cognition as abstract reasoning processes implemented in the brain. Research in cognitive science, however, emphasizes the way that our cognitive skills are embodied in our more basic capacities for sensing and moving, and the way that tools in the external environment can extend the cognitive abilities of our brains. It is important to address the implications of research in embodied cognition and extended cognition for how we think about cognitive impairment and rehabilitation, how cognitive reserve mitigates neural impairment, and the distinction between medical and social models of disability.","PeriodicalId":386445,"journal":{"name":"The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133184913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
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