残疾、健康和差异

J. Bickenbach
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本章首先区分对残疾的两种政治和哲学理解:残疾是一个离散和孤立的弱势少数群体的标志,残疾是一种普遍的人类经验,以健康为基础,由环境因素决定。虽然各种方法都主张以正义的名义对残疾作出同样的社会反应,但在与健康的概念关系和残疾的规范力量问题上,它们是不相容的。这一章回顾了两种立场的当前争论——一个人可以是完全健康的残疾人,而缺陷“仅仅”是差异——并发现这种争论是错误的,并且为基于社会正义的残疾法律和政策提供了不稳定的、经验上不支持的基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Disability, Health, and Difference
This chapter begins by distinguishing two political and philosophical understandings of disability: disability as a marker of a discrete and insular disadvantaged minority group and as a universal human experience, grounded in health and determined by environmental factors. Although approaches argue for the same social response to disability in the name of justice, they are incompatible on the issue of the conceptual relationship with health and the normative force of impairments. The chapter reviews current arguments for both positions—that one can be disabled and perfectly healthy and that impairments are “mere” differences—and find the argumentation both faulty and offering unstable and empirically unsupportable foundations for disability law and policy grounded in social justice.
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