认知排斥、不公正和残疾

J. Scully
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引用次数: 7

摘要

本章探讨了残疾人在认知上受到不公正对待的方式。它首先介绍了社会认识论如何模拟共享知识的创造,然后使用女权主义认识论来强调社会和政治权力在产生知识特权、排斥和压迫方面的作用。我们讨论了与残疾有关的证言和解释性认知不公正的众所周知的概念,展示了这些形式的不公正是如何在残疾人的生活中经常经历的。特别是,残疾人的经历与性别歧视和种族主义的经历不同,这两种经历最常被用来说明认知上的不公正。本章最后提出,在当前背景下,潜在的认知不公正给残疾人带来了前所未有的风险,通过认识到对残疾人生活的无知并非不可避免,而是可以而且应该受到挑战,这种风险可以最小化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
This chapter examines the ways in which disabled people are subject to epistemic injustice. It starts by introducing how social epistemology models the creation of shared knowledge and then uses feminist epistemology to highlight the role of social and political power in producing epistemic privilege, exclusion, and oppression. The well-known concepts of testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustice are discussed in relation to disability, showing how these forms of injustice are frequently experienced within the lives of disabled people. In particular, disabled experience has features that distinguish it from the experiences of sexism and racism most commonly used as illustrations of epistemic injustice. The chapter ends by arguing that the potential for epistemic injustice poses unprecedented risks for disabled people in the current context, which could be minimized by recognizing that ignorance about disabled lives is not inevitable, but something that can and should be challenged.
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