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ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)最新文献

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Regulation, Resource Reallocation and Productivity Growth 监管、资源再配置与生产率增长
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-21 DOI: 10.6027/9789289330282-4-en
J. Arnold, G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta
{"title":"Regulation, Resource Reallocation and Productivity Growth","authors":"J. Arnold, G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta","doi":"10.6027/9789289330282-4-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6027/9789289330282-4-en","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we review theory and evidence on the links between product market regulations that curb competitive pressures, the efficiency of resource allocation and productivity growth. We show that product market regulations differ across countries and industries and have evolved differently over time. We argue that differences in regulation have played an important role in driving resource allocation and productivity outcomes. Countries and industries where direct and indirect regulatory burdens are lighter have generally experienced the highest GDP per capita and productivity growth rates. Moreover, where regulatory burdens are lighter, the reallocation of resources towards the highest-productivity firms is stronger. The impacts of inappropriate regulations on aggregate and firm-level productivity performance are estimated to be quantitatively important and thus, reforming such regulations can provide a significant boost to potential growth in OECD economies.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127702417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 67
Governing the Internet, Towards Common Regulation 管治互联网，迈向共同规管
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2277208
C. Alonso
{"title":"Governing the Internet, Towards Common Regulation","authors":"C. Alonso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2277208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2277208","url":null,"abstract":"The internet and new technologies in general are increasingly important tools for the political, social and economic life of our societies. Internet management is the result of the work of various organisations that, in many cases, are dominated by private interests far removed from the target community and public interest. This article aims to provide an overview of the regulatory scenario for the internet, as well as identify the key aspects in this debate. In this respect, and lacking a global solution, some legislative responses can be formulated and, at a practical level, technical regulation envisaged based on the parameters underlining the management of affairs of public interest, i.e. objectivity, transparency and participation, whose introduction falls to institutions within a common regulatory framework.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127217410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulated Prices and Real Options 管制价格和实物期权
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-11-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1825109
G. Guthrie
{"title":"Regulated Prices and Real Options","authors":"G. Guthrie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1825109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825109","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows how the cash flows received by an unregulated firm operating in a workably competitive market can be replicated for a regulated firm. The only change to standard regulatory practice is that each time the regulated firm invests, the amount added to its rate base is the product of its capital expenditure and a multiplier, greater than one, that captures the reduction in value of the unregulated firm's growth options that occurs whenever the firm invests. The regulated firm is allowed to earn a rate of return equal to its weighted-average cost of capital, applied to this rate base. Four possible approaches to estimating the size of the multiplier are presented, each based on an established real-options investment model.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130643933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
How to and How Not to Introduce Competition Law and Policy in Transitional and Developing Economies 在转型期和发展中经济体如何引入和不引入竞争法律和政策
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-10-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1951609
F. Emmert
{"title":"How to and How Not to Introduce Competition Law and Policy in Transitional and Developing Economies","authors":"F. Emmert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1951609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1951609","url":null,"abstract":"The paper first summarizes the benefits of competition, i.e. why competitive markets are more efficient than oligopolistic or monopolistic markets, and the threats to competitive markets from cartels, concentration, and government interference. In the main part, the paper presents the key components of effective competition oversight, in particular for countries seeking to reform their competition laws and agencies and those planning for the first time to introduce meaningful competition oversight. Finally, the paper advocates that transitional and developing countries should look to the European Union for the most advanced model of robust competition oversight and avoid costly and time consuming experiments with inferior alternatives. In an annex, the paper provides links to legislative materials of countries that have modernized their competition laws since 1990.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128527268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Roaming III: Regulating International Mobile Roaming Charges to 2022 漫游III:调整国际移动漫游费至2022年
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1883244
E. Sutherland
{"title":"Roaming III: Regulating International Mobile Roaming Charges to 2022","authors":"E. Sutherland","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1883244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1883244","url":null,"abstract":"The European Commission has proposed its third Roaming Regulation to cap the prices charged for international mobile roaming, to ensure transparency of prices and to eliminate the risk of \"bill shock\". The present proposal would come into force in 2012 and extends until 2022. It adds a price cap for data roaming and reduces the existing caps on voice and SMS. It proposes structural changes to allow MVNOs to buy wholesale IMR charges independently and to separate the purchase of IMR from domestic services on the domestic market. The proposal now goes to the European Parliament and Council for debate.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133052875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Impact of Market Fragmentation on European Stock Exchanges 市场分割对欧洲证券交易所的影响
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1997419
Monica Gentile, Simone Fioravanti
{"title":"The Impact of Market Fragmentation on European Stock Exchanges","authors":"Monica Gentile, Simone Fioravanti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1997419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1997419","url":null,"abstract":"MiFID has fostered competition between stock exchanges and alternative trading systems by removing the possibility for EU Member States to establish that equities must be traded only on regulated markets (so-called concentration rule). This paper empirically measures how market fragmentation is affecting the quality of blue chip’s trading on European regulated markets. Our study evaluates the impact of fragmentation on liquidity, on information efficiency and on the price discovery process. We test the robustness of our results by applying a variety of empirical approaches. Our main findings are that fragmentation increases liquidity, but it reduces market efficiency. Moreover, primary exchanges tend to lose their leading role in the price discovery process of fragmented stocks. We show that our results are in line with some regulatory concerns which are leading to the review of MiFID.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"293 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115973935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Regulating Different Trading Venues – The European Experience Based on MIFID 监管不同的交易场所——基于MIFID的欧洲经验
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1930170
K. Sørensen, Nis Jul Clausen
{"title":"Regulating Different Trading Venues – The European Experience Based on MIFID","authors":"K. Sørensen, Nis Jul Clausen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1930170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930170","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of alternative trading systems has created a dual system, with heavily regulated exchanges on the one hand, and almost unregulated alternative trading systems on the other hand. The European Union has responded to this development by enacting Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (MiFID). Evidence has shown that the MiFID regulation has increased competition between trading venues within Europe and substantially lowered the costs of trading. This paper analyses to what extent MiFID actually has created a level playing field between the different trading venues and to what extent investors are adequately protected when trading on different venues.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116999484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
De-Merger Regimes in Europe - Are National Deconcentration Powers an Appropriate Tool for Enhancing Competition in the EU? 欧洲的去合并制度——国家权力分散是促进欧盟竞争的适当工具吗?
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-12 DOI: 10.1093/JECLAP/LPR017
Stefan Thomas
{"title":"De-Merger Regimes in Europe - Are National Deconcentration Powers an Appropriate Tool for Enhancing Competition in the EU?","authors":"Stefan Thomas","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPR017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPR017","url":null,"abstract":"Bigness as such is not an offence in the EU. Nonetheless, in several EU- and Non-EU-jurisdictions there exist powers to order the breaking up of large firms if this is deemed necessary to remedy adverse effects on competition even if they were not created by an unlawful merger or by abusive behaviour of a dominant firm. This raises the question whether such national deconcentration laws are actually an appropriate antitrust tool. The effectiveness of such provisions is highly questionable. Potential social benefits must be balanced with its expected social costs. Market design through de-merger orders might seem a compelling idea but runs the risk of eliminating efficiencies and deterring growth and innovation. Above that, US experience tells us that deconcentration proceedings are cumbersome and protracted. Moreover, it is far from clear whether such “de-merger” laws are in compliance with EU primary law. National powers to deconcentrate large firms undermine the Commission’s jurisdiction under the European Merger Regulation and contravene the European competition law order as implemented by the EU. In light of the foregoing, the German lawmaker has finally rejected in 2011 the idea to create such a deconcentration regime. The present article analyses these legal end economic issues and provides an overview on several national de-merger regimes within and outside of the EU.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130687962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Evaluation of the Regulations of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States and the European Community 美国和欧共体信用评级机构法规的评价
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-04-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1803132
Maria Barducci, Timo Fest
{"title":"Evaluation of the Regulations of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States and the European Community","authors":"Maria Barducci, Timo Fest","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1803132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1803132","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on the National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) and Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) operating in Europe before and after the latest reforms. Particular attention is given to Section 15E(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, IOSCO’s Code of Conduct fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies and Annex I of the European Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies. Within these reforms it is possible to identify and highlight three common objectives: the increase of competition amongst rating agencies, the increase of transparency, and the prevention of conflict of interest. This study begins with an analysis of the regulative history as regards NRSROs before the financial collapse of Enron and WorldCom analyzing the deficiencies in the rating system that lead to the need for revision of existing regulations. This background sets the stage for an explanation of how recent regulations set out to achieve their stated objectives by creating an efficient means of registration and surveillance. These instruments serve to increase transparency not only among rating agencies but also for investors’ desideratum to be well informed. Finally, we evaluate the change that these regulations make in the payment system as well as in the actions of participants in the agencies, the results that will be achieved because of the creation of provisions and rules that aim to establish an impartial rating agent and system.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124309931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited – The European Commission’s Proposal COM(2010) 748 final – 布鲁塞尔I和仲裁重审-欧盟委员会提案COM(2010) 748 final -
ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-03-28 DOI: 10.1628/003372511796351313
M. Illmer
{"title":"Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited – The European Commission’s Proposal COM(2010) 748 final –","authors":"M. Illmer","doi":"10.1628/003372511796351313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/003372511796351313","url":null,"abstract":"In December 2010, the European Commission presented its long-awaited proposal for a reformed Brussels I Regulation. One of the cornerstones of the proposal is the interface between the Regulation and arbitration. In the first part, the article sets out the development of the exclusion of arbitration from the Regulation's scope up to the West Tankers and National Navigation cases. In the second, main part, the author, who is a member of the Commission's Expert Group on the arbitration interface, provides a detailed account and evaluation of the new lis pendens-mechanism established by the Commission proposal in order to effectively prevent parallel proceedings in the arbitration context. In the third, final part, the author scrutinizes the Commission proposal against the background of the Commission's Impact Assessment before concluding with a short resume.This article is published in this Research Paper Series with the permission of the rights owner, Mohr Siebeck. Full-text Rabel Journal articles are available via pay-per-view or subscription at IngentaConnect, a provider of digital journals on the Internet.","PeriodicalId":382921,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (European) (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128210329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
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