ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Umbrella Effects and the Ubiquity of Damage Resulting from Competition Law Violations","authors":"F. Maier-Rigaud","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPU027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPU027","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the ubiquity of damage resulting from competition law violations. Umbrella pricing is considered but one instance of quantifiable damage of potentially substantial magnitude occurring outside the vertical chain typically considered the relevant locus of damage resulting from competition law infringements. One of the reasons for this restrictive approach are the general tort principles of causality and foreseeability. This article suggests that, if interpreted too narrowly, the use of these principles as claims regulators is threatening the very policy goal of full compensation for any individual harmed. A wider interpretation of these general tort principles is proposed that would allow claims to be regulated by the merits of the evidence presented. This would render private enforcement in line with the more economic approach followed in the public enforcement of competition law.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129492422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optional Regulation of Standard Contract Terms","authors":"Florian Möslein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2397761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2397761","url":null,"abstract":"Optional regulation of standard contract terms gives rise to several functional pecularities and to a number of difficult systematic questions. More specifically, the present chapter deals with the draft rules on standard contract terms in the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL). Rather than commenting these rules in sub-stance, however, its focus is precisely on these functional questions. We proceed in three steps, starting with an overview of the existing European rules on standard con-tract terms, including the draft provisions of the CESL. In a second step, we examine whether the CESL rules themselves could potentially become subject of control under (national) standard contract terms legislation, given that these rules are provided in a standard format, and that they are adopted by the contracting parties’ opt-in. Thirdly and finally, we briefly analyse the mode of function of the CESL’s own rules on standard contract terms. These three steps will show that according to the European legislator’s design of the opt-in mechanism, two different optional contract law regimes operate within the very same national legal system. This two-foldedness implies ambiguities, namely because the control of standard terms strongly interacts with substantial rules of contract law. This interaction is a necessary, unavoidable consequence of the embeddedness of the optional regime in national contract law.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"22 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126485149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Derivatives. Regulation and Disputes in the Italian Legal Order","authors":"Mirella Pellegrini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2392764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2392764","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, the main features of over-the-counter derivatives are examined together with the rules applicable in case of so-called negotiation “per conto altrui” (that means as a simple seller of financial instrument on behalf of the issuer or owner). In this regard, the questions and following litigation on trading in derivatives concerned essentially the operations in direct counterpart not traded on regulated markets that have been characterized by evident problems of illiquidity and opacity. As a consequence, the reference to the behavioral norms that the legal system requires to intermediary in the execution of investment services and that have been subject to revision as a result of the transposition of MiFID directive. In the attempt to identify remedies that protect the investor from errors in risk assessment assumed on trading these financial instruments (remedies able to prevent a misuse of derivatives and able to come beyond the information transparency) it draws to the attention the behavioral finance and the probabilistic risk assessment.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133519144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strategic Interaction vs. Regulatory Compliance Among Regulated Utilities: The Swedish Water Sector","authors":"E. Lundin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2401747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2401747","url":null,"abstract":"This study provides the first empirical test of strategic interactions in the pricing decisions of regulated utilities. Since publicly owned water utilities in Sweden are governed by a cost-of-service regulation, prices in neighboring municipalities should not affect the own price other than through spatially correlated cost factors. In contrast, spatial dependence is pronounced. This behavior can be explained in terms of an informal yardstick competition: When consumers use neighboring utilities' prices as benchmarks for costs or as behaviorally based reference prices, utilities will face the risk of consumer complaints and successive regulatory reviews if deviating too much from neighbors' prices.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115645453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Universal Service Policies in Europe & Latam: Evidence on Bridging the Divide in Rural Areas","authors":"J. Castellano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2509896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2509896","url":null,"abstract":"Broadband access is a key factor for economic and social development. However, providing broadband to rural areas is not attractive to private telecommunications operators due its low or zero investment return. To deal with broadband provision in rural areas, different governance systems based on private and public cooperation have appeared. This paper not only identifies and defines public and private cooperation models but also assesses their impact on overcoming the digital divide in rural areas. The results show that public ownership infrastructure under private management policy has had positive effects on reducing the broadband digital divide and being applied to areas with higher digital divide; subsides to private operators providers only positive effects on reducing broadband digital divide; but public infrastructure with public management programs did not. The results, obtained using quasi-experimental methods, suggest the importance of incentives and control mechanisms in broadband universal service provision plans.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126936863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The New EU Economic Governance: Vertical and Horizontal Power Shifts","authors":"F. Naert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2363884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2363884","url":null,"abstract":"The euro crisis made visible the omitted stage in the European integration process. The EU jumped from the common market straight to the monetary union, neglecting the formation of the economic union. The new EU economic governance is a combination of a vertical shift of competences, i.e. from one level of government to another level, and a horizontal shift of powers and competences, i.e. from elected governments to unelected government bodies entrusted with (parts of) government policies, from discretionary policy towards rules. In both types there is a risk of accountability problems, although of a different kind.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the new EU economic governance within the conceptual framework of these vertical and horizontal shifts. This two-dimensional approach offers a better analytical tool than the more traditional one-dimensional fiscal federalism approach. In the first part of the paper the focus is on the policy domains that are the objects in the shifting process. Budgetary policy mainly is at stake, but also banking regulation and monetary policy are partly involved. The second part of the paper deals with the relevant aspects of the theories on the division of powers along vertical and horizontal lines. The fiscal federalism approach to vertical separation and the time consistency theory on the horizontal distribution of power are briefly exposed. In the third part the power shifts occurring within the new EU economic governance are presented and defined in terms of our framework of vertical and horizontal power shifts. Finally the accountability problems of these shifts are analyzed.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125112945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Achieving a Roaming Free Europe","authors":"T. Shortall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2833232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2833232","url":null,"abstract":"European roaming rates are not set by market forces because when a competitive market did not evolve in Europe, European legislators stepped in to set rates by legislative fiat. This paper argues that legislators’ tendency to set rates cautiously led to high wholesale prices that undermined smaller operators’ ability to put roaming-free offers into the market. Operators with larger footprints are less constrained by wholesale pricing since more roaming traffic is kept on-net. In this context, the outright abolition of retail roaming charges without wholesale backstops bestows a competitive advantage on larger operators. The paper notes the experience of the US where roaming persists for all operators but retail customers can avoid roaming charges subject to significant cut off limits. The effective wholesale roaming rate in the US is estimated at just above 1 eurocent per minute for voice while rates are observable for national roaming in Europe of 1 eurocent for voice, and 0.2 eurocent for data and 0.2 eurocent for SMS events. It is proposed that such rates would be appropriate for wholesale roaming in Europe and that these rates would facilitate pan-EU retail offers such as those observable in the US. Unlike the US, European operators charge each other termination rates to carry calls from other networks. This creates another barrier to pan-EU retail offers and creates tensions (and transfers) from low cost termination markets to high cost termination markets. This inconsistency of approach must be addressed if the elimination of intra-EU roaming is to be possible. It is suggested that low but consistent termination rates would be required to go with the low wholesale roaming rates and that these rates would need the speed and consistency of application delivered through a Regulation. The extension of retail caps to international calls and SMS is unwarranted and may have adverse effects on network valuation. Such a major policy initiative would benefit from a public consultation.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116615182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Global Financial Crisis & Asset-Backed Securitization Regulatory Responses Thereto in the EU and the United States","authors":"Troy C. Fuhriman","doi":"10.17248/KNULAW..43.201308.299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17248/KNULAW..43.201308.299","url":null,"abstract":"In her 2009 article in the Cornell International Law Journal, Georgette Chapman Phillips posits that in order for a debt market in any country to function, one must find the following factors underpinning such market: (ⅰ) adequate legal protections, (ⅱ) strong economic foundations and (ⅲ) a low degree of political risk. Phillips discusses general legal protections, such as strong foreclosure laws, the need for stable inflation and real estate values as underpinnings of economic stability and the need for government to respect private property and contract rights. Her three-pronged focus on legal, economic and political fundamentals serves as the basis for analyzing recent and ongoing regulatory efforts in developed countries that are struggling with the important work of re-establishing stable and useful securitization markets. Presently, the United States and the European Union (“EU”) are at the forefront of financial market re regulation in the wake of the most recent banking, financial and economic crisis. Since 2007, they, like those regulators in various other jurisdictions around the world, have instituted new regulations on asset-backed securities (“ABS”). Such regulations have been part of a comprehensive, yet fairly disjointed, re-regulation of domestic and international financial markets, including previously lightly regulated areas. While their asset backed securitization (“securitization”) regulations have had some positive impact on the functionality of the debt markets in the United States, Europe and beyond, they (1) have thus far failed to provide a coherent legal framework for market participants to rely upon and have (2) increased the political risk associated with involvement in the debt markets. The disjointed and improperly targeted nature of regulatory efforts thus far are evident in the primary areas of securitization regulation thus far, the so called “skin in the game” regulations and transparency regulations. In both areas, the United States and the EU have started with similar objectives but are in the process of instituting regulatory regimes that fail to be properly coordinated within their own jurisdictions and across jurisdictions as well. Part of the reasons for this is that regulators, in a bit of panic or maybe opportunism, started the regulatory process before they could fully understand what they were regulating or the true problems they were trying to deal with. As regulators and market participants around the world endeavor to restart ABS markets or even launch them for the first time, they need to do a better job of understanding the institutions and markets they are seeking to regulate. Additionally, they need to acknowledge that no regulations can make up for prudent underwriting and thorough due diligence. No amount of regulation can force such activities to take place.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114522180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Gatekeeper Liability: A Response to the Financial Crisis","authors":"G. Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2317213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317213","url":null,"abstract":"The first financial crisis, triggered by the burst of the U.S. housing bubble, has many causes. One such cause is the failure of gatekeepers, i.e. accounting firms and rating agencies. Consequently lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic tightened the regulatory regimes for accountants and rating agencies, following the same path they had walked earlier, in response to financial scandals such as the one involving Enron and Worldcom. However, the liability rules for these institutions remained untouched once again so that accountants and rating agencies continue to work under skewed liability regimes. Incentives to err on the side of customers remain strong and unbalanced by adequate liability towards third parties. This article explores legislative strategies for a more symmetrical liability regime. In doing so, it takes a critical view of the recent EU Regulation No. 462/2013.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133859988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Sector Reform after the Crisis: Has Anything Happened?","authors":"Alexander Schäfer, I. Schnabel, Beatrice Weder di Mauro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2274044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2274044","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the reaction of stock returns and CDS spreads of banks from Europe and the United States to four major regulatory reforms in the aftermath of the subprime crisis, employing an event study analysis. In contrast to the public perception that nothing has happened, we find that financial markets indeed reacted to the structural reforms enacted at the national level. All reforms succeeded in reducing bail-out expectations, especially for systemic banks. However, banks’ profitability was also affected, showing up in lower equity returns. The strongest effects were found for the Dodd-Frank Act (especially the Volcker rule), whereas market reactions to the German restructuring law were small.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131157884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}