看门人责任:对金融危机的回应

G. Wagner
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引用次数: 2

摘要

由美国房地产泡沫破裂引发的第一次金融危机有很多原因。其中一个原因是看门人的失败,即会计师事务所和评级机构。因此,大西洋两岸的立法者都收紧了对会计师和评级机构的监管制度,走上了他们早些时候走过的道路,以应对涉及安然(Enron)和世通(Worldcom)等金融丑闻。然而,这些机构的责任规则再次保持不变,因此会计师和评级机构继续在扭曲的责任制度下工作。站在客户一边犯错的动机仍然很强,而且由于对第三方承担了足够的责任而不平衡。本文探讨了更为对称的责任制度的立法策略。在此过程中,它对最近的欧盟第462/2013号法规进行了批判。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Gatekeeper Liability: A Response to the Financial Crisis
The first financial crisis, triggered by the burst of the U.S. housing bubble, has many causes. One such cause is the failure of gatekeepers, i.e. accounting firms and rating agencies. Consequently lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic tightened the regulatory regimes for accountants and rating agencies, following the same path they had walked earlier, in response to financial scandals such as the one involving Enron and Worldcom. However, the liability rules for these institutions remained untouched once again so that accountants and rating agencies continue to work under skewed liability regimes. Incentives to err on the side of customers remain strong and unbalanced by adequate liability towards third parties. This article explores legislative strategies for a more symmetrical liability regime. In doing so, it takes a critical view of the recent EU Regulation No. 462/2013.
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